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Sommaire 
Notre thèse apporte des éclairages nouveaux sur le rôle que joue le contexte socioculturel-i.e., 
les us et coutumes- dans les processus de prise de décisions microéèonomiques. Le premier chapitre 
''s'interresse à la problématique émancipation socioéconomique des femmes via la microfinance dans 
des environnement où elles font face à des limitations et des complications humaines. Le deuxième 
chapitre porte une attention particulière à la difficile modernisation des activités agricoles en Afrique 
Subsaha.:rienne (ASS) où certaines pratiques sociales- comme la solidarité africaine- i~citent les 
.' \ . 
individus à mettre de côté leurs intérêts pour le bien des autres. Dans un troisième chapitre, notre 
thèse contribue à la littérature sur les retours à l'éducation en Afrique en estimant les taux de 
rendement privés à l'éducation au Cameroun. 
De façon plus précise, le premier chapitre vise à démontrer que la difficile émancipation so-
cioéconomique de la plupart des femmes vivant dans les pays èù de nombreuses institutions de 
microfinanfe (MFIs) les ciblent, serait le résultat d'une incapacité des MFIs à mettre en place des 
réseaux d'entreprèneures capables de surmonter les obstacles socioculturels)qui limitent l'accès 
femmes aux activités économiques les plus lucratives dans le secteur informel. Pour ce faire, nous 
construisons un modèle de théorie de jeux non coopératifs dans lequel le choix par une entrepre-
neure du type d'activité économique qu'elle projette d'opérer informellement ainsi que sa taille 
sont conjointement déterminés par: (i) la quantité de capital qu'elle a empruntée à une MFI de 
son choix; (H) sa capacité à atténuer les coûts de transaction qui limitent son accès à des activités 
économiquement plus rentables. Dans notre environnement, l'opération d'une activité économique 
informelle plus lucrative nécessite que l'entrepreneure établisse des liens avec ses consoeurs opérant 
le même type d'activité qu'elle. Une telle initiative leur permet de mobiliser des ressources collec-
tives capables de toutes les aider à surmonter les obstacles créés par les normes .sociales régissant 
affaires dans le secteur informel et qui par conséquent freinent leur émancipation. Nombreuses 
seront les entrepreneures membres d'un tel réseau, plus à même sera ce dernier de garantir le suc-
cès des fem~es. opérant des activités informelles plus lucratives. Une caract~ristique essentielle 
de l'environnement entourant l'entrepreneuriat des femmes dans l'économie informelle est par con-
séquent la complémentarité de leurs stratégies d'affaires respectives: la décision d'une entrepreneure 
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de s'orienter vers la gamme d'activités hautement productives augmente le gain marginal d'autres 
entrepreneures qui prennent la même décision qu'elle. Nous démontrons qu'en absence d'un mé-
canisme de coordination pouvant inciter les femmes à établir des liens au sein d'un tel réseau, le 
jeu non coopératif que celles-ci jouent admet deux équilibres de Nash en stratégies pures : un 
équilibre de hauts revenus où toutes les entrepreneures opèrent des activités informelles à haute 
productivité, et un équilibre de bas revenus où elles demeurent toutes confinées dans des activités à 
. faible rentabilité, nonobstant l'accès non contraint au crédit d'affaire. L'obtention de l'équilibre de 
faibles revenus malgré la facilitation de l'accès des femmes au crédit par les MFls pourrait signifier 
qu'en assistant financièrement les entrepreneures, la microfinance n'a pas été capable d'agir comme 
un mécanisme de coordination nécessaire à l'émergence de vastes réseaux d'entrepreneures opérant 
des.activités à haute productivité. Nous affirmons que soumettre l'accès des femmes au crédit abor-
da.!:>le à leur adoption d'activités plus lucratives agira comme un~ condition suffisante pour que leur 
émancipation s'opère au moyen de la microfinance. Ceci parce qu'une telle conditionnalité pourrait 
induire l'émergence de réseaux d'entrepreneures suffisamment vastes pour atténuer l'importance 
des us et coutumes qui occasionnent des coûts supplémentaire lors d'opération d'activités plus 
lucratives dans le secteur informel lorsqu'on est une femme. 
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous proposons un modèle offrant une nouvelle lecture des· piètres 
performances agricoles de l'ASS, région où l'offre de produits agricoles contraint très souvent la 
demande. Dans notre modèle, les agents économiques sont de petits exploitants agricoles (ou fer-
miers) qui doivent constituer une épargne afinde financer l'achat d'un niveau recommandé d'engrais 
, 
nécessaire à l'augmentation de la productivité agricole. Pour constituer cette épargne, ces fermiers 
doivent recourir aux revenus issus des récoltes de la saison précédente. Nous supposons cependant 
qu'en raison de la présence des traditions de solidarité et de partage qui obligent les individus inno-
vateurs à se départir de leurs avoirs d'une façon improductive, un petit exploitant agricole agissant 
en autarcie pourrait avoir du mal à économiser en vue de la prochaine saison d'ensemencement (en-
viron quatre à six mois d'attente), à moins qu'un un nombre suffisamment élevé de fermiers ne fasse 
pareil. Un fermier qui anticipe une telle situation peut donc renoncer à se constituer une épargne et 
choisir plutôt de partager ses revenus avec les autres membres de sa communauté, tel que le veulent 
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les pratiques sociales en vigueur dans son univers. Plus nombreux seront les autres fermiers qui 
se distanceraient de cette tradition en s'engageant fermement à constituer une épargne productive, 
plus vraisemblable sera la possibilité qu'un fermier qui épargne en autarcie puisse protèger cette 
épargne contre la prédation sociale. Conséquement donc, la décision d'un fermier de constituer une 
épargne augmente le gain marginal d'autres fermiers qui choisissent d'épargner. Nous démontrons 
que le jeu non coopératif auquel se livrent ces fermiers admet deux équilibres de Nash en stratégies 
pures: un équilibre de modernisation où tous les fermiers choisissent d'épargner afin de financer 
l'achat d'engrais, et un équilibre traditionnel (ou de statut quo) dans lequel ils choisissent tous 
de ne pas épargner, et renoncent ainsi aux avantages économiques procurés par la modernisation 
des activités agricoles. L'obtention de l'équilibre de statut quo en dépit du fait que l'ASS réunit 
l'ensemble des conditions identifiées par les théoriciens néo-classiques (ou néo-Boserupiens) comme 
étant nécessaires et suffisantes pour l'introduction des innovations en agriculture (notamment des 
sols très pauvres et des opportunités d'affaire) suggère que ces conditions sont uniquement néces-
saires dans des environnements dominés par des institutions informelles comme la solidarité. Pour 
devenir suffisant, nous suggérons que cet ensemble de conditions comprenne la création d'une tech-
nologie d'épargne capable d'atténuer les effets de la prédation sociale sur la décision du fermier de 
constituer une épargne productive. 
Une grande emphase été mise sur la nécessité d'augmenter le niveau du capit91 humain par le 
biais de la vulgarisation de l'éducation, afin de soutenir une croissance économique plus' forte en 
Afrique. Cette emphase a généré un intérêt sans cesse renouvelé pour l'estimations des taux de 
rendement privés à l'éducation (TDRE) en Afrique, afin de comprendre les motivations et les con-
traintes auxquelles les individus font face dans leur analyse coüts-bénéfices des investissements en 
éducation et d'être ainsi en mesure d'informer les décisionnaires. Bien qu'il existe actuellement une 
vaste littérature empirique sur l'analyse des taux de rendement à l'éducation (voir, par exemple, 
Psacharopoulos,1994; Psacharoupoulos et Patrinos ,2002), la plupart des publications concernant 
l'Afrique reposaient jusqu'à un passé très récent, sur des enquêtes non représentatives de la pop-
ulation cible. Comme conséquence, les résultats issues de telles analyses ne pouvaient en aucune 
façon être généralisés à la population toute entière. Dans le troisième chapitre de notre thèse, nous 
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prenons en compte cette limite tout en contribuant à la littérature sur les retours à l'éducation en 
Afrique. Pour conduire notre analyse, nous nous servons de l'enquête sur les conditions de vie des 
ménages, réalisée en· 2001par l'institut national de la statistique du Cameroun auprès de 20,000 
ménages. Nous comparons les TDRE des individus ayant fréquenté un cycle d'éducation sans y 
avoir gradué à ceux de personnes qui ont reçu un diplôme dudit cycle d'éducation. Nous permettons 
également aux individus d'être choisis de manière endogène dans le secteur informel, le secteur privé 
formel ainsi que dans le secteur public. Comme résultats probants, ·nous démontrons que lesTDRE 
sont fortement convexes et élevés dans tous les secteurs d'activité. De plus, nos résultats indiquent 
que ceux qui n'ont pas reçu de diplôme de l'école primaire n'engrangent aucun retour à l'éducation 
comparés à ceux qui ne sont jamais allés à l'école. Nous montrons aussi que les individus ayant reçu 
un diplôme d'un cycle d'éducation ont des rendements à l'éducation statistiquement signifi~atifs 
et plus élevés que ceux qui n'ont pas de diplôme dudit cycle. Nous trouvons également que les 
personnes qui ont suivi une formation professionnelle enregistrent des retours à l'éducation plus 
élevés en traVaillant dans le secteur informel qu'ailleurs. Étant donné que nos estimations sont 
robustes à l'utilisation des informations statistiques pondérées (par les poids d'échantillonnages), 
nous pouvons donc argumenter qu'elles restent valables pour la population camerounaise toute en-
tière. Nos résultats militent en faveur d'une approche intégrée de l'éducation dans laquelle l'accent 
est mis non seulement sur la scolarisation mais aussi sur la graduation de sorte que beaucoup plus 
d'.élèves puissent atteindre l'université et y graduer. Notre ~tude milite également en faveur d'un 
accroisse~ent des budgets alloués à l'éducation à tous les niveaux pour que le nombre et à la qualité 
de diplômés universitaires africains puissent augment~l'. (Classification JEL : D13, J16, 014, C72, 
013,Q12, 121, J3l). 
Mots clés: microfinance, femmes; esprit d'entreprise, jeux super modulaires, Afrique Subsahari-
enne, modernisation agricole, adoption de fertilisants, Cameroun, rendements, éducation, secteurs 
d'activité. 
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Summary 
Our dissertation provides behavioural economics literature with new theorizations of how social 
" 
context matters a great deal in decision-making and the decision-making process itself, especially 
in regions where agents display human limitations and complications. The first chapter develops a 
, theory of female empowerment through access to business loans in an environment where informality 
is the only affordable venue for operating a business venture. In Sub-Saharan Africa, many social 
institutions, arise either from lack of access to formaI insurance mechanisms or from the imperfection 
of financial markets. One such institution is the traditional sharing obligation whereby individuals 
must spread their wealth around. In chapter 2 , we show that integrating such institutions into 
the standard neo-Boserupian framework can improve our Understanding of the causes of poor 
, agricultural performances in Sub-Saharan Africa. In chapter three, our thesis also cémtributes to 
the literature on returns toeducation in Africa by using the 2001 Cameroon household survey to 
estimate private rates of returns to education. 
In a more precise presentation, chapter one uses the non-cooperative game theory to highlight 
coordination failure that hinders the emergence of networks of female entrepreneurs necessary to 
overcome patriarchal business practices that limit female entrepreneurs' access to high-productivity 
informaI activities. In our model, women's entrepreneurship is assisted by microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) which provide loan and training to aIl their clients. We focus on women's demand for ven-
ture capital and choice of activity as jointlydetermined by their ability to mitigate the ,transaction 
costs that limit their q,ccess to more productive business activities. In our framework; à female 
entrepreneur must jointly choose the type of business activity she plans to operate informally and 
its size as determined by the amount of capital borrowed from the MFI of her choice. Operating 
a high-productivity informaI activity puts a higher demand on a woman to link up with other 
women operating the same type of activity in order to generate collective resources necessary to 
overcome obstacles created by patriarchal business practices. The more there are female entre-
preneurs operating in such a network, the more able will this network be in enhancing women's 
success at operating high-productivity activities. Conse'quently, an essential feature of the envi-
ronment underlying women's entrepreneurship in the informaI economy is the complementarity of 
VI 
their respective business strategies: a female entrepreneur's decision to tap into the range of high-
productivity activities increases other female entrepreneurs' marginal gain from following suit. We 
demonstrate that in absence of a mechanism for inducing coordination of women's decision tQ link 
up in a such a network, the non-cooperative game these women play admits two pure-strategy 
Nash-eqtiilibria: a high-income equilibrium whereall of them operate high-productivity informaI 
activities, and a low-income equilibrium where they aH remain confined into low-productivity ones, 
despite access to credit. We argue that co~ditioning women's access to credit ta their adoption of 
high-productivity activities acts as a sufficient condition for MFIs to nurture female empowerment. 
This is because such conditionality may induce the emergence of networks of female entrepreneurs 
large enough to mitigate patriarchal practices that raise the costs of operatirig such activities in 
the informaI economy. 
In the second chapter, we develop a game-theoretic model of fertilizers use to explain poor 
agricultural outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter referred to as SSA). In our model, agents are 
smallholder farmerswho must build up their savings so as to finance the purchase of a recommended 
level of fertilizers. To build up their savings, farmers in our model must draw on the proceeds from 
the previous harvesting season. However, a smallholder acting in autarky may find it hard to commit 
to savingfor the next growing season (sorne four to six months away), if enough other far mers do 
not follow suit, because of traditional sharing obligations that put pressure on innovation-minded 
individuals to part with their assets in an unproductive manner. A farmer who anticipates thismay 
renege on her commitment to save, and instead partake in the tradition to share his income with 
others.· The more there are other farmers who break away from this tradition by firmly committing 
to saving, the higher the likelihood that a far mer who saves in autarky will be able to protect 
her savings from social predation. Consequently, a farmer's decision to save rais es other farmers' 
marginal gain from saving. We show that the non-cooperative game these farmers play admits two 
pure-strategy Nash-equilibria: a modernization equilibrium where all of them choose to save in order 
to finance the purchase of fertilizers, and a traditional equilibrium where they all elect not to save, 
and thus forfeit the benefits of farming modernization. Our game-theoretic model is consistent with 
the observed coexistence, in SSA, of low-fertilizer consumption with economic conditions whichneo-
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Boserupian theories identify as essential for the onset of technological innovations in agriculture--
namely poor soil fertility and market opportunities. Indeed, in our model, conditions identified 
by neo-Boserupian theories as necessary and sufficient for the onset of agricultural innovation are 
shown to be only necessary. To be sufficient, this set of conditions must be enlarged to include the 
creation of a savings technology capable of mitigating the effects of social predation on farmer's 
decision to save. 
Much emphasis is placed on the need to increase the .level of hum an capital through improved 
education access, to sustain high· economic growth_ in Africa. This emphasis lias given rise to 
renewed Înterest in obtaining estimates of private rates of returns to education (RORE) in Africa 
so as to understand the motivations a~d constraints which individuals face in their education 
cost-benefit analysis and thus be in a position to inform policy makers. While there is a large 
empiricalliterature on analysis of rates of returns to education, until recently, most analysis for 
Africa relied on non-representative surveys. As a result, their findings cannot be generalized to 
the whole population. The third chapter addresses that issue and contributes to the literature on 
returns to education in Africaby using the 2001 Cameroon household survey to estimate RORE. 
( 
We compare RORE for those who attended an education cycle with those who have graduated 
from that education cycle. We also allow individuals to be endogenously selected into the informaI 
sector, the formaI private sector or in the public sector. We find strong convex and high RORE 
inall sectors of employment. 1nterestingly, those who did not graduate from primary school earn 
no returns compared to those who never attended school. As expected, those who graduated from 
an education cycle earn statistically significant .and higher returns than those who have not. We 
also find higher returns to having attended vocational school when working in the informaI sector 
thân elsewhere. As our estimates are robust to using population-weighted data we can therefore 
argue that they hold for the whole population of Cameroon. Our results militate in favour of an 
integrated education approach whereby emphasis is placed: (i) not only on school attendance but 
on graduation so that more students can reach and complete university; and (ii) a scaling-up of 
the education budget at all levels for the number and the quality of African university graduates 
to increase (JEL Classification: D13, J16, 014, C72, 013,Q12, 121, J31). 
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Key words: Microfinance, female entrepreneurship, supermodular games, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Agricultural modernization, Fertilizer adoption, Cameroon, Returns, Education, Employment. 
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Introduction générale 
La plupart des pays pauvres continuent encore aujourd'hui de crouler sous l'écrasant poids de 
multiple institutions informelles comme l'hospitalité, la générosité et la solidarité. Conséquemment 
à cet état. des choses, la grande majorité des comportements individuels qui sont issus de ces 
régions sont loin de traduire sur le plan pratique l'un des postulats fondamentaux de la théorie 
néo-classique selon lequel un agent économique rationnel fait généralement des choix qui l'orientent 
vers l'utilité espéreé la plus élevée, étant donné ses préférences et l'ensemble d'informations dont il 
dispose. En effet, les choix économiques issus de bon nombre de pays pauvres dépendent largement 
des régularités comportementales que l'agent économique observe ou qu'il a initialement pris en 
compte (Platteau, 2002). Malgré cela, le rôle du contexte socioculturel reste largement sous-estimé 
dans notre représentation formelle des comportements des agents économiques vivants dans les 
pays pauvres. Dans cett~ thèse, nous démontrons que des facteurs sociaux pertinents peuvent 
être responsables de comportements microécOnomiques qui, bien qu'étant rationnels, ne sont pas 
nécessairement néo-classiques. Pour ce faire, nous proposons des théories de choix individuels qui 
non seulement tiennent compte explicitement des pratiques sociales, mais dérivent en même temps 
les conditions· sous lesquelles ces dernières pourront générer des conséquences économiquement 
positives pour l'ensemble des agents économiques. 
En caractérisa~t l'idée selon laquelle un agent économique rationnel optimise ses choix en ten-
ant compte du comportement collectivement admis, nous apportons une double contribution à la 
littérature croissante sur le rôle du contexte social dans la formation des comportements individu-
els propres aux pays pauvres. Premièrement, nous démontrons à l'aide des jeux super modulaires 
qu'en raison de la présence de normes sociales dans la plupart des ènvironnements sous développés, 
les préférences portent en priorité sur les conséquences sociales des aCtions engagées par les agents 
économiques et non sur les actions ou sur les décisions qu'ils prennent. Notre deuxième contribution 
consiste à mettre en évidence l'importance de prendre en compte les faCteurs socioculturels dans 
l'implémentation de projets sociaux destiner à améliorer le niveau de vie des populations pauvres. 
Dans un premier essai, nous relançons le débat sur les capacités réelles de la microfinance à 
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conférer aux femmes vivant dans les régions où elle~ continuent d'être considérées comme des agents 
économiques de seconde importance, un meilleur statut socioéconomique. En effet, bien qu'elles 
représentent plus de la moitié de la population àctive dans beaucoup de pays en développement, 
les femmes continuent d'être victimes de violence conjugale, de pauvreté et de discrimination sur 
le marché du travail. Par exemple, plus de 70% sur approximativement 1.3 milliards de personnes 
vivants sous le seuil de pauvreté s,ont des. femmes. Ces dernières bénéficient d'une part dispro· 
portionnellement faible du crédit des instituions bancaires' (c'est le cas en Afrique par exemple, 
où seulement 10% du crédit bancaire est octroyé aux femmes); les femmes occupen~de manière 
globale, seulement 10% de tous les sièges parlementaires et seulement 6% des postes de direction ( 
1 
voir conférences de Beijing en 1995 et 2005).1 
La microfinance qui cible prioritairement les femmes et qui par conséquent élimine l'imperfection 
des marchés financiers, est considérée depuis plusieurs décennies par les principaux intervenants 
en matière de développement international (i.e., experts, organisations non gouvernementales, 
États, institutions financières) comme l'instrument par excellence d'amélioration du statut so~ioé­
conomique de la femme dans les régions pauvres. L'importance de la microfinance dans le processus 
d'émancipation des femmes réside principalement sur l'idée selon laquelle l'octroi de micro credits 
à des conditions économiquement avantageuses aux femmes peut leur procurer une autonomie fi-
nancière. Mues de cette nouvelle indépendance économique, celles-ci pourront alors améliorer leur 
bien être, leur pouvoir de négociation dans le ménage ainsi que leur influence dans la vie de leur 
communauté. 
Sur le plan pratique cependant, les inégalités socioéconomiques entre hommes et femmes con-
tinuent de perdurer dans plusieurs pays ayant une longue histoire d'intervention des institutions de 
microfinance visant en priorité les femmes. Une telle tendance indique probablement que la pratique 
" des microcredits à des conditions avantageuses pour l'emprunteuse ne suffit pa~ à elle seule pour 
améliorer la situation socioéconomique des femmes pauvres. Pour que l'émancipation financière des. 
1 Pour plus d'information, voir la Convention sur l'élimination de toutes les Formes de Discrimi~ation contre les 
Femmes; la Déclaration de Beijing et Plate forme pour l'Action; ainsi que d'autres documents sur le site Web: 
www.undp.orgjunifem. 
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'femmes se matérialise à travers la microfinance, cet essai démontre que les institutions de micro-
finance doivent conditionner l'accès de ces femmes au micro credit à leur adoption d'activités plus 
lucratives. Nous montrons qu'à l'aide d'un tel mécanisme de coordination, ces institutions pour-
ront organiser un réseau d'affaire (à l'image par exemple des coopératives) suffisamment large pour 
faire face avec succès aux pratiques sociales qui accroissent considérablement les coûts d'opération 
d'activités plus productives lorsqu'on est une femme, et qui par conséquent les confinent dans des 
activités moins rémunératrices que celles clans lesquelles opèrent habituellement les hommes. 
Dans le deuxième essai, nous nous intéressons à la persistance de piètres performances 
du secteur agricole africain, comparativement à celui d'autres régions en développement comme 
l'Amérique Latine, l'Asie du Sud Est, les Caraïbes et la région du pacifique. Dans leur très grande 
( 
majorité, les membres· de la communauté scientifique (comme les agronomes et les économistes agri-
coles). et les agriculteurs admettent que la modernisation des activités agricoles, indépendamment 
de la forme qu'elle p~ut prendre (fertilisants, nouvelles semences, machines plus performantes ou de 
nouvelles techniques agricoles), est généralement garante Id 'une productivité plus élevée. De plus, 
plusieurs facteurs socioéconomiques militent largement en faveur d'une augmentation significative 
de la productivité agricole en Afrique. Tout d'abord, l'agriculture continue de représenter plus de 
50% du produit intérieur brut dans la majorité de pays africains et d'y employer près de 70% de la· 
population active (WDI, 2006). De plus, la malnutrition y est encore persistance et l'autosuffisance 
alimentaire reste dans beaucoup de pays africains, un vœuX pieux. Malgré cela, plusieurs études 
empiriques (voir DuRo, Kremer and Robinson, 2005; Dufio, 2006) démontrent que l'agriculture de 
beaucoup de pays africains reste une agriculture faiblement productive car étant très peu dévelop-
pée, nonobstant la présence de nombreuses incitations à accroître les rendements dans le secteur 
agricole. 
Que l'Afrique continue malgré tous ces incitatifs socioéconomiques, d'être l'endroit· où l'on en-
registre les plus mauvaises performances du secteur agricole montre indiscutablelp.ent que la rareté 
et les opportunités économiques ne représentent que des conditions nécessaires à la modernisa-
tian des pratiques agricoles dans cette partie du monde. Dans cet essai, nous démontrons que la 
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présence de certaines institutions informelles (comme la solidarité afriCaine), qui incitent les indi-
vidus à mettre de côté leurs intérêts pour le bien des autres, peut être/ à l'origine de la très faible 
productivité agricole qui c~actérise la majorité des pays africains. Comme conditions suffisantes, 
cet essai démontre qu'on doit accompagner les prescriptions de la théorie néo-Boserupienne (i.e., 
rareté et opportunités économiques) d'un mécanisme de coordinatiori (l'épargne sécuritaire serait 
un.exemple) qui protègerait les moyens financiers des agriculteurs contre toute pression sociale qui 
les empêcherait de réaliser des investissements visant à accroître la rentabilité de leur principale 
activité économique qu'est l'agriculture. 
Nous terminons notre thèse en analysant la rémunération du capital humain dans un pays 
. (i.e. le Cameroun) où des facteurs socioculturels exercent encore une influence considérable sur 
la formation des préférences parentales concernant l'éducation des enfants. Dans plusieurs régions 
camerounaise par exemple, l'éducation des filles reste encore considérée comme une perte de temps 
puisque ces dernières sont généralement destinées aux activités qui ne requièrent aucune connais-
sance académique particulière (comme les travaux domestiques ou à l'agriculture de subsistance). 
Dans d'autres, l'enfant continue de représenter: (i) un bien de consommation parce qu'il procure 
une certaine utilité à ses parents; (ii) un facteur de production car il accompli des travaux domes-
tiques et participe des activités productives nécessaire à la survie de toute la famille; (iii) un actif 
financier contre le risque du fait qu'il constitue l'unique garantie de survie de ses parents lorsque ces 
derniers deviendront vieux et ne pourront par conséquent plus travailler. Untel contexte sociocul-
turel contribue inévitablement à créer un niveau sous optimal d'in~estissements privés en éducation. 
Conséquemment donc, la rémunération du capital humain au Cameroun ne suivra nécessaire~ent 
pas le même sentier de croissance que celui qui a été observé et documenté pour la plupart des pays 
riches (voir Psacharopoulos, 1994). 
En plus d'enrichir notre connaissance de la rentabilité des investissements en éducation au 
Cameroun, cet essai est intéressant pour l'Afrique subsaharienne parce que le Cameroun partage 
un certain nombre de similitudes avec d'autres pays de cette région. Tout comme plusieurs autres 
pays africains au sud du Sahara en effet, le Cameroun déperid fortement des produits primaires, a 
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un taùx de chômage relativement élevé et est assujetti aux mêmes chocs sur les termes del'échange. 
De plus, puisqu'il a été colonisé par la France et la Grande-Bretagne, le Cameroun a hérité des 
deux systèmes d'éducation qui sont présents dans le reste de l'Afrique. 
Nous nous distinguons des précédentes études portant sur la rentabilité des invéstissements 
privés en éducation au Cameroun, et dans beaucoup d'autres pays africains au sud du S;:thara 
de trois manières. Tout d'abord, notre échantillon inclut simultanément les travailleurs du secteur 
formel et ceux du secteur informel, puisque que l'emploi informel représente environ 65% de l'emploi 
. . 
global au Cameroun. Dans notre échantillon, près de deux tiers des participants au marché du tra-
vail qui ont fréquenté l'école primaire n'y ont pas reçu de diplôme. Deuxièmement dO!1c,' nous 
comparons la rémunération du capital humain issu de la fréquentation d'un cycle d'études sans y 
avoir gradué à celle du capital humain issu de la graduation du même cycle d'éducation. Troisième-
ment, nous tenons compte dans notre stratégie d'estimation, de l'existence possible d'un biais de 
sélection grâce à l'utilisation de la méthode de correction du biais d'échantillonnage proposée par 
Trost and Lee (1984). Finalement, nous produisons des estimàtions qui résistent à la critique de 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2004) et qui sont représentatives de la population active du 
Cameroun. 
Nous montrons que les rendements privés en éducation au Cameroun sont convexes dans tous les 
secteurs d'activité, indépendamment de l'utilisation du niveau de scolarité ou du diplôme comme 
variable 'explicative des revenus d'activité. Nous démontrons aussi que ces rendements sont beau-
coup plus élevés pour les diplômés universitaires, etmême pour ceux qui ont fréquenté l'université 
mais n'y ont pas reçu de diplôme, que pour n'importe quel autre niveau d'éducation. De plus, 
nous montrons que les individus vivant dans des régions rurales gagnent moins que les résidents 
de milieux urbains et que l'équité salariale entre hommes et femmes n'est présente que dans les 
secteurs public et parapublic. 
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Chapter 1 
Microfinance and Female Empowermentt 
.. ;,. 
t This chapter is based on a paper coauthored with Sylvain Dessy. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper offers a new perspective on the empowerment potential of microfinance institutions 
targeted at women. 1 It develops a theory of female empowerment through access to business loans 
in an environment where informality is the only affordable venue for operating a business vènture. 
Its aim is to examine the choices of activities informal female entrepreneurs make when faced with 
patriarchal forms of business regulations that substitute for the absence of legal means for enfotcing 
contracts in the informaI economy. 
Basic economic theory supporting the empowerment potential of microfinance targeted at 
women emphasizes access to credit and the resulting opportunity for èarning an independent income 
as the theoreticallinks to female empowerment through microfinance. In other words, involvement 
in income-generating activities should translate into greater empowerment for worrien. But, female . 
empowerment is ab.out improved ability to bring about changes that enhance women's well-being 
at the household, community, and national levels. 2 Bringing about such well-being requires that 
women first acquire the power to change their social environment.3 Whether women can. gain 
such power at individual, community or national levels obviously depends on a number of factors, 
including social, political, institutional, as well as purely economic factors, such as access to micro-
finance services. How these factors interact to affect female empowerment, therefore, warrant due 
consideration. Here is why. 
First, in many developing countries, business formalization in order to access legal means for 
enforcing contracts is often a privilege available only to politically powerful entrepreneurs, given 
1 A 2001 survey by the Special Unit on Microfinance of the United Nations capital Development Fund 
(SUMjUNCDF) reveals that approximately 60% of the clients of the 29 micro finance institutions surveyed were 
women, and six of the 29 focused entirely on women. Furthermore, according to USAID's annual Microenterprise 
Resu/ts Report for 2000, approximately 70%.of USAID-supported microfinance institutions were women. 
2 Duflo (2005) offersan alternative definition. She defines female empowerment as the improvement in the abilit~ 
of women to access the constituents of development-in particular health, education, earning opportunities, rights, 
and political participation. 
3 According to Carter and Fletschner (2004, p.3), in sorne developing countries, wo~en who work away from the 
family environ ment have a bad reputation and men don't want people talking about their spouses. 
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the prevalence in these countries of high costs of legality.4 Figure 1 below presents a comparative 
illustration of these costs for a sam pIe of countries, including Sub-Saharan African countries and 
OECD countries. In terms of days lost dealing with licensing, Figure 1 shows clearly that in average, 
a potential formaI sector entrepreneur in Sub-Saharan Africa loses about three times as many days 
dealing with licensing as do es his counterpart from any advanced industrialized country. 
Figure 1 : Days of dealing with licence: time spent in days 
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Source: World Bank (2005) 
For the vast majority of these countries' micro-entrepreneurs-including women- who cannot 
afford these high cost of legality (bribes collection by public officiaIs are an example), the informaI 
4 De Soto (1989) finds evidence that the process of legaUy registering a smaU business is to expensive for any person 
of sm aU means in Peru. Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997) find evidence of high costs of Iegality in a case study 
of Cameroon. Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodruff (2000) find that bribes and corruption are reasons why 
firrns hide in the unofficial economy. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) also provide evidence 
that countries with heavier regulation of entry have larger informai sectors. They argue that such entry barriers are 
deliberately set by politicians who seek to create extractable rents by restricting entry into formai markets. 
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economy becomes a "getaway" -a framework for producing and/or selling legal goods albeit using 
illegal means. 5 
Second, in the informaI economy, patriarchal forms of business regulations substitute for the 
absence of le gal mearis for enforcing businesscontracts,6 and often emphasize the use of threat and 
violence as an enforcement mechanism (de Soto, 1989). Relative to men, this institutional feature 
of the informaI economy put women at a comparative disadvantage for accessing certain lucrative 
markets (Gibbons, 1995; Kabeer, 2001). For example, relative to male entrepreneurs, women may 
face limited aCcess to crucial input markets necessary to effectively operate a high-productivity 
business venture. This includes labour markets- where lack of legal mechanisms for resolving 
contract disputes may exposedfemale micro-entrepreneurs to male employees' violence--, and 
\ 
fertilizers markets-:-which are often controlled by male-only cooperatives. Due to these patriarchal 
practîces, developing countries women still face trade-off that cause them to make decisions that 
are arguably disempowering, such as dustering in low-productivity activities, and/or relying on 
male family members (often their husband) as contract enforcers (Kabeer, 2001).7 
Third, notwithstanding the ab ove, intrahousehold bargaining models have demonstrated that 
female empowerment is positively associated with the level of a woman's fall-back option, which, 
in turn, is shown to rise with her relative earned-income (e.g., Anderson and Eswaran, 2005; Basu, 
2005). Yet, in the informaI economy of developing countries, women continue to earn less than 
5 According to a 2002 survey sponsored by the International Labour Organization (ILO), excluding South Africa, . 
the share of informaI employment in non-agricultural employment is 78 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa.· 
6Business contracts are usually defined as me ans for organizing and transfering property rights (De Soto, 1989). 
1 Lost of bargaining power may, for example, force her to surrender a fraction of her venture capital to her husband 
in exchange for his services as her informai contract enforcer ( Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). Or, it may take the 
form of lost of control over her fer,tility C Kritz, Makinwa-Adebusoye and Gurak, 2000), which may raise the costs 
of operating a relatively high-risk, high-return business venture, thereby reducing her earned income. In particular, 
Kritz, Makinwa-Adebusoye and Gurak (2000) studied women's status and fertility within married couples in five 
Nigerian ethnie groups (The Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, Ijaw and Kanuri). They look at several dimensions of women's 
decision-making and spousal communication on the desire for more children, and wife sayon family planning. Among 
othe!; things, their study finds that spouses from groups in whieh women's status i5 lowest (e.g. Kanuri and the Hausa) 
have higher disagreement on fertility desires than those from ethnie groups in which women's status is higher (Yoruba, 
Ibo, and Ijaw). 
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men, even when controlling for differences in literacy and education. In Bangladesh-a country that 
pioneered MFIs targeted at women-, there is evidence that self-employed men earn more than three 
times the income earned by self-employed women; while male informaI micro-entrepreneurs earn 
about four times more than their female counterparts (Dasgupta and Barbattini, 2003). In Figure 
2 below, this gender disparity in earnings among self-employed agents is shown to be apparent in 
other developing countries as weIl: 
100 
90 
1 
80 
CL 
E 70 QI 
Ill: 
51 
CI 60 c 
~ 
co 
. ~ 50 
'5 
~ 
on 40 co 
on 
·CI 
c 
lê 30 co 
QI 
.on 
C 
~ 
0 
20 
:i: 
19 
0 
Figure 2. Informai Economy: Women's earnings as a % of Men's among Self·Employed, by Country 
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Most of these disparities reflect the extent to which \:Vomen enterprises differ from men's in terms 
of scale, items sold by traders, extent of diversification, access to effective networking (Kabeer, 
2001).8 Given the prevalence of patriarchal practices in the informaI economy, networking among 
8 According to Charmes (2000), in the informai sector ~f many developing countries, levels of in come in metal 
working or wood processing (typical male activities) are always higher than levels of.income in textiles (a typical 
( 
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female' entrepreneurs may play an essential role in overcoming transaction costs ind uced by com-
plianèe with such practices. Understanding constraints to the emergence of enough networ1:s 
of female entrepreneurs can therefore shed light on the issue of female empowerment through mi-
crofinance. ' 
In this paper, we use a game-theoretic model to highlight coordination failure that hinder 
the emergence of networks . of female entrepreneurs necessary to overcome patriarchal business 
practices that limit female entrepreneurs' access to high-productivity informaI activities. In our 
model, women's entrepreneurship is assisted by an MFI which provides loan and training to aIl their 
clients. We focus on women's demand for venture capital and choice of activity as jointly determiried 
by their ability to mitigate the transaction costs that limit their access to more productive business 
activities. In our model, a female entrepreneur must jointly choose the type of business activity 
she plans to operate informally and its size as determined by the amount of capital borrowed from 
the MFI of her choice. Operating a high-productivity informaI activity puts a higher demand on 
a woman to Hnk up with other women operating the s~me type of activity in order to generàte 
collective resources necessary to overcome obstacles created by patriarchal business practices. The 
more there are female entrepreneurs operating in such a network, the more able will this network be 
in enhancing women's success at operating high-productivity activities. Consequently, an essential 
feature of the environment underlying women's entrepreneurship in the informal'economy is the 
complementarity of their respective business strategies: a female entrepreneur'sdecision to tap into 
the range of high-productivity activities increases other female entrepreneurs' marginal gain from 
following suit. 
In absence bf a mecha:n,ism for inducing coordination of women's decision to Hnk up in a such 
a network, the non-cooperative game these women play admits two pure-strategy Nash-equilibria: 
ahigh-income equilibrium wheré all of them operate high-productivity informaI activities, and a 
low-income equilibrium where they aIl remain confined into low-productivity ones, despite access 
to credit. Therefore, when the low-incorne pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium obtains despite women's 
female activity). 
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improved access 1 to credit, it must be that microfinance assistance to female entrepreneurship has 
1 
failed to act as a coordination mechanism for the emergence of large enough networks Qf female 
entrepreneurs operating high-productivity activities 
, From an empirical point ofview, there is a case that women's attempt to access high-productivity 
business activities may be subject to strategic complementarities. Available evidence reveals 
that most women who receive loans from microfinance institutions tend to be confined into low-
productivity, low-capital activities, despite access to credit, and often despite having equal manage-
rial credentials as men. In a case study of Bangladesh, Kabeer (2001) reports that while access to 
.credit succeeded in increasing the rate at which women participated in econorriic activities, it failed, 
however, to increase the range of economic activities they haveaccess to. Lairap-Fonderson (2002),. 
in' a case study of Cameroon and Kenya, finds similar evidence. She argues that women micro-
entrepreneurs are clustered within a narrow range of activities that offer virtually no opportunity 
for innovation, or for upgrading to more~lucrative ventures. This includes street-vending, operating 
food kiosks, selling second-hand "clothes and unprocessed food, which are relatively low-capit?-l, 
low-productivity activities, and which, in addition, face strong competition from cheap imports. 
She concludes that microfinance fail to lift women out of the confine of such low-capital activities. 
In a case study of Zimbabwe, Gibbon (1995) finds that rural women business activities tend tOTe-
main at a survivallevel, despite assistance from microfinance institutions. Mayoux (1998b) reports 
that in sorne micro finance programmes, women have expressed a clear preference for compulsory 
savings and directed loans to enable them to protect their incomes from men. 
Our research is related to a growing theoretical llterature focusing on women's empowerment 
through participation in income-generating activities. Anderson and Eswaran (2005) develop an 
intrahousehold bargaining model which demonstrates the relative ability of earned income to nur-
ture empowerment for women within the household. The model is tested to rural Bangladeshi data, 
which provides support for their model's prediction. McIntosh and Wydick (2005) develop a model 
of competition among potential entrants in the microfinance industry that highlights the misgiv-
ingi? ~f increased competition in terms of the performance and' viability of microfinance institutions. 
13 ; 
Carter and Fletschner (2004) build a model of women's demand for entrepreneurial capital that 
explicitly incorporates into women's qecision-making the effect of social norms prescribing gender 
behavior. They use this model to argue that microcredit programs that relax women's capital sup-
) 
ply constraints may have benefits that extend rwell beyond the direct beneficiaries. Our research 
builds around this literature by emphasizing the need to explicitly organize female entrepreneurs 
in large enough business networks capable of mitigating patriarchal business practices that confine 
women in low:productivity activities. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented and solved in sec~ion 2. 
Section 3 offers concluding remarks. 
2~ The Environment 
There are N > 0 ex ante homogenous female entrepreneurs. Each female entrepreneur has a choice 
between a'range of business activities iridexed each by its degree of productivity, p E [0,1].9 To 
start up a business venture of any type, women in this environment can borrow venture capital 
from an MFI of their choice. 10 Borrowed capital determines the size of the venture. Denote as 
k E [k, k] the loan obtained by a female entrepreneur, with a < k < k < +00. / 
All business operations take place in the informaI economy. In that economy, owihg to the 
prevalence of patriarchal forms of business regulations, each female informaI entrepreneur may face 
, \ 
gender-specific transaction costs, unless she can joint a network of business women large enough 
to overcome these costs. Let n E [0, N] denote the cardinality of the subset of female informaI 
entrepreneurs who are connected with one another through a business network (say a cooperative 
or any business association). Each female entrepreneur member of that network will face a level, 
te == <p(n,p)pk, (2.1) 
of transaction costs refiecting the éxtent to which the network she belongs to is unable to eliminate 
9Examples of activities inc1uding the vending of perishable goods (such as fruits and vegetables), and the veilding 
of non- perishable goods (such as household appliances, furnitures, and other consumer durables). 
10 Microfinance, programs generally foster self-employment. 
/ 
\ 
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her comparative disadvantage for being a female informaI entrepreneur. These transactions costs 
are a8sumed to increase with size, k, and the degree of producti~ity, p, of the business venture. 
Assumption 1. The function i.p satisfies the following properties: 
l' (n,p) ~ { ~ if n> Ti (p) 
if n :::; Ti (p) 
(2.2) 
where Ti (p) E (1, N] denotes the critical mass of connected female informal entrepreneurs 
above which networking becomes successful in eliminating gender-specific transaction costs in 
the informaI economy. 
Assumption 1 implies that unless the size of the network of female informaI entrepreneurs is 
enough, transaction costs induced by the prevalence of patriarchai forms of business regulations 
will not disappear. 
Assumption 2. The function ri (.) is strictly increasing and satisfies the following boundary con-
ditions: (i) ri (0) 0; (ii) 1 < ri (1) < N. 
That Ti (P) is bounded below by 0 means that a femaie entrepreneur who elects to capitalize 
a business venture with the lowest degree of productivity (Le., p 0) faces no transaction, cost 
whether or not she operates in autarky. However, that Ti (1) > 1, means that no femaie informal 
entrepreneur acting in autarky can. avoid gender-specific transaction costs when she chooses to 
informally operate a business venture with the highest degree of productivity (Le., pl). 
Next,denote as cP (p, k) the gross revenue generated by a female informaI entrepreneur who uses 
her Ioan, k, to invest in a business activity with degree of productivity, p. 'We make the following 
Assumption: 
, 
Assumption, 3. The functioncP satisfies the Iollowing properties: for all p, and aU k, 
(i) cPp > 0, k given; 
(ii) cPk -> 0, p given; 
(iii) cPpk = cPkp > 0 
(iv) cPkk < O. 
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Assumption 3 states that the function cp is strictly increasing in p (property i) and in k (property 
ii). It also states that the function cp has increasing differences in (p, k) on the feasible domain 
(property iii), and that cp is strictly concave in k (property iv). 
2.1 Choice of Business Size 
In this subsection, we are interested in characterizing'female entrepreneurs' choice of business size. 
Let r denote the rentaI rate of capital pre-determined by the assisting MFI. Denote as Tf' (k,p, r) the 
residual claimed by a female entrepreneur who operates an informaI business venture with degree 
of productivity, p, and 
) 
k, when the marginal co st of borrowing an additional unit of capital is 
r=r+<p(n,p)p, (2.3) 
where equation (2.3) makes use of equation (2.1). Therefore we can write Tf' (k,p, r) as follows: 
Tf'(k,p,r) = cp(p,k) -rk. (2.4) 
Next, consider a female informaI entrepreneur decision problem. Given the pair (n, r), a typical 
female informal entrepreneur sequential decision problem is to choose (i) the degree of productivity, 
p, of the business she plans to run, and (ii) the loan level, k E. [.l!!, k] ,. necessary to capitalize the 
venture. Rer objective is to maximize her residual daim defined in (2.4). It will be assumed that 
each female entrepreneur solves her two-stagé problem by backward induction. 
Let K (p, r) arg maxk Tf' (k, p, r) be the optimal loan size chosen by a female informaI entre-
preneur when the state of the world is describedby the pair (p, r). And suppose that this optimàl 
loan size is interior. The Implicit function theorem may be applied to establish the following result: 
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 3 hold. Then 
(i) ô ôpK(p,r) > O. 
(ii) ô ôrK(p, r) < O. 
Part (i) of Lemma 1 states that if a female entrepreneur plans to run a more productive activity, 
it is optimal for her to increase her demand for capital, otherwise she will not maximize the 
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return to entrepreneurship. Part (ii) states that a return-maximizing female entrepreneur will 
always reduce her dèmand for capital âs a result of an exogenous increase in the marginal cost 
of capitaL Lemma 1 will prove useful for characterizing a female informaI entrepreneur's choice 
l 
of the degree of productivity of the business venture she plans to ope~ate. Since all women in 
this environment have access to credit, we characterize this choice as dependent upon relevant 
socioeconomic characteristics of the environment in which these women live. 
2.2 Choice of Business Activity by Female Informal Entrepreneurs 
In this subsection, we study a femaie informal entrepreneur's choice of the degree of productivity, p, 
of the business venture she plans, to operate in an environment where a collective action by women 
entrepreneurs is necess'ary to eliminate gender-specific transaction costs that severely constrain this 
choice. We assume that the objective pursued through such a choice is the maXimization of the 
return to entrepreneurship. 
Let 11" (n, p) 1f' [K (p, r) ,P, 11 denotes the return to entrepreneurship earned by a female en- ' 
trepreneur who joins a business network of size n when she chooses an activity with degree of 
productivity, p. Then 
11" (n,p) = 1> [p, K (p, r)]- rK (p, r) (2.5) 
with raS defined in (2.3). The following proposition formalizes the incentive for female entrepre-
neurs to operate business ventÙIes with a high degree of productivity. 
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1 ~3 hold. If n > n (p), for all p E [0, 1], then 1 = arg maxp 11" (n, p). 
Proof. Observe that ifn > n (p), for an p E [0,1], then 'P (n,p) 0, and, using (2.5), it can 
be shown that the return to entrepreneurship earned by a typical female informal entrepreneur 
reduces to 
'ft(p) == 1> [p,K(p,r)] rK(p,r). (2.6) 
Therefore, it suffices to establish that 'ft (.) is a strictly increasing function : 'ft' (p) > 0, for aH p. The 
proof follows directly from the application of the envelope theorem to (2.6) given that Assumptions 
1-3 hold simultaneously· 
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Proposition 1 states that if gender-specific transaction costs were to be eliminated (i.e., n = N), 
access to credit would provide female entrepreneurs with an incentive to tap into the range of highly 
productive informaI activities usually controlled by men. In other words, a return-maximizing 
female informaI entrepreneur will always select a business activity with degree of productivity, 
-p = 1. Proposition 1 therefore highlights the importance for women, as a group, to overcome 
patriarchal forms of business'regulations that put them at a comparative disadvantage in managing 
-' 
highly productive informaI activities. When such forms of business regulations are overcome by 
women, the optimal return to entrepreneurship is given by 
ft(l) = 4>[I,K(I,r)]- rK (l,r). (2.7) 
, 
Now, suppose instead that for sorne reasons, no female entrepreneur Can link up with enough 
other female entrepreneurs in a business network when she chooses to run an activity with a degree 
of productivity, p E [0, 1J. In other words, n ~ Ti (p), for all p E [O,IJ. Row would this fact affect her 
optimal decision on the level of p? The following proposition provides an answer to that question: 
Proposition2. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold simultaneously. Suppose in addition that for all feasible 
pairs (p, k) 
(2.8) -
If 
n ~ Ti (p) , (2.9) 
for all p E [0,1], then 0 = argmaxpfr(n,p). 
Proof. Observe from (2.5) that if n ~ Ti (p), the return to entrepreneurship becomes 
zr (p) == 4> [p, K (p, r + 8p)] - [r + 8pJ K (p, r + 8p). (2.10) 
It then suffices to show that zr (.) is a strictly decreasing function: zr' (p) < 0, for all p. The proof 
follows as an implication of the envelope th eo rem, using condition (2.8). Rence the maximum 
obtains at the corner p = o. 
/ 
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Condition (2.8) states that, wh en they exist, gender-specific transaction costs, as measured by 
the lower bound, 8&, are sufficiently high. We draw from anthropological andeconomic studies of 
developing countries, in assuming that in area where. women display human limitations and com-
plications, a typical informaI femaIe entrepreneur faces prohibitive transaction costs that lead her 
to cluster in business venture that are less lucrative than those operated by male entrepreneurs, 
unless there are a sufficient number of other female entrepreneurs who have chosen a more pro-
ductive project. For instance, Shilue (2003) reveaIs that in the Guinean city of Guekedou where 
tax collectors are mostly men, business taxes are levied every day on about five percent of the 
income earned by female traders while male traders pay approximately one percent of their total 
earnings. As a result, male traders in this area earn $3,500 per annum in compaiison with $ 820 
for their female counterparts. According to Shilue, a woman who refuses to pay such a higher 
gender-specific business cost either willlose her space in the market or will be spending sorne times 
in prison. Likewise, Gonzalez Aguilar (2006) reports that, because developing countries' women 
have had to fight against an adverse environment, which traditionally had been minimising and 
exploiting their capacities, in sorne cases, as a consequence of this reality, women are just satisfied 
with the non-financial benefits, such as the psychological satisfaction of "sociaI contact". 
Proposition 2 formalizes the observed overrepresentation ofwomen entrepreneurs in low-productivity 
informaI activities. It explains this overrepresentation by the prevalence in the informaI economy 
of patriarchal forms of business regulations that substitute for the absence in that economy of 
legal means for enforèing contracts. A very important remark follows from Proposition 2 As an 
implication of Proposition 2, the optimal return to entrepreneurship when ri (p) 2: n, for aIl pis 
1[(0) = <jJ[O,K(O,r)]-rK(O,r) (2.11) 
To highlight the empowerment potential of microfinance, it is important to obtain a ranking of the 
returns 7i" (1) and 1[ (0) as defined by Equations (2.7) and (2.11), respectively. The following result 
is obtained as a corollary to Proposition. 
Corollary 1. Given r as pre-determined by the microfinance institution, the following inequality 
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obtains: 
11: (0) < ft (1). (2.12) 
Corollary 1 formalizes female entrepreneurs' incentive to use their ac'cess to credit in or der 
to capitalize informaI activities with a high degree of prodtictivity. In other words, if ,all female 
entrepreneurs knew that enough other female entrepreneurs will choose to capitalize an activity of 
type p = l-which is the informaI activity with the highest degree of productivity-they will each 
elect to capitalize that activity because it maximizes their return to entrepreneurship: ft (1) > 11: (0). 
However, since each woman is anonymous, she may not know, prior to choosing any activity p, how 
many other women will link up with her in the business network spanned by that activity. If she 
chooses p = 1, on the basis that 11: (0), < ft (1), she may indeed earn a return ft (1), if the total 
number, n, of female entrepreneurs in the business network spanned by activity p = 1 is large 
enough: n > ri: (1). However, if n :S ri: (1), theh she will earn a return 
11: (1) = <p [1, K (1, r + 8)]- (r + 8) K (1, r + 8), (2.13) 
which, by proposition 2, is less than 1[ (0): 
11:(1)<1[(0) 
since 11: (p) is a decreasing function of p. 
Whether or not n > ri: (1) becomes crucial for the optimality of the business strategy of choosing 
p = 1. Thus, a typical female entrepreneur's decision whether or not to capitalize an activity of 
type p = 1 becomes a strategic reaction to what other female entrepreneurs choose as their business 
strategy. In other words, women's activity choice strategies are complement. How many women 
will choose to use their access to credit in order to tap into activities of type p can therefore be 
viewed as the outcome of a non-cooperative game between the N women livin'g in the targeted 
environment. In what follows, we analyze the women's activity choice game in its normal form. 
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2.3 The Activity Choice Game 
Each woman entrepreneur is indexed by i, with i E l, where 1= {1, .... , N} denotes the set of women 
living in this environment. On the basis of Propositions 1 and 2, women in this environment have 
a choice between two types of informal activities: either a low-productivity one indexed by 0, or a 
high-productivity one indexed by 1. Thus, we can define~ = {O, 1} as the strategy set for woman 
i E l, with generic element Pi EPi. We interpret Pi as woman i's activity choice strategy. 
Let P = XiEIPi denote the strategy space, whose elements P = (Pi,p-i) E P define a strategy 
profile of the activity choice game. Let P-i X{jEI; jf.i}Pj be the set of feasible joint t:i\'ra\,t~glt~t:i 
for all women other than womàn i, with generic element P-i E P- i . Observe that since ~ is finite 
for ail i, P is also finite and contains a total of 'lN elements. 
2.3.1 The Payoff Function 
To construct each player's payofI function, we make use of eJepressions (2.7), (2.11), and (2.13). On 
the basis of Propositions 1 and 2, if player i selects the activity choice strategy Pi 0, she will earn 
a payofI .Z!:(O) as specified by (2.11), irrespect ive of the activity choices of other players, because 
.Z!: (0) ~ ft (0). In contrast, if she plays the strategy Pi = 1, she will earn a return II (n) depending 
upon the strategy profile selected by her rivais, where 
{ 
ft(l) . II (n) 
.Z!: (1) 
1 
if n > ri (1) 
ifn~ri(l) 
(2.14) 
Observe that sinee .Z!:(I) < .Z!:(O) < ft(I); clearly playing the stiategy Pi = 1 is never a dominant 
strategy for any player of this game~ 
Now, let Vi : P --l- ~ denote woman i's payofI function. Therefore, we can define a typical 
woman-entrepreneur payoff as féllows: 
(2.15) 
where 
(2.16) 
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denotes the size of the network of female entrepreneurs who choose to play. the activity choice 
strategy Pi = 1. Thus, if woman i plays the strategy Pi = 0, she will gain a payoff 
irrespect ive of what 6ther ,:,omen do. However, if she plays Pi = 1, she will gain a payoff 
Vi (l,p-i) = II (n) , 
which is dependent upon the level of n as determined by the the strategy profile P-i selected by 
players other than player i, where II (n) is as defined in (2.14). 
A non-cooperative normal-form game is the triple n = (J, P, {Vi: i E J}) , consisting of a non-
empty set Of players J, a set P of feasible joint decision strategies, and a collection of payoff 
functions {Vi : i E I} . Since aIl players have identical strategy spaces (Pl = P2 = ... = PN ) and for 
aIl i,j E {l, .... ,N}, Vi (p) = Vj (p), for aIl i 1= j , the normal-form game n is symmetric. 
2.3.2 Pure-Strategy Nash-equilibria. 
In this sub-section, we characterize the set of pure-strategy Nash-equilibria when aIl women make 
their business-activity decision simultaneously. We define a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in terms 
of the payoffs players receive fromvarious strategy profiles: 
Definition 1. A pure-strategy profile p* EPis a Nash equilibrium of n if and only if Vi (p*) ~ 
Vi (Pi,P~i) for aU Pi E Pi and aU i E J. 
Let No denote the set of pure-strategy Nash-equilibria of the game. Let pL EPand pH E P be 
feasible pure-strategy profiles, wherepL (respectively pH) is the p~re-strategyprofile such that each 
woman i E J chooses an activity of type Pi = 0 (respectively Pi = 1). The following proposition is 
proved in Appendix A: 
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold simultaneously. Then, {pL,pH} E No. 
Proposition 3 states that the pure-strategy profile where aIl women elect to stay within the 
confine of low-capital, less productive economic ~ctivities (i.e., the profile pL) and the one where 
aU of them elect to tap into high-capital, high-productivity activities (i.e., the profile pH) belong 
to the set of pure-strategy Nash-equilibria of the women's business-decision game, o. 
Before we pr~ceed to derive further policy implications from the above result, we must address 
the question of whether the pure-strategy profiles pL and pH are indeed the only stable equilibria 
of the symmetric game, o. To address this issue, we first show that 0 is a supermodular game 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), also known as agame characterized by strategie complementarities. 
Definition 2. (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) 0 is a supermodular game, if for all i, 
( i) Pi is a compact subset of 1R; 
(ii) Vi is upper semi-continuous in Pi, for each fixed P-i; 
(iii) Vi is continuous in P-i, for each fixed Pi; 
(iv) Vi has a finite upper bound; 
(v) Vi has increasing differences in (Pi,p-i) on Pi x P-i. 
In particular, property (v) of Definition 2 implies that for a player i, the incremental gain from 
taking her highest action is higher wh en players other than herself also take theirhighest action: 
for all p~ > Pi and aU P'--i > P-i, 
Our interest in supermodular games stems from several crucial properbes these games have. First, 
the main characteristic of models with strategic complementarities is the possible presence of mul-
tiple equilibria, creating the possibility for coordination failures (Cooper and John, 1988; Diamond, 
1 . 
1982). Second, with a supermodular game, there is no need to rely on mixed-strategies for the exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium, as existence of equilibrium of such game do es not require continuity of 
best response functions (i.e., application of Tarski's fixed point theorem). Third, as an implication 
of supermodularity, we can restrict the search for equilibria to pure-strategy Nash-equilibria only, 
since mixed-strategies equilibria, when they exist, are unstable (Echenique (2002); Echenique and 
Edlin (2004)). 
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To show that the women's business-decision game, n, is supermodular, it suffices to prove .that 
properties (i) (v) abôve are satisfied. The following Proposition, which is proved in Appendix B, 
establishes this result. 
Proposition 4. Un der Assumptions 1-3, the symmetric game n,. is super:modular. 
Proposition 4 implies that conditions underlying Topkis' theorem apply so that for the game 
n, women's best replies are increasing in opponents' actions: for each 
f3dp-i)E arg max Vi (p), 
Pi 
and for aU 
Now, since the f3i (p-Ü are increasing, to rule out asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria, 
we show in the following Lemma-which we prove in Appendix C-, that women's best reply are 
1 
single-valued correspondences (i.e., each f3i is a function): 
Lemma 2. Let f3i (P-i) = {Pi: Pi E argmaxpiEPi Vi (Pi,p-Ü}, for all i, given P-i. Then, under 
Assumptions 1-3, f3 i (P-i) is a singleton~ 
Lemma 2 states that players best replies are single-valued. This reSult, com,bined with our above 
application of Topkis' theorem rulesout the existence of asymmetric pure-strategy Nash-equilibria 
for the women's occupational choice game. Rence the following Proposition: 
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1-3, {pL ,pH} = ~n. 
Proposition 5 states that the pure-strategy profile where aIl women elect to stay within the 
confine of low-productivity economic activities and the one where all of them elect to tap into 
high-productivity activities are the only pure-strategy Nash-equilibria of the activity-choice game, 
n. This multiplicity. of equilibria suggests a potential role for a deliberate action to select one of 
the equilibria. Such deliberate action is desirable, however, only if the two equilibria can be ranked 
according to the Pare~o principle. The following Proposition establishes this ranking. 
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Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1-3, the symmetric pure-strategy profile pH Pareto dominates 
the profile pL._ 
Proof. To prove this Proposition, it suffices to show that for .aU i E l, and for aU Pi E Pi, 
Vi (pH) Vi (pL) > O. Let ~i == Vi (0) - Vi (pL) . From the definition of the payoff function Vi, 
the differenèe ~i red uces to 
Since n(l) E (l,N), by Assumption 2, the rèsult simply foHows from CoroHary 1. This completes. 
the proof. 
Proposition 6 states that the pure-strategy profile where aH women elect to operate high-
productivity business ventures in the informaI ~conomy is strictly preferred to the one where aH 
women elect to stay within the confine of low-productivity activities. Because the high-income equi- ' 
librium (i.e., pH), is counter-intuitive in many poor countries where women are generally confined to 
low-productivity business activities,ll our analysis therefore suggests that in these societies, coor-
dination failures in women's activity choice.decisions are to be blamed. Such a coordination failure 
prevents women from creating làrge enough business networks likely to enable them to overcome 
patriarchal forms of business regulations that put them at a comparative disadvantage, relative to 
men, at managing high-productivity business ventures in the informai economy. 
We have posited' that for aH values p, the marginal revenue from increasing p is a1ways smaller 
than or equal.to the marginal increase in transaction costs, provided there are not a sufficient 
number of other female entrepreneurs undertaking the same project which would have made trans-
action cost zero. This Bssumption guarantees the existence of only two possible equilibriums: (a) 
a corner solution whereby aIl female entrepreneurs opt for the less productive project p = 0; or 
Il Gonzalez Aguilar (2006) documents five charactei:istics that are pervasive among business women of the developing 
world: (i) their business are smallèr than other, employing less than five employees; (ii) they use traditional and iow-
productive technologies; (iii) they are concentrated in market sectors that have low barriers to entry and low levels 
of outside communication, ie., transfer to other inarkets;(iv) they are often home basedj (v) their business growth 
strategies are affected by household responsibilities. 
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(b) il, corner solution whereby all female entrepreneurs opt for the most productive project p = 1 
(and transaction costs are zero). It is worth noticing however that, relaxing condition (2.8) would 
lead to a stable interior solution with all women choosing projects of medium product,ivity p > o. 
This, in turn, would generate a sufficient network size and have transaction costs drop to zero fôt 
that productivity level. This possible interior equilibrium will imply that informaI business women 
living in areas where their empowerment is generally seen as a threat to male hegemony need more 
than a large enough social network to gain social and politic powers as well as economic power. 80 
as to run highly productive business ventures, these women will need strong support in negotiating 
the complex changes in gender roles that must ultünately take place in order for them to succeed 
as micro entrepreneur especially. To put it more precisely, they will need a very diversified help to 
reduce gender disparities that constrain the sets of choices available in many aspects of life. Other':' 
wise these women will continue to have systerriatically poorer command over a range of productive 
resources, inc1uding education, land, information and financial resources, despite their access to 
microfinance services and their ability to mitigate gender-specific transaction costs that lead them 
, 
to make economic decision that are arguably disempowering. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
This paper had two important related goals. The first was to explore the implications for women's 
choice of activity and demand for capital, of the interaction between economic and social factors. 
Improved access to credit and informality were the main economic factors underlying women's 
business decision in our model, while the prevaience in the informaI economy of patriarchal forms 
of business regulations highlighted the social context underlying this decision. The second goal 
was to investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for microfinance services to nurture empow-
erment for women. We drew from the existing literature in assuming that women's earned income 
. from entrepreneurship was a determining factor of their empowerment. To achieve that goal, we 
used a game-theoretic model featuring a supermodular game of activity choice between ex ante 
homogenous female entrepreneurs. We demonstrated that this game admits two Pareto-ranked 
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Nash-equilibria, aU of which are symmetric in pure strategies. The equilibrium where aU women 
elect to operate high-productivity business ventures in the informaI economy is more empowering 
for women, and therefore preferred to the one where aU of them elect to stay within the confine of 
·low-productivity activities. Because of this multiplicity of equilibria, we concluded that access to 
credit was only necessary, but not sufficient for female empowerment. Indeed coordination failures 
in women's activity choices may prevent women from creating business networks large enough to . 
mitigate patriarchal forms of busi·ness regulations that put them at a comparative disadvantage, 
relative to men, at managing high-productivity business ventures. We found that a sufficient con-
dition for MFIs to succeed in nurturing female empowerment is that women's access to credit be 
conditioned to their adoption of high-productivity informaI activities. Such conditionality may 
help the MFIs to organize these women in a business network (cooperatives are an example) large 
enough to mitigate patriarchal practices that rai se women's cost of operating high-productivity 
activities in the informaI economy. FinaUy, our analysis shows the importance of including the 
social context underlying the implementation of development projects targeted at women. 
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4. Appendix 
A. Proof of Proposition 3. 
The proof is divided in two daims: 
Claim 1 The stmtegy profile pL = (pf, .... pf, .... pt) such that Pi = 0 for aU i E l, is a pure-
stmtegy Nash equilibrium of n. 
Proof: Using (2.15) and the definition of a Nash-equilibria, it follows from definition 1 that, 
the profile pL is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium ofn if and only if the foUowing condition is 
always satisfied for aIl i: 
zr (0) - II (1) ~ 0 (4.1) 
Since ri, (1) > 1, the result then dearly follows from the strictly decreasing property of the f,!1nction 
zr (as an implication of proposition 2), Le., 2!: (0) > 2!: (1). Hence the result 
Claim 2. The stmtegy profile pH 
stmtegy Nash equilibrium of n 
(pfI, .... p{I, .... p~) such that Pi = 1 for aU i E l, is a pure 
Proof: With inequality (2.12) in hands, the prooffollows in the same manner as in daim 1. This 
completes the proof of proposition 3. 
B. Proof of Proposition 4. 
To prove proposition 4, first, observe that for all i, Pi = {O, 1} " is dearly a compact subset 
of ~, since Pi is closed and bounded. Therefore property (i) of a supermodular game is trivially 
satisfied. Second, to establish property (ii) and (iii), it suffices to prove the following daim: 
Claim 1. For aU i E l, the function Vi : P -+ ~, is continuous on P, where P = XiEIPi. 
Proof. Since Pi is finite for aIl.i, therefore P is also finite, as the Cartesian product of a finite 
number of finite sets. Indeed, P has cardinal equal to 2N , which is finite, since N is a finite number. 
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Therefore, by theorem 12, Vi is continuous on P. This establishes property (ii) and (iii) of a strictly 
supermodular game. 
Third, to establish property (iv) , it suffices to prove the following daim: 
Claim 2. For all i E I, the function Vi : P -t ~, attains a maximum on P. 
Proof. Since the set of feasible joint strategies reduced to P is finite and has no more than 
2N elements, we also have that Vi (P) c ~ is also finite; and finitesubsets of ~ always contain 
their upper and lower bounds. It therefore follows that, Vi has a finite upper bound on P. This 
completes the proOf of this daim. 
Fourth, the following daim establishes propèrty (v) . 
Claim 3. Un der assumptions 1-3, the function Vi : P -t ~ has increasing differences in (Pi,P-i) 
on Pi X : for all i E I, for all ~> Pi and P'-i > P-i, 
(4.2) 
Proof. Let ~ > Pi and P-i > P-i and suppose, 
(4.3) 
Observe that inequality (4.3) can also be written as follow: 
(4.4) 
. aH i E I. 
Since Pi E {a, 1}, take 'A = 1 and Pi = a. Then, using the definition of Vi (.), it can be shown 
that the strict inequality (4.4) reduces to 
TI (n') - TI (n*.) < O. (4.5) 
12Theorem (continuity with opened sets): Any function defined on a finite set is contînuous. 
where 
n' = 1 + '""' ~l 
" L/J 
J-I-i 
n* 1+ Dj" 
J-I-i 
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Since P'-i > P-i, its follows that n' > n* by construction. Now, if n' ::s; n (1), then from (2.14), 
it follows that TI (n') - TI (n*) = 0 and we reach a contradiction. If n* ::s; n(l) < n' instead, then 
(4.5) reduces to 
1i"(1)-1[(1) < o . (4.6) 
. By using the Envelope theorem, one can easily show that inequality (4.6) leads to a contradiction, 
since () > 0 (i.e., since r < r, by construction). Finally, if n(l) < n*, then inequality (4.5) never 
holds. Hence the result. This completes the proof of proposition 4. 
c. Proof of Lemma 2. 
To prove Lemma 2, it suffices to show' that given p-i E P -i, and for an pairs (pf, pfI) E Pi X Pi 
such that pf #- pfI, Vi (pf,P-i) #- Vi (pfI,p_i).Suppose by way of contradiction that for sorne 
i Eland for sorne P-i E P-i, we have ( 
(4.7) 
Since Pi = {O, 1}, take pf = 0 and pfI = 1. Then, we can rewrite (4.7) as follows: 
which, using the definition of function Vi, reduces to 
1[ (0) = TI (n) , (4.8) 
where 
Ti l+LPj 
Ni 
Now, if Ti ~ n (1), then equality (4.8) reduces to 
1[(O)=K(l), . 
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(4.9) 
which is a contradiction since by Proposition 2, 1[(.) is a decreasing function, Le.,1[ (0) > K (1). If 
Ti> n (1), then (4.8) reduces to 
which contradicts inequality (2.12). Rence the result. 
31 
References 
[1] Anderson Siwan and Eswaran Mukesh (2005). "What Determines Female Autonbmy? Ev-
idence from Bangladesh". Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of British 
Columbia. 
[2] Anderson, Siwan, and Jean-Marie Baland (2002), "The Economics of Roscas and Intra-
household Resource Allocation, The. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117, no. 3, pp. 
963-995(33). 
[3] Basu, Kaushik (2005), "Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behavior with Endogenously-
determined Balance of Power, Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
[4] Charmes, Jacques (2000) " InformaI sector, Poverty and Gender: A Review of Empirical 
\ 
Evidence", Background paper for the World Development Report 2001. 
[5] Carter Michael and Fletschner Diana (2004). "Constructing and Reconstructing Gender: 
Credit Supply and Women's Demand for venture Capital". CSDE Working Paper No. 04-10. 
[6] Cooper, Russell and Andrew John (1988), "Coordination Failures in A Keynesian Models", 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 103(3): 441-463. 
[7] Dasgupta, Sukti and BarbattiniSmita (2003). "Own Account Work as Work Status: Learning 
from the PSS in Bangladesh and Tanzania". In Martha Chen, Renana Jhabvala and Guy 
Standing (eds). Rethinking Informality and Work. 
[8] De Soto, Hernando. (1989). The Other Path: the invisible revolution in the third world. Harper 
and Row, NY. 
[9] Deshpanda Rani (2001):. "Increasing Access and Benefits for Women: Practice and Inovations 
among Microfinance Institutions-SurveyResults" New York: UNCDF, 2001, 3. 
[10] Diamond, Peter k (1982) " Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium" , Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 90, 881-94. 
32 
[11] Djankov Simeon., La Porta Rafael., Lopez-de-Silanes Flbrencio, Shleifer Andrei.(2002). "The 
regulation of entry". Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1 -37. 
[12] Do'ing Business-Custom Query (2005), The World Bank Group. 
http:j jwww.doingbusiness.orgjCustomQueryj (acessed on December 2005). 
[13] Duflo, Esther (2005) " Gender Equality and Development". Working Paper, MIT Department 
of Economics. 
[14] Echenique, Frederico (2002) " Comparative Statics by Adaptative Dynamics and the Corre-
spondence Principle", Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 2, 833-844. 
[15] Echenique, Frederico. and Aaron S. Edlin (2004) "Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Unstable in 
Games of Strategic Complements". Journal of Economic Theory, 118: 61-79. 
[16] Fortin, Bernard, Nicolas Marceau, and Luc Savard (1997), "Taxation, Wage Controls and the 
InformaI Sector", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 66: 293-312. 
[17] Gibbon, Peter (1995). Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor III Zimbabwe. (Eds) , 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
[18] Goetz, Anne-Marie and Rina Sen Gupta (1996), "Who Takes the Credit?: Gender, Power, 
and Control over Loan Usein Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh", World Development vol 
24(1): pp. 45-63. 
[19] Gonzalez Aguilar Véronica (2006) "Women's Participation III Microfinance" 
http:j jwww.globenet.orgjhorizon-Iocaljadaj9905w.pdf (acessed on October 2006). 
[20] International Labour Office (2002b). Women and Men in the InformaI Economy: A Statistical 
Picture. Geneva: Employment Sector, International Labour Office. 
[21] Johnson Simon, Kaufmann Daniel, McMillan John and Woodruff Christopher.(2000). "Why 
do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism". Journal of Public Economics 
76, pp. 495-520. 
33 
[22] Kabeer, Naila (2001), "Confiicts Over Credit: Re-Evaluating the Empowerment Potential of 
Loans to Women in Rural Bangladesh", World Development. 29(1), pp. 63-84. 
[23] Kritz Mary M., Makinwa-Adebusoye Paulina and Gurak Douglas T.(2000) "The Role of Gen-
der Context in Shaping Reproductive Behavior in Nigeria" ... In Harriet B. Presser and Gita 
Sen eds.,Women's Empowerment and Demographic Processes. Oxford University Press, pp. 
239-260. 
[24] Lairap-Fonderson, Josephine (2002). The Disciplinary Power of Micro-Credit,in Parpart, J.L. 
eds, Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World. Routledge, 
chapter Il. 
[25] ,Mailloux, Linda (1998b) "Participatory programme learning for women's empowerment in 
microfinance programmes: negotiating complexity, confiict and change". IDS Bulletin, 29, 
39-50. 
[26] McIritosh, Craig and Bruce Wydick (2005). "Competition and microfinance". Journal of De-
velopment Economics 78(2), pp. 271-298. 
[27] Milgrom, Paul and Roberts John (1990). "Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strate-
gic Complementarities". Econometrica, 58, 1255-1278. 
[28] Sethuraman S. V. (1998) "Gender, Informality, and Poverty: A, Global Review" .World Bank, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department, and WIEGO, Washington, D.G 
[29] Shilue, J (2003). "Cultural Cynicisms & Market Forces-Women Empowerment Strug-
, 
gle in Liberia and West African Countries" , The Perspective, Atlanta, Georgia. 
http:j jwww.theperspective.orgjwomenempowerment.html (acessed on March 2008). 
[30] Tarski, Alfred (1955) "A Lattice Theoretical FixPoint Theorem and its Applications", Pacifie 
Journal of Maths, 5, 285-309. 
[31] Topkis, Donald M. (1968) Ordered Optimal Decisions. PhD. Dissertation, Stanford University. 
34 
[32] USAlD. Microenterprise Development in a Changing World: U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment Microenterprise Results Reporting for 2000 (Arlington, Va.: Weidmann Associates, 
2000),22 
,/ 
Chapter 2 
Why Are Agricultural Performances So Poor in 
Sub-Saharan Africa?t 
t This chapter is based on a paper coauthored with Sylvain Dessy and Isabelle Ouellette. 
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1. Introduction 
Po or agricultural performances and rapid population growth have combined to keep improve-
ments in agricultural productivity at the top of the policy agenda of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter SSA) has long been an arena for persisting food insecurity 
. and poverty, and does not look on track to achieve the new millennium development goals. Experts 
strongly recommend immediate action; Here is why. 
On one hand, available evidence shows that agriculture is the main source of economic growth 
in SSA (Diagana, 2003)1, and that the majority of it's population derives its livelihoodfrom agri-
cultural activities (Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985; Resnick, 2004). Yet, a 2004 report from the 
United Nations Conference on Nutrition reveals that 33 percent of SSA's population was under-
nourished in 2000, among which children were reported as particularly vulnerable (UNSCN, 2004). 
On the other hand, as shown in the graphs below, labour productivity and output growth in SSA 
rank weil below that of other developing regions.First,Figure 3 shows that SSA's average agricuI-
turai value-added per worker persi~tently lags behind that of ail other developing regions, including 
East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South Asia.2 
1 In SSA, the agricuiturai sector accounted in 1997 for about 35% of Gross Domestic Product, 40% of its exports 
and about 70% of employment (World Bank, 1997). It is also estimated in 1993 that, due to its stimulating effects 
on industry, transport and 
Bank, 1993). 
a 1% growth in agriculture generates an overall economic growth of 1.5% (Word 
2 A vailable data aiso indkate that during this period, SSA 's average agricultural value added per worker was 84 
percent of the averàge for East Asia and Pacific; 77 percent of the average for South Asia and, only 12 percent of 
that of the Latin America and the Caribbeanregion (World Development Indicators 2005). 
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Figure 3: Agricultural value added per agricultural _orker (constant 2000 US $) 
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Source: World Development Indicators 2005 
Second, as shown in Figure 4 below, agricultural productivity has been the lowest in SSA during 
the 1993-2001 period , when compared to other developing regions, including East Asia and Pacific, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and South Asia. 
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Figure 4: Regional trend in agricultural value-added (constant 2000 billion 
US$) 
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Source: World Development Indicators 2005 
Without d~liberate action, this trend will not reverse and the vast majority of small scale 
food-insecure rural households will be definitively doomed to a life poverty. 
2001 
38 
Third, according to agricultural experts worldwide, short term increases in agricultural pro-
duction can be achieved through the combination .of several factors, including fertilizer application 
(Gabre-Madhin and Johnston, 2002; Johnston and Kilby, 1975; Mellor, 1976). The Green Revolu-
tion of the 1960s and 1970s which led tospectacular increases in food production in several Asian 
countries, e.g. in lndia, Pakistan and, to.a lesser extent, Bangladesh and Nepal directly.speaks for 
this. 
Unlike Asia, and Latin America however, SSA has a persistent idiosyncrasy: :p.ot only is soil 
fertility very poor (Crawford, Jayne, and Kelly, 2006), but, in addition, at least 90% of its agri-
culture is controlled by poor smallholder farmers farming less than 5 hectares usuaily with over 
two thirds having less than one hectare and who have restricted access to large enough financial 
assets (Spencer, 2001). There is a consensus in the literature on agricultural development that, 
given SSA agroecological idiosyncrasies, the best remedy for poor agricultural performances lies in 
efficient use of fertilizers (see Banerjee and DuRo, 2006). In other words, for financially constrained, 
smallhold13r SSA' farmers, relying on fertilizer consumption to inc~ease on-farm yield is a viable 
alternative to mechanization of agriculture. Yet, as Figure 5 reveals, SSA persistently ranks last in 
fertilizer consumption compared to other dèveloping regions, with the gap increasing overtime.3 
n.'-',"V.LUH'I; to the Word Bank Report 1999, the observed trend of low fertîlizer use in Africa continues to raise 
concerns about the continent's ability to overcome it food problems because these low application rates have severe 
. consequences for the fertility of the soil and the sustanabilityof agricultural production. 
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Fijiture S: Re~ional Trends in fertilizer consumption (100 ~rftm per hectar of arable land) 
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Arguably, given the empirical evidence on the high productivity effect of fertilizer consumption4 , 
the small size of their farming operations, their difficulties to accessing credit and insurance markets, 
and the availability of fertilizer in small packs, smallholders need not rely on loans in order to finance 
fertilizer's consumption. Instead, they may need to rely upon their own savings, which they can 
build up using the proceeds from the previous harvesting season (DuRo, 2006). 
1Conservative estimates suggest an average return to using fertilizer that exceed 100 percent, while the median 
return is above 75 percent (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006). Further, in tables not reported here to save space, we also 
estimate the productivity effect of production-enhancing technologies such as agricultural machinery, land irrigation, 
fertilizer use, agricultural labour. Using on a Cobb-Douglas production function with data from a sample of 152 
countries- members of the World Bank for the 1990 to 2005 time period , we show that for agricultural outcomes 
such as food production, crop production, cereal yields, and agricultural productivity, fertilizer application has the 
highest productivity effect in the set of agricultural inputs. These evidence therefore suggest that even wh en small-
holder farmers in SSA cannot afford to buy the full package of production-enhancing technologies, poor agricultural 
performances in that sub-region have more to do with low fertilizer consumption, than any other factor among ail 
agricultural inputs. 
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Standard economic theory predicts that a rational farmer will choose to build up savings 
and purchase the recommended quantity of fertilizer if provided with the incentive to do so. In other 
words, demand for fertilizer is induced by economic incentives. This conclusion is the corner stone 
of neo-Boserupian theories of induced innovation, in the tradition of seminal works' by Binswanger 
and Ruttan (1978), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), and McGuirk and Mundlak (1991).5 Works in that 
tradition emphasize factor scarcity (fertile soils, in this case) and market opportunities as the main 
determinants of the demand for fertilizers. For instance, Goldman (1993) finds a relation between 
low fertilizet consumption and low population density in Kenya, implying that measures aiming 
at improving transportation and marketing infrastructure in rural areas are the means by which 
crop priees can be raised so that fertilizer use becomes more profitable for smallholders (Crawford, 
Jayne and Kelly, 2006). Poulton, Kydd, and Dorward (2006) arguethat enhancing affordability of 
fertilizer for smallholders may be important to increase fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa, even 
where fertilizer use is profitable. In a review of the existing literature on the demand for fertilizer 
in SSA, Kelly (2006) finds that priee stabilization in output I?arkets is seen as providing a high 
incentive for SSA smallholders to increase fertilizer consumption. 
In this paper, we argue that these poor agricultural outcomes are caused by the failure of SSA's 
farmers to intensif y agriculture through efficient use of fertilizers, and develop a game-theoretic 
model to explain low fertilizer consumption in SSA. In our model, agents are smallholder farmers 
who must build up their savings so as to finance the purchase of a recommended level of fertilizers. 
To build up their savings, far~ers in our model must draw on the proceeds from the previous 
harvesting season. However, a smallholder acting in autarky may find it hard to commit to saving 
for the next growing season (sorne four to six months away), if enough other farmers do not follow 
suit, because of traditional sharing obligations that put pressure on innovation-minded individuals 
to part with their assets in an unproductive manner. A farmer who anticipates this may renege on 
her commitment to save, and iristead partake in the tradition to share his incom~ with others. The 
more there are other farmers who break away from this tradition by firmly committing to saving, 
5 Neo-Boserupian theories are those that build around the seminal work of Boserup (1965). 
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the higher the likelihood that a farmer who saves in autarky will be able to protect her savings 
" from social predation. Consequehtly, a farmer's decision to save raises other farmers' marginal gain 
from saving. We show that the non-cooperative game these farmers play admits two pure-strategy 
Nash-equilibria:' a modernization equilibrium where all of them choose to save in order to finance 
the purchase of fertilizers, and a traditional equilibrium where they all elect not to save, and thus 
forfeit the benefits of farming modernization. 
Our game-theoretic model is consistent with the observed coexistence, in SSA, of low-fertilizer 
consumption with economic conditions which neo-Boserupian theories identify as essential for the 
onset of technological innovations in agriculture-namely poor soil fertility and market opportu-
nities. Indeed, in our model, conditions identified by neo-Boserupian theories as necessary, and 
suffident for the ons et of agricultural innovation are shown to he only necessary. To be sufficient, 
this set of conditions must be enlarged to include the creation of a savings technology capable of 
mitigating the effects of social predation on farmèr's decision to save. 
Apart from assuming that aU farmers are smallholders who must rely on fertilizer consumption 
to improve on-farm yield, two additional key assumptions provide t"he theoretical foundations of 
our model. First, farmers face a savings problem due to social pressures to part with their savings 
in an unproductive manner. Second, despite the fact that all farmers face this savings problem, 
they do not cooperate in solving it. In what follows, we provide evidence that motivates these two 
assumptions. 
1.1 Social Predation and Bounded Rationality 
That economic incentives alone dictate smallholders' behavior is the main implication of neo-' 
Boserupian theories. In the context of SSA, this is rather puzzling, given decades of intervention 
by both African governments and the international donor community.6 Indeed, this puzzle found a 
6 At the internationallevel, key bilateral donors, including the Department for international Development (DFID), 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), aild the US Agency for intern~tio~al Development (US-
AID) have developed extensive agricultural and rural development programs such as micro-credit progranis and, 
extensive fertilizer aid to small African farmers (Resnick, 2004). In 1996 for instance, Africa received the largest 
amount worldwide of Japan's Grant Aid for the Increase of Food Production (41 %), while the remaining aid was dis-
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resounding echo ina recent series of field experiments undertaken by Dufio, Kremer and Robinson 
(2005) in Busia, a rural district in Western Kenya where agriculture is the main income-generating 
activity and mostly operated by smallholder farmers growing corn on· their own field mainly for 
consumption. Their experiments seek to understand why so many people in Busia do not use 
fertilizer to enhancesoii-fertility even though it appears to have the potential to generate high 
on-farm yield increases, which in turn may improve farmers' well-being as well as food security 
in the region. Before their experiments, only 10% of farmers used fertilizer at any point in time, 
despite there being market opportunities for their crop, while fertilizer were available in small 
packs that required no large investment. For instance, Dufio, Kremer, and Robinson reveal that it 
costs 8 shillings, less than the price of 1 kilo gram of maize-the main staple cereals in the region-
to apply fertilizer on an area of 30 square meters. Furthermore, Dufio, Kremer, and Robinson 
also reveal that 80% of Busia farmers who received training on how to use fertilizer were still 
not usingit. According to Dufio (2006), 98% of these farmers reported facing a savings problem, 
that hindered their abilityto finance the purchase of fertilizers. So when, in another experiment, 
farmers were presented the option of buying a non-refundable, non-transferable voucher for fertilizer 
delivery in the growing season, Dufio, Kremer, and Robinson (2005) notice that 83% of them 
accepted the voucher-for-fertilizer scheme. Thus, despite the presence of economic incentives to 
increase fertilizer's consumption,' unresolved savings problems refiecting the social context that 
\ 
shapes farmers' behavior appeared to have introduced a constraint on farmers' ability to respond 
to these incentives. 
Evidence of social predation does not stop at Busia, or in Kenya. lndeed such evidence abounds 
tributed to Asia (28%), Central and ~outh America (15%), the middle East (8%) and East Europe (8%). The largest 
recipient include Kenya-with one billion yen worth of agricultural inputs, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zambia (The World 
Bank,1999). At the domestic level, fertilizer subsidies were adopted by almost ail African countries' governments and 
farmers were often freely trained and largely sensitized to its use. In the early 1980s, explicit fertiÜzer subsidies 
were widespread, and reached 25 percent in Malawi, 60 percent in Tanzania, 50 percent in Cameroon, 46 percent in 
Sene gal and 85 percent in Nigeria. In addition, many African governments also adopted macroeconomic policies that 
include currency overvaluation, budgetary constraints and foreign exchange restrictions aimed at reducing fertilizers 
priees (The World Bank, 1999). 
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throughout SSA. For example, James (1999) argues that in community with social norms and codes 
prescribing behaviors, people may publicly disapprove those who accumulate wealth without shar-
1 
ing it with the community. Fafchamps (1999) claims that iIi po or agrarian communities where 
people continuously interact in close proximity with another, private wealth accumulation is per-
ceived as an anti-social behavior precisely because it is an attempt to break away from traditional 
solidarity networks. Based on' a field research conducted in Southern provinces of Zambia between 
January and August 2000, Verstralen (2001) documents the presence of sociocultural factors such 
as tradition al ceremonies-e.g., marriage, initiation rites and funerals- that affect savings behavior 
because they often involve the generation and the redistribution of social payments. ,Chao-Béroff 
, (2003) reports increased daily social pressures in rural African areas where banking services are 
generaUy inaccessible and concludes that without a savings discipline amongst rural populations, it , 
is difficult for an individual in this environment to resist social pressures that make savings fungible. 
Ambec and Treich (2003) argue that in rural societies of African countries; traditional values press 
investment-minded individuals to spread their money within their community. Platteau (2006) 
reports that as a rule, generosity and hospitality are highly praised behaviors in traditional rural 
communities aIid successful individuals therefore gain social prestige and esteem wh en they redis-
tribute their surplus. AU the above facts suggest the presence, in SSA, of social institutions that 
put a bound on farmers' rationality. In other words, unlike the traditional homo economicus, a 
farmer's rationality, in SSA, is not unbounded, and our model takes explicit consideration of this 
facto 
1.2 Why Don't Smallholders Cooperate? 
Given that a farmer's decision to save raises other farmers' marginal gain from saving, one may 
expect that this strategic complementarity in farmers savings decisions pave the way for mutual 
cooperation in solving this savings problem. Yet, such cooperation is unlikely to emerge endoge-
nously, unless far mers , as a group, have access to a savings mobilization technology that satisfies 
the constraint that aU farmers access their savings at the same time, due to identical calendar 
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events. Obviously, such a requirement rules out informaI saving-by-Iending mechanisms of mutual 
cooperation such as those suggested by Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000). There are two main 
reasons for this: First, aIl farmers earn their in come at the same time (harvesting season). Sec-
ond, they aIl need their savings at the same period (growing season). Existing saving-by-Iending 
mechanisms, however, emphasize rotating credit among members throughout time. Consequently, 
we conjecture that an essential featureof the environment underlying farmers' decision to save in a 
smallholder agrarian corn munit y is the absence of cooperation among farmers in finding solutions 
to their savings problems. Hence the non-cooperative game these farmers play. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on strategie complementarities in agriculture. For 
example, Besley and Case (1994) show that in India, adoption of high-yield variety (HYV) seeds 
by an individual is correlated with adoption among their neighbors. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) 
study the use of fertilizer during the early years of the Green Revolution in India. They find that 
the profitability of HYV seeds increased with past experimentation, of either the farmers or others 
in the village. Conley and Udry (2005) show that pineapple farmers in Ghana imitate the choice of . 
fertilizer quantity of their neighbors when the latter have a good shock, and move furth~r away from 
these decisions when they have a bad shock. We build around this literature by emphasizing access 
to a savings technology as another source of strategie complementarities among farmers living in 
the same community. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented and 
solved in section 2. Section 3 offers concluding remarks. 
2. The Framework 
Consider an agrarian corn munit y consisting of N ex ante homogenous self-employed farmers, each 
endowed with a plot of farm land in which she grows a single agricultural crop. As essential means 
for boosting on-farm yield, assume a land-saving biotechnology is introduced in this region.7 For the 
sake of simplicity, assume this agrarian community lasts for four periods representing two identical 
7 One can think of this bio-technology as an' input p,ackage including, for example, high yielding varieties, and 
assorted fertilizer. 
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cropping cycles. Each cycle consists of two seasons, a sowing season (i.e., season 1) and a harvest 
season (i.e., season 2). The farmer's harvest is entirely sold in a competitive market by the end of 
the season. 
During the first cropping cycle, it is assumed an farmers use a traditional method of production 
at sowing-combining land with own labor as the only essential inputs. However, at the end of the 
first cycle, i.e., after the first harvest is sold, each farmer may consider modernizing her farming 
practices, by combining recommended commercial biotechnology with land and own-Iabor. The 
\ 
purchase of the recommended commercial input package must be self-financed, which. requires a 
period of savings. 
2.1 InformaI Savings and Social Pressures 
Let k > 0, denote the savings level required to purchase the recommended quantity of commercial 
biotechnology. Therefore, at the end of the first harvest season, a typical self-employed farmer 
i E I, (where I = {l, 2, ....... , N}) faces a binary decision in preparation for the next cropping cycle: 
either she saves ~ part of the proceeds of the sale of her first harvest (i.e., k), in or der to modernize 
her farming practices during the next cycle, or she do es not save, in which case she maintains a 
traditional production method throughout the two cycles. In other words, at the end of the first 
agricultural cycle, each farmer either takes an action Si = 1, meaning she commits to saving the 
amount of mèmey needed to purchase the recommended input package at the opening of the next 
cropping period; or she takes an action Si = 0, meaning she commits to maintaining the status quo 
for next cycle, in which case she does not save. 
However, in this community with no alternative formaI individual savings commitment tech-
nologies, it isassumed traditional values can press those who decide to save to spread their money 
within their community.8 Therefore, denote as 
"'n=a(n)k, (2.1) . 
8 For empirical evidences of this feature, see Platteau (2000) and Wendy (1979). 
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the net savings entirely controlled by a self-employed farmer who decide to modernize her farming 
practices, wh en n = Li Si, farmers elected to save. Thus, a (n) E [0,1], represents the fraction of 
her savings a typical farmer is able to protect from traditional sharing obligations. 
Assumption L The function a satisfies the following property: 
if n < n* 
if n 2: n* 
(2.2) 
where Q E (0,1), and n* E (I,N) den otes the threshold number of self-employed farmers in-
volved in a farming modernization activity, above which choosing to save entails no traditional 
sharing obligation for a farmer. 
Assumption 1 highlights the importance for smallholder farmers, as a group, to overcome social 
pressures that give rise to savings predation, preventing them from modernizing their farming 
activities. That n* is bounded below by 1 means that by privately accumulating savings alone, a 
typical farmer will suffer from the highest social pressures from doing so.9 
2.2 Farmer's Welfare 
Denote as zr, the gross earned-income a typical farmer claims, when she remains trapped into the 
agricultural status quo during the next cropping cycle. By contrast, let 
if n < n* 
if n 2: n* 
(2.3) 
9 As therefore implied by condition (2.2), that n < n°, means that a higher demand of others will undermine 
farmer i's ineentive to adopt a high-productive technology, In this case, all farmers will stagnate and remain poor. 
By contrast however, that n 2: n°, means that the higher is the ability for farmers to use land-saving biotechnologies 
introduced in their region. This may be do ne through the implementation of a savings discipline in this community, 
by offering farmers an instrument to save through for instance the creation of a all-farmers new commercial inputs 
purchasing association enabling participants to purchase commercial inputs immediately after the first harvest. Renee, 
that n 2: n°, can thus be interpreted as implying that ~n order for an inputs purchasing association to.be a viable 
collective barrier against traditional sharing obligations, there must 'be a higher number of self-employed farmers 
participants. 
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denote a farmer's returns to cropping when she chooses to modernize her agricultural activities. 
The term "'n is as defined in (2.1) and 2I: < ft by construction. 
Therefore, when a typical farmer chooses to play Si = 0, she only claims 2I:, after the second 
harvest. But, when she chooses to play Si = 1, she claims the residual 2I: if 'Tl- < n*, and ft > 2I:, if 
individual savings was to be totally secured from traditional sharing obligations, i.e., if n 2::, n*. 
Next, assume each farmer i E l, enjoys a level of seasonal consumption of a nufneraire good,as 
proxied by c), at the end of each cycle j (j = 1,2). Thus, a typical farmer i's budget constraint in 
cycle j is then given as follows: 
j = 1 
j='2 
where 1T ("'n) is as defined in (2.3). 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
Let u : C --t ~, denote a typical farmer's periodic utility function, where u (c)) represents the 
periodic, utility level she attains when she consumes an amo~nt, c). 
Assumption 2. The function u : C --t ~ has the following property for all c' > c, u (c')-u (c) > o. 
Assumption 2 implies that more consumption is always better for aIl farmers in this environment. 
Let 'V : {O, 1} x [0, N] be a real valued function with typical argument (Si, n) , where Si E {O, 1}, 
and n E [0, N]. We denote as 
where 
{ 
(1 + ,8)u (2I:) 
V(~,n)= _ 
, u(2I:- k )+,87J(n) 
if Si = 0 
if Si = 1 
J ( n) = { u (2I:) 
u(ft) 
if n < n* 
if n 2:: n* 
and ,8 E (0,1) denotes the usual intertemporal discounting factor. 
(2.6) 
As implied by assumption 2, if Si = 1 and n < n*, V(I,n) < V(O,n). Thus, in astate where 
n < n*, social pressures will become so harmftil to a typical farmer that she will be inclined to 
reject agricultural innovations introduced in her communitY. 
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Assumption 3. The parameters 1i", lI. and k satisfy the following condition: 
,B [u (1i") - u (lI.)] > u (lI.) - u (lI. - k) (~.7) 
Assumption 3 simply guarantees that all farmers in this environment have the incentive to 
use the commercial biotechnology. It implies that neo-Boserupian policy prescriptions aimed at 
inducing agricultural innovations are materialized in this environment. First, the left-hand term 
of condition (2.7) (i.e., ,B [u (1i") - u (zr)]) states that fertilizer's use boosts post-harvest income. 
According to neo-Boserupian induced innovation theory, this effect arises from public investment in 
storage and transportation infrastructures that create market opportunities for farmers' products. 
Indeed, as farmers in SSA often live in low-populationdensity rural areas, the profitability of 
farming modernization is essentially linked to their ability to find market opportunities for their 
products in consumption centers located in urban areas. Without adequate transportation a~d 
storage infrastructures, such opportunities would not exist. 
Second, the right-hand term (i.e., u (lI.) - u (zr - k)) denotes the cost, in utils, of modernizing 
farming methods. If fertilizer's costs (i.e., k) are too high, condition (2.7) may become violated. 
This violation would imply that modernization costs are at least as high as it benefits, if not higher. 
Therefore, in order for assumption 3 tci hold, it is necessary that the costs of using fertilizers be 
reduced, so as to create an incentive for modernization. This too, is a neo-Boserupian policy 
prescription. Yet, because the incentive to moderniie also depends on the farmer being able to 
secure her entire savings, and this, in turn, depends on how many other farmers will choose to 
build up their savings for this purpose, whether modernization will actually take place in our 
model agrariancommunity depends on the out come of a non-cooperative game between the N 
farmers. 
2.3 The Modernization Game 
Let l = {l, .... , N} be the finite set of self-employed farmers. The strategy set for each farmer 
i E I, is denoted as Si = {O, I}, with a generic element Si E Si. In addition, we adopt the following 
notations. Let S = XiE/Si denote the strategy space, whose elements s = (Si, S-i) E S define a 
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strategy profile.1° Let S-i = X{jEI; #i}Sj be the set of feasible joint strategies for farmers other 
\ 
than farmer i, with Li E S-i. Observe that since Si is finite for aIl i, S = Si X S-i is also finite 
and contains a total of 2N elements. 
2.3.1 Payoff Functions 
Continuing our description of the normal-form of the farming modernization game, we now turn 
our attention to the players' utility payoff functions. Let Ui : S ---+ ~, denote farmer i's payoff 
function associated with a strategyprofile Si = (Si, Li), where Ui (s) == V (Si, n) represents farmer 
i's payoff. The number n = Li Si, denotes the cardinality of the subset of farmers who choose to 
play the strategy Si = 1. 
Thus, as an implication of (2.6), if farmer i plays the strategy Si = 0, she will gain a payoff 
irrespect ive of what other farmers do. 
In contrast, if she plays the strategy Si = 1, she will gain a payoff 
if n < n* ; while she will gain a payoff 
if n ~ n*. 
A non-cooperative normal-form of the farming modernization game is the triple r = (1, S, {Ui : i E I}) , 
consisting of a nonempty set of players 1, a set S of feasible joint farming modernization strategies, 
and a collection of payoff functions {Ui : i E I}. As players aIl have identical strategy sets i.e., 
10 Si may'represent the message a typical farmer sends to his collectivity, while S may denote the set of messages 
within the same population of farmers, 
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SI = S2, ... = SN and for aIl i,j E {l, .... ,N}, Ui (s) = Uj (s), for aIl i =f j ,the normal-form game 
r is symmetric.ll 
2.3.2 Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies 
The problem set out in this subsection-,-- that of determining farmers' choice of the type of agri- ' 
cultural practices- is characterized here through the set of Nash equilibria when aIl farmers make 
their agricultural innovation's decision simultaneously. We define a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
(NE) in terms of the payoffs players receive from various strategy profiles: 
Definition 1. A pure-strategy profile s* ES is a NE of r if and only if Ui (s*) 2: Ui (Si, S:'-i) for 
~all Si E Si and all i E J. 
Let 'cr denote the set of pure Nash equilibria of the game r. Let sI E S andso E S be feasible 
strategy profiles, wheres l (respectively sO) is the strategy profile such that ~Il farmers choose to 
, purchase and to use the recommended commercial inputs package during the opening of the next 
croppingcycle, i.e., Si = 1 for aIl i (respectively opt for the agricultural status quo at sowing, i.e., 
Si = 0, for an i). First, we obtain the foIlowing result proved in Appendix A. 
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, {sO; sI}' E 'cr. 
Proposition 1 states that the strategy profile where aIl far mers choose the agricultural status quo 
(Si = 0, aIl i J and the strategy profile where they aIl use the recommended level ofbiotechnology 
in their agricultural activities (i.e., Si = 1, aIl i) are both Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative 
game r. 
Before we proceed to derive further policy implications from the result outlined in PropositIon 
1, we must address the question of whether the strategy profiles sO and sI are indeed the only stable 
equilibria of the symmetric game, r. , After aIl, there is no a priory guarantee that a symmetric 
game with strategie complementarities only has symmetric equilibria. Therefore to address this 
issue of whether {sO, sI} are indeed the only equilibria of the modernization game, we first show 
llHence, the identity of the players does not matter and we do notneed to consider strategy profile separately. 
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that r is indeed a supermodular game (as this concept is defined and used in Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990), also known as agame characterized by strategic complementarities. 
Definition 2. (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) r ,is a supermodular game, iffor all i, 
(i) Si is a compaâ subset of R; 
(ii) Ui is upper semi continuous in Si, for each fixed B-i; 
(iii) Ui is continuous in B-i, for each fixed Si; 
(iv) Ui has a finite upper bound; 
(v) Ui has (strictly) increasing differences in (Si, B-i) on Si x S-i. 
In particular, property (v) of Definition 2 implies that, ,for a typical small self-employed farmer 
i, the incremental gain from taking a higher action is higher, when other farmers also play their 
. . 
highest action: for all s~ > Si and s'-i > B-i, 12 
The theory of supermodular games provides rigorous analytical tools for eliciting both the car-
dinality and the structure of the set of Nash-equilibria of a non-cooperative game with.strategic 
complementarities. In particular, the importance of this theory in the present paper lies in sev-
eral crucial properties these games have. First, the major characteristic of games with strategic 
complementarities is the presence of Pareto-ranked equilibria, which creates the possibility for co-
ordination failures (Cooper and John, 1988; Diamond, 1982). Second, wit;h a supermodular game, 
there is no need for mixed-strategies to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium, as the existence 
of ~quilibrium of such game do es not 'require continuity of best response function (i.e., application 
of Tarski's fixed point theorem). Third, as an implication of super:rp.odularity, we can easily restrict 
12 As an implication of property (v) of Definition 3, each' player will therefore choose a higher action when other 
players increase their action. 
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our analysis to NE in pure strategies, because when a supermodular game has mixed strategy 
equilibria, these equilibria are always «unstable» under a variety of dynamic adjustment process 
(Echenique, 2002; Echenique aJ)d Edlin, 2004). 
To show that the farming modernization game, r, is supermodular, it suffices to prove that 
properties (i) - (v) above are satisfied. We prove the following proposition in Appendix B. 
Proposition 2. Under assumptions 1-3, the symmetric farming modernization game r, is super-
modular. 
Proposition 2 implies that conditions underlying Topkis' theorem apply, so th~t for thegame 
r, each small self-employed farmer's best response function (i : S-i --t Si , where 
is strictly increasing in the strategy profile chosen by players other than herself: for all i, and for 
all S'-i > S-i,' (i (S'-i) > (i (S-i). Indeed, given the properties of the function (i, a pure-strategy 
Nash-equilibrium of r always exists, by the application of Tarski's fixed-point theorem . 
. N ow, since the best replies, (i (S-i), are increasing, players' strategies are complements, implying 
that r indeed admits multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Thus, to rulè out asymmetric pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, we show in the following Lemma -whiCh we proved in Appendix C-, that 
farmers' best responses are single-valued correspondences (i.e., each (i is a function): 
Assumptions 1-3, (i (S-i) is a singleton. 
Lemma 1 states that given S-i E S-i, Ui (., S-i) has a unique maximizer in Si. In other words, 
players best replies are single-valued. This result combined with the application of Topkis' theorem 
rules out the existence of asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the farming modernization 
game, r. Hence the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-3 , {sO, SI} = Cr. 
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Proposition 3 states that the strategy profile where aIl farmers elect to maiiltain the status quo 
and the oné where they aIl elect to save and thE;!refore modernize their agricultural practices are 
the only pure-strategy Nash-equilibria of the farming modernization game, r. 
As an implication of Proposition 3, it foIlows that, in an environment with strategic complemen-
tarities, individual (farm-Ievel) adoption of high-productive land-saving biotechnologies introduced 
in the community is strongly determined by the aggregate behavior. In other words, "when in 
Rome", it pays to "do as the Romans do". 
The multiplicity of equilibria outlined in Proposition 3 suggests that there is a role for public 
policy in enhancing farming modernization, beyond what is prescribed by neo-Boserupian theories 
of induced innovation. Such additional policy would help coordinate farmers' decisions toward 
the modernization equilibrium. But. such an action is desirable only if the two equilibria can be 
ranked according to the Pareto principle. The foIlowing Proposition therefore establishes the needed 
ranking. 
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-3, the symmetric pure-strategy profile sI Pareto dominates 
the profile so. 
Proof. To prove this Proposition, it suffices to show that for aIl. i El, and for aIl Si E Si, 
Ui (sI) - Ui (sO) > O. To proceed, let Ai == Ui (SI) - Ui (sO) . From the definition of the payoff 
fun.ction Ui, the differenc~ Ai red uces to 
The result simply foIlows from condition (2.7). This completes the proof. 
Proposition 4 states that the strategy profile where aIl farmers elect to modernize their farming 
. practices by adopting high-productive land-saving biotechnologies is strictly preferred to the one 
where they aIl elect to maintain the status quo. 
Because the modernization equilibrium (i.e. SI) is counter-intuitive for SSA economies charac-
" 
terizedby a timelessly low performance of the agricultural sector, our analysis suggests that SSA's 
J 
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persistent poor record of agricultural modernization reflects a coordination failure in farmers' sav-
strategies. Our analysis also suggests that the creation of new, less-fungible savings products 
by helping SSA farmers overcome social pressures that prevent them from firmly committing to 
saving, may indeed boost modernization of SSA agriculture. 
As the optimàl intertemporal decision depends the more on the discount fun ct ion utilized, 
a growing body of the time-inconsistent-literature (see, for instance, Ackerlof,1991; Brocas and 
Carrillo, 2001; Strotz, 1956) argues that in a case of a behavioural regime where decision makers 
discount rather hyperbolically than exponentially (i.e., the discount rate is not a constant but 
declining over time), it can be optimal from an ex-antè point of view to PostpoIl;e technological 
. -
changes from traditional agricultural practices to modern agricultural practices into the future. 
Clearly, with hyperbolic preferences, the potential problem of time-inconsistency generally occurs, 
implying that an ex ante optimal intertemporal consumption and investment strategy, obtained 
from the maximization of farmer's welfare in the first sowing season, will not be optimal if reassessed 
at the second sowing season when no mandat ory commit ment can be enforced. The model in this 
paper differs from much of the time-inconsistent-preference explanation for saving difficulties in 
two main ways. First, its makes a clear case that savings commitment problem is plausibly related 
, 
to social obligations. Second, its shows that it is more important to protect the farmer from others 
and not from herself, as suggested by the literature linking saving commitment problems with time 
inconsistent preferences. 13 
3. Conclusion 
This paper had two principal goals. The first was to show how the sociocultural context impacts 
farmers' decisions to modernize their agricultural activities. The sociocultural context we con-
sidered was highlighted by the prevalence, in African rural communities, of traditionàl sharing 
13The later literature supports the idea that institutions such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations can help 
their members to overcome inconsistent preferences problems preventing them to manage their money in a way that 
help them better coping with poverty they are trapped ln (see, for instance, Banerjee and Dufio, 2006; Rutherford, 
1999). 
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obligations that present innovation-minded individuals with self-control problems on their private 
financial and non financial assets. The second goal was to investigate necessary and sufficient 
conditions for farmers to modernize their farming practices in such a context. We drew from the 
existing literature in assuming that the introduction of high-productivity, land-saving biotechnolo~ 
gies in agriculture was a determining factor of on farm productivity increase. We also maintain 
that the African environment, with the exception of war-torn countries, potentially offers profitable 
economic opportunities for smallholder farmers, which, according to neo-Boserupian theorists ac-
counts for the decision to introduce technological innovations in agriculture. To achieve these two 
goals, we used a game-theoretic framework featuring a non-cooperatIve game of farming modern-
ization decision between ex ante homogenous self-employed farmers. We demonstrated that this 
game admits two pure-strategy, Pareto-ranked, symmetric Nash-equilibria. The equilibrium where 
all farmers choose to modernize their farming methods is preferred to the one where aIl of them 
choose to remain trapped in the agricultural status quo. Because of the multiplicity of equilib-
ria, we conc1uded that there is a role for public policy in enhancing farming modernizatioll in 
SSA, beyond what is prescribed by neo-Boserupian theories of induced innovation. In other words, 
scarcity and economic opportunities for farmers, which have been put forward by neo-Boserupian 
agricultural economists as determinants for the onset of technological innovations in agriculture, 
are, in the context of SSA, only necessary, but not sufficient, to generate modernization of farming 
methods. Indeed, coordination failures in farming modernization choices may prevent farmers from 
mitigating traditional sharing obligations that hinder their saving efforts. We argued that in SSA, 
to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions, one must supplement neo-Boserupian policy prescrip-
tions with the creation of savings products---say, non-refundable and non-transferable vouchers as 
argued by DuRo (2006). Such savings technology may help mitigate social pressures that prevent 
SSA's smaIlholder farmers from firmly committing to building their savings necessary to finance 
fertilizer consumption. 
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4. Appendix 
A. Proof of Proposition 1. 
The proof is divided in two daims: 
Claim 1 The strategy profile sO =( s~, .... s?, .... sfy) such that Si = 0, for aU i, is a pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium of r. 
Proof: Using the definition of a payoff fllnction, it follows from definition 1 that the profile sO 
is a pure-strategy NE of r if and only if the following condition is always satisfied for aIl i: 
u(2r)(I+,B)- V(1,0) ~ 0 (4.1) 
Since n* > 1, the resllit then clearly follows from the definition of fllnetion V, and the strictly 
increasing property of the funetion u i.e., u (zr.) > u (1[ - k). 
Claim 2. The strategy profile SI (si, .. .. s}, .... sJv) such that Si = l , for aU i, is a pure-strategy 
Nash equiliorium of r. 
Proof: With inequality (2.7) in hands, the proof follows in the same manner as in daim 1. 
Rence the resllit. 
B. Proof of Proposition 2. 
To prove proposition 2, first, observe that for aIl i, Si {O, 1}, is clearly il compact sllbset· 
of 1R, sinee Si is closed and bOllnded. Therefore property(i) of asùpermodular game is trivially 
satisfied. Second, to establish' property (ii) and (iii), it sllffices to prove the following claim: 
, ' 
. Claim 1. For aU i E l, the ju,,!ction Ui : S -7 1R, is continuous on S, where S XiE/Si. 
Proof. Sinee Si is finite for all i, it follow that S is aIso finite, as the Cartesian prodllct of a 
finite number of finite sets. Indeed, S has cardinal eqllal to 2N , which is finite, since N is a finite 
number. Therefore, by theorem14 , Ui is c~ntinllolls on S. This establishes property (ii) and (iii) of 
a strictly sllpermodlliargame. 
14Theorem (continuity with opened sets): Any function defined on a finite set is continuous. 
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Third, to establish property (iv) , it suffices to prove the following daim: 
Claim 2. For aU i E 1, the function Ui : 8 ---t iR, attains a maximum on 8. 
Proof. Since the set of feasible joint strategies reduced to 8 is finite and has no more than 
2N elements, we also have that Vi (8) c iR is also finite; and finite subsets of iR always contain 
their upper and lower bounds. It therefore foUows that, Ui has a finite upper bound on 8. This 
completes the proof of this daim. 
Fourth, the following daim establishes property (v) . 
Claim 3. Under assumptions 1-3, the function Ui : 8 ---t iR has increasing differences in 
(Si, S-i) on 8i x 8-i : for aU i E 1, for aU s~ > Si and s'-i > Li, 
(4.2) 
Proof. Suppose that for aU i E 1, s~ > Si and s'-i > Li but, 
(4.3) 
We will show that inequality (4.3) leads to a contradiction. First, observe that inequality (4.3) 
can be written as follows: 
(4.4) 
Next, since Si E {O, 1}, for àll i E 1, take s~ = 1 and Si = O. Then, it can be shown that (4.4) 
reduces to 
V (1, n') - V (1, ri) < 0 (4.5) 
where 
n' 1+ LS} 
j'fi 
n 1+ LSj 
j'fi 
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Since > .Li, its follows by construction that ri < n'. Now, If n' < n*' then from (2.6), it 
follows ,that V (1, n') V (1, ri) D and we reach a contradiction. If ri < n* :::; n' insteàd, then 
(4.5) reduces to 
u (1r) - U CE) < D. 
Contradiction again, sinee by Assumption 2, the function u (.) is strictly increasing in its argument, 
Le., u(1r) > u(11:). Finally, if ri;::: n*, then inequality (4.5) never holds onee more. This completes 
the proof of proposition 2. 
C. Proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof. To prove Lemma 1, it suffiees to show that given Li E S-i, and for aIl pairs (s7, sD E 
Si X Si such that s? =1- st, Ui (s7, Li) =1- Ui (sI, Li)' Suppose by way of eontr!3-diction that for sorne 
i El, and for sorne E S-i, we have 
(4.6) 
Sinee Si = {D, 1}, for all i E l, take S7. = D and sI = 1. Then, we can rewrite (4.6) aS follow: 
whieh, using the definition of function Ui, reduces to 
(1 + p) u (11:) V (1, fi) (4.7) 
where 
Now, suppose that Sj = 0, for all j =1- i. Then, sinee 1 < n*, equality (4.7) reduees to 
(4.8) 
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which is a contradiction of Assumption 2 implying that u (zr:) > u (zr: - k) . Likewise, suppose 
that Sj = 1, for all j -:/= i. Ifn < n*, then, equality (4.7) reduces again to (4.8) and we also reach a 
contradiction once more. If n ;::: n*, then (4.7) reduces to 
(i +,B) u (1I:) = u (zr: - k) +,Bu (if) (4.9) 
which contradicts condition (2.7) Implying that (1 + ,B) u (l[) < U (l[ - k) + ,Bu (if) Rence the 
result. 
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Chapter 3 
An Empirical Analysis of Private Rates of Returns to 
Education in Cameroont 
t This chapter is based on a paper coallthored \Vith Désiré Vencatachellllffi. 
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1. Introduction 
A rational individual invests in education if the expected private benefits exceed the cost. A 
government which aims at increasing school enrollment should adopt policies to reduce the cost of 
schooling and to increase the private benefits of education. Consequently, estimates of private rates 
of return to education (RORE), defined as the increase in a worker's earnings following addition al 
schooling (or as the average effect on labour in come of one year increase in educational attainment), 
are of interest as they allow us to understand the education process of individuals and to inform 
éducation policies. Recently, sorne studies have estimated RORE for a number of countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 1 Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002), who summarize the literature, conclude 
that RORE are positive but decrease with the level of schooling (concave RORE) across countries. 
However, more recently, Schultz (2004) finds that RORE increase with the level of schooling (convex 
RORE) in six sub-Saharan Africa countries. While the survey for each country in Schultz'sanalysis 
is representative of the population, this is not true for many countries in Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2002).2 
We contribute to that literature by using the 2001 Cameroon Household Survey (CHS) to 
estimate the RORE and the determinants of employment in Cameroon. We differ from previous 
studies of RORE in Cameroon, and many others for sub-Saharan Africa in three ways. First, our 
sample includes formal and informaI sect or workers as those in the informaI sect or account for 
sixty-five per cent of workers. 3 Second, we compare returns to attending an education cycle with 
returns from graduating from that education cycle. lndeed, in our sample, close to two thirds of 
·1 See Kazianga (2004); Michaud and Vencatachelum (2001); Mwabu and Schultz (1996, 2000) ; Schultz (2002, 
2004); Siphambe Kufigwa (1999); 
2In a critical review of the RORE literature in sub Saharan Africa, Bennell (1996) remarks "empirical shortcomings 
which seriously undermine the credibility of aggregate RORE estimates for the co~tinent as a who le" . 
3The 2001 CRS documents if arespondent's employer, or the respondent "if self-employed, was registered for" 
tax purposes. Such individuals are assumed to be in the formai sector, while the others are in the informai sector. 
According to this définition therefore, twenty-four per cent of workers are in the formai private sect or and the 
, 
remainder, i.e. a sm ail minority, work in the public sector. The importance of the informai sector in Africa also stems 
from the fact that its created six million jobs between 1980 and 1986, white only 500,000 were created in the formai 
sector over the same period (ILO, 2002). 
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labour market participants who attended primary school did not graduate. Using schooling at a 
particular level as an explanatory variable means that we cannot distinguish between those who 
have completed the education cycle from those who have not. Ceteris paribus, weexpect graduates 
to earn higher incomes than non-grad~ates. Third, we account for sample selection by using T'tost 
and Lee's (1984) correction and verify if our results are robust to population weights. Finally, in 
addition to undèrstanding the realities of Cameroon, our analysis is of interest for sub-Saharan 
Afrka because Cameroon shares a number of similarities with other countries of that region. It 
dependsheavily on primary commodities, has a relatively high unemployment rate and suffered 
from similar terms of trade shocks.4 
We know of two studies which estimateRORE for Cameroon. The first one by Lanot and Muller 
(1997) uses data from a sample of women in Yaounde (the capital of Cameroon). They find convex 
RORE in aIl sectors. However, their sample contains fewer than 200 individuals when they estimate 
the wage equation, ip.c1udes only women, and is not representative of the population. Moreover, 
while they distinguish between the formaI and informaI sectors, they do not treat those who work 
in the public sector separately. In a second study, Bigsten and Al. (2000) also find convex RORE 
for a sample of workers from 170 companies in the manufacturing sect or. Unfortunately, they can 
neither account for sample selection, nor inform us about RORE in the non-manufacturing (formaI 
or informaI) sectors. 
We start by noting that the unweighted and population-weighted estimates differ. For example, 
not using the population-weighted estimates would wrongly lead one to conclu de that primary 
school graduates who are in the public sector earn positive returns and that in the public sector, 
men with primary school certificate earn more than women with the same type of credentials. 
Focussing on the population-weighted estimates we find that the private RORE are convex in aIl 
sect ors of employment, irrespective of using school attendance or graduation as an explanatory 
variable of earnings. As expected, private RORE are higher at aIl comparable levels of education 
4We also add to the few francophone and lusophone sub-Saharan Africa countries for which there exist RORE 
estimates. Two exceptions are Psacharoupolos (1994) for Senegai, Kazianga (2003) for Burkina Faso and Schultz 
(2004) 
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for graduates than for those who fail to graduate. This difference indicates that there is a value 
from having successfully completed an education cycle and may arise because the labour market 
interprets school graduates as being of higher productivity than those who do not graduate. The 
results are particularly enlightening for primary school: while primary school graduates working; 
in the private sectoI: èarn significant positive returns, those who have not successfully completed 
primary school earn no returns. Hence, assuming that the quality of schooling does not change, 
. . 
one policy implication of our result is to strive to at least make students graduate from primary 
school. 
There are a number of other interesting results which are worth highlighting. The returns to 
education are much higher for university graduates, or even for those who have attended university 
but did not graduate, than for any other education level. For example, everything staying constant, 
a university graduate earns 4.6 times more than a primary school graduate. Given the large size 
of the informaI sector, it is of interest to note that workers in that sector earn higher returns to 
vocational education than to general education. We also find that those who live in rural areas 
earn less than those in urban areas, and females who work in the private and informaI sectors earn 
less than their male counterparts. Interestingly, once we control for other characteristics, there is 
no male-female earnings gap in the public sector. 
Our estimation strategy is related to Lassibille and Tan (2005) for Rwanda who find convex 
RORE inall sectors of employment. Apart from using data for Cameroon, we differ from these two 
authors by estimating à sample-weight~d model which provides a consistent estimate of the popu-
lation regression function under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified (Deaton, 
. , 
1997, p.71). Although our estimates are consistent with those of Lassibille and Tan (2005), there 
is an important difference. While they find no returns for primary school graduates, we do find 
that these workers earn positive returns in the informaI and private formaI sectors, but not in the 
public sector. Lassibille and Tan (2005) also find no statistically significant male-female wage gap 
in the public or private formaI sectors, but such a gap exists in the informaI sector. Our estimates 
are also in line with Schultz (2004) and are confirmed by our robustness checks. 
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The fact that there are positive private returns to having graduated from primary school, but not 
from having attended primary school, has important policy implications. This threshold, combined 
with the low share of the population who complete primary school, suggest that many households 
are in a poverty trap. Although the expected benefits from completing primary school are high, 
many parents may be too poor to afford to see their children through primary school. These parents 
may not be able to afford the material to enable their children to perform al school. Given the 
budget constraint they face, parents may decide not to educate their children who in turn make 
the same choice when they become parents. To avoid this intergenerationa1 poverty trap, policies 
which target budget-constrained housèholds, such as cash transfers, would allow these children to 
complete primary school. Moreover, given the high RORE for university'graduates, a scaling-up 
of the education budget àt aUlevels is required to increase the number of students who reach and 
complete secondary and tertiary education. Such policies may also help to solve any coordination 
failure problem where firms are reluctant to adopt skill-biased technologies because of the low 
aggregate humari capital (Galor and Moav, 2000) and thus increase economic growth in Africa. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a very simple framework 
to understand the fundamentals of an economy which can give rise to convex or concave returns to 
education. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the educational system and of the labour market in 
Cameroon, and describes the main characteristics of the 2001 Cameroon CRS. Section 4 outlines 
. our estimation strategy, while the estimates of the earnings and participation equations are in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The proof and aU tables are in the Appendix at the end of the 
paper. 
2. A Simple Model of Convex Returns toEducation 
We construct a simple model to highlight the fundamentals of an economy which can give 
rise to either concave or convex returns to education. Consider an economy populated by a . large 
number of individuals, each endowed with some human capital (or education). For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume three education levels, which in turn implY some skills level: a person is 
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either uneducated (unskilled), has only primary education (semi-skilled), or at least secondary 
education (skilled). There areU uneducated persons, P who have attended primary school and S 
have at least secondary education. 
On the production side, assume a two-sectors economy composed of a formaI and an informaI 
sectors. The informaI sector is characterized by a technology which can be used by labour with no 
education. Those ~ho work in that sector are paid their reservation wage w. Concerning the formaI 
s~ctor, we assume firms operate in a perfectly" competitive environment and use a technology which 
has semi-skilled and skilled workers âs inputs. As in Acemoglu (2002), we assume formal~sector 
firms produce a homogenous good-using a constant elasticity of substitution production function. 
'-
Let a representative formal-sector firm hire p individuals with primary education and s persons· 
with at least secondary school to pro duce y units of the marketable good: 
(2.1) 
where ap and as are factor-augmenting technology terms and the parameter cp :::; 1. 
As firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment, workers are paid at their marginal 
product. ~learly, we assume that firms seek to maximize profits from producing y subject to input 
prices w and we solve for profit maximization as a non-constrained" optimization problem. Thus,· 
using (2.1), and letting À = s/p, we obtain that skilled and semi-skilled workers earn 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
respectively. 
Generally, there ar~ two ways to modellabour-augmenting technical progress (ak, k = p, s): as 
the introduction of new production methods that directly increase the productivity of labour, or as 
the introduction of new goods and tasks that use labour (Acemoglu, 2002). But for simplicity, let 
suppose here that labour-augmenting progress takes the first form. Hence, the ratio as / ap captures 
l, 
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skill bias of production technology in our environment. It is therefore useful to briefly outline the 
intuition for why returns to education can be convex. The following proposition gives conditions 
under which the wage premiumfor skilled workers, relative to semi-skilled ones, is greater than the 
wage premium earned by semi-skilled workers relative to those who are unskilled. 
Proposition 1. (Concavity or convexity of returns to education) The returns to education 
are strictly convex il 
(2.4) 
Otherwise, returns to education are concave. 
Proposition 1 means that the relative scarcity of skilled workers, which is captured by >., and the 
nature of the technology as measured by as/Op combine to generate convex returns to education. 
Proposition 1 holds trivially if>' is relatively small. Now, suppose for instance that as/Op 1, that 
labour-augmenting progress is identical for aIl categories of skilled workers. Thus, comparing 
(2.2) and (2.3), it follows that those who have completèd secondary school never earn less than 
those with only primary education. In fact, there is a positive premium to education as long as 
there are fewer skilled workers than unskilled ones, i.e. >. < 1. If an economy is characterized by 
the opposite (>' > 1), skilled and ,semi-skilled wages WQuid be equal in equilibrium because skilled 
workers can hold unskilled positions.5 It is interesting however to note that for a more general 
case of labour-augmenting progress (i.e., as/Op # 1), the scarcity of skilled workers per se is not 
sufficient to generate convex returns ta education in an economy. Indeed, a corollary of Proposition 
1 is that the returns to education are concave if skilled and semi-skilled workers are complements, 
that is, when cp' approaches 0: (2.4) never holds in this case. Consequently, observing convex 
returns to education allows us to make inferences about both the share of skilled individuals in the 
country and the technology being tised. In many developing Gountries there are far less people with 
secondary education than those who have only primary education. As a result, when the ratio s/p 
is relatively small, the returns to education ~an be convex provided that cP is not too high. Note 
"Note that by assumption, workers in the informal soctor earn less than those with only primary education and 
who work in the formai soctor, 
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that the proposition excludes the case where skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes 
(<p = 1) in which case aIl workers earn the same wage. 
Although our model is extremely simple, the main implications would still ho Id in more complex 
environments. For example, consider the impact of an administrative sector on Proposition l. 
Assume, as is the case in Cameroon, that employment conditions in the administrative sector 
are as good as, if not better than, in the private formaI sector. Moreover assume there are few 
openings in the administrative sect or. The number of vacant positions, and wages, is determined 
by the government. It is also the case that those in the administrative sector enjoy having lifetime 
employment. Consequently, a rational individual would prefer to work for the government instead 
of the private seètor, thus creating an excess demand for these positions. Introducing such an 
administrative sector in our model would reduce the share of skilled workers available for the 
private sector and make the returns to education more convex. A more realistic model should allow 
parents to choose their investment in the education of their children. In this case, the number of 
individuals, at each level of education, will depend on their parents' income, the opportunity cost 
of attending school and of the expected returns of doing so. In such an environment, although 
the rates of returns to education are very high,parents may rationally choose not to educate their 
children if the cost of doing so is too high ( Dessy and Vencatachelum, 2003). This may be the 
case if parents have no access to credit markets to complement the income fall when their children 
attend school. Consequently, high convex returns to education point to significant barriers which 
parents face in educating their children. 
In what follows, we discuss the institutional aspects of the educationa:l sector and labour market 
in Cameroon. This allows us to highlight the constraints which parents face in educating their 
children, the suppl y of skilled and unskilled labour and the technology which firms use in Cameroon. 
3. Institutions and the Cameroon Household Survey 
We briefly review in section A the institutional and economic environments which may m?-tter 
for the returns to education in Cameroon. We then discuss the main characteristics of the 2001 
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Cameroon household survey and carry a non-parametric analysis in section B. 
3.1 Institutional and economic environment 
Cameroon has two parallel educationnal systems along the same lin es as the British and French 
ones. Primary education, which consists of six grades in French-speaking Cameroon, and of seven 
grades in English-speaking areas, is compulsory from age five. There is approximately the same 
number of government and private combined to religious-run primary schools. While governIllent-
run schools charge no tuition fee, private and religious-run ones usuaIly do. Primary schools 
graduates can choose between secondary (grammar) schools, technical (vocational) schools, and 
training institutes. After secondary school, those who wish to pursue further studies in Cameroon 
can choose among six state-owned and two private universities, and about a dozen professional 
schools. 
Compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the Cameroon educational system has performed 
relatively weIl. The adult (those aged 15 and above) literacy rate is estimated at 72 per cent while 
the c·orresponding number for sub-Saharan Africa is 62 per cent (United Nations Development 
Program, 2003). There exists however important regional and gender disparities in educational 
attainment in Cameroon. In 2001, the net school enrolment rate for those aged 6 to 14 years was 
79 per cent countrywide, 90 per cent in cities and 70 per cent in rural areas. Moreover, while 80 
per cent of males are literate, this is true for only 60 per cent of females. 
These educational attainments have been threatened by the economic downturn which hit 
Cameroon in the 80s and 90s. The government's revenue fell because of lower world commod-
ity prices while at the same time its expenditure increased. For instance, the public-sect or wage 
bill reached 63 per cent of the government's revenue in the fiscal year 1985-86. In the meantime, 
international prices of raw materials widely produced in Cameroon, fell by 11.3 ·per cent for co-
coa, 12.5 per cent for coffee robusta, and 5.2 per cent for cotton (Le Cameroun en chiffres, 2000; 
DSCNjMINEFI, 2001). As a result, the government could not pay its employees. Sorne civil ser-
vants earned more through second jobs and jor bribes than from their official jobs. Many were 
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not paid on time or had to pay bribes in order to be paid (WorId Bank, 2001). AlI. this gave 
additional impetus to the informaI sector. The government reacted by cutting the wages of civil 
servants and administration contract workers (but not military personnel) first by 15 per cent and 
then by an additional 45 per cent. The government also reduced its other e~penditures, including 
that on education. Public expenditure on education fell therefore from 309 million US$ to 223 
million US$ from 1995 to 1999, i.e.) a level which is only marginally higher than in 1980 (WDI, 
2004). Similarly, the studentJteacher ratio in primary schools increased from 51 to 65 between 1997 
and 2000.6 cuts reduced the size of the public service by nearly 15 per cent between 1990 
and 1998 (Ministry of Finance, Economie and Financial report 1999/2000, p45). Bearing those 
institutional and macroeconomic facts in mind, we now present the relevant data from the 2001 
CHS which is used to estimate the rates of returns to education. 
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The 2001 CHS is a representative sample of the population which contains informations at both the 
household and individuallevel.7 Each of the ten province was split in an urban and a rural cluster 
and the two largest towns, Douala and Yaounde, were treated separately. A two-stage stratified 
cluster design was used in Douala, Yaounde, small and large towns in urban areas. The first 
stage draws randomly from the population of Zones de denombreml?nt (ZD) and then in a second 
stage households were drawn. A three-stage stratified c1uster design was used in rural areas: first 
arrondissements were drawn, then ZD and third households.8 In summary, 1,200 households were 
surveyed in each of Douala and Yaounde, while an average of 915 households were sampled in each 
other province. The final sample consists of 10,992 households and 56,443 individuals. 
labour force: Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the main variables of interest. The 
latest available figure for 2000, indicates that public expenditure in education has.increased by 43 per cent 
from 1999. School-days and workdays. were also modified to allow childreri to attend school and participa te in the 
labor market (Eloundou-Enyengue and Davanzo, 2003). 
7The 2001 CHS used the same methodology and questionnaires as the well-known living standard measurement 
surveys (Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale 2001). 
8Further information on the design of the survey is available in Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité 
Nationale (2001). 
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average respondent is 22 years old and 50 per cent of respondents are between Ir and 60 years 
old. As in Michaud and Vencatachelum (2001), we start by restricting the sample to those who are 
older than 16 (29,456 individuals). We then exclude those who report being inactive on the labour 
market (6,281) or who are unemployed but have stopped looking for a job for at least a mo~th 
(2,724). Excluding these individuals is in line with the usual definition of the labour force which 
counts as unemployed only those who have actively looked for employment. We also remove unpaid 
trainees (480), who can be assimilated to students, and those who report attending school full time 
(680). After accounting for the above restrictions, we obtain 19,291 labour market participants, 
among whom 10,265 are males and 9,026 are females. The unemployment rate computed by using 
the International labour Organizationdefinition reveals the foll.owing informations. First, slightly 
more than 8 per cent of labour market participants are unemployed. Second, more males (i.e, 8.7 
per cent) than Jemales (8.1 per cent) are unemployed. 
Earnings: The explanatory variable of interest is the individual's hourly earnings from his 
or her main occupation. We use hourly earnings to account for the number of hours worked 
which is a choice variable in many instances. These earnings includeany premium that the person 
may have received in addition to his or her regular wages. For instance, in the public sector, 
earnings comprise earned wage, technical premium and other premiums due to the status each civil 
servant has in the State structure. To the extent that these other earnings are correlated with an 
individual's characteristics, excluding them would underestimate the returns to education and could 
lead to biased estimates.9 The average monthly earnings equals 55,701 CFA Francs (Communauté 
Financière d'Afrique), but males earn (69,331 CFA) more than females (37734 CFA). In addition, 
hourly wages are significantly higher for males (415 CFA) compared to females (291 CFA).1° By 
contrast however, we were un able to reject the null hypothesis of wage equality across gender within 
9We derive hourly wage, Yi, from hours worked per week, weeks worked per year and annual salary 'as follow: 
Yi = Ri/([Weeks/years] * [hours/weeks]), where Ri, represents the sum of principal and secondary incomesdeclared 
by an individu al i. 
IOThe 2001 exchange rate was 100 CFA for 1 French Franc. The hypothesis that males and females earn equal 
wages is strongly rejected with t-tests of equal and unequal variances of 5.34 and 5.10 for the informai sectorj 4.56 
and 4.30 for the formai p~ivate sector. 
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para-statal companies. 
FormaI/InformaI sector: Given the importance of the informaI sector across Africa, we 
cannot exclude those who work in that sector from our sample. ll We define those whose employers, 
or themselves if they are self-employed, are not registered for tax purpose[ as being in the informaI 
sector. The remainder of wage earners are in the formaI sector. Given the small number of 
respondents in para-statal companies, we include them in the public sector. Using that definition, 
we find that 65 per cent of those with positive earnings are in the informaI sector, 24 per cent in the 
formaI private sector and the remainder 11 per cent are in the public sect or. Those in the formaI 
private sector report working on average 8.7 hours daily, which is higher than the corresponding 
number for those in the public sector (8.1 hours) or the informaI sect or (7.2 hours). Similarly, 
male's average number of hours worked per month is statistically greater (204 hours) compared to 
women (171 hours). As expected, informaI sector workers earn the least (32,894 CFA), while those 
in the public sector earn the most (133,182 CFA). 
Region of residence: While fewer respondents live in ur!:>an areas (45 per cent), those who 
have a j?b earn a wage premium of 35 per cent in comparisorr with their counterparts (30,878 
CFA compared to 73,861 CFA). This difference refiects the nature of activitiesin rural and urban 
areas. Agricultural activities and farming constitute the main activity (43 per cent) for those with 
positive earnings and is concentrated in rural areas. Small commercial activities account for 20 per 
cent of all workers. Finally, only 6.4 per cent of those with positive earnings report working in the 
manufacturing sector. Given this low figure, studies of RORE which focus on those who work in 
the manufacturing sector (for example Arne Bigsten et Al, 2000), are unlikely to be informative of 
the RORE for the population at large. 
Education: Although the median labour market participant has completed primary school, 
close to a quarter of them have never attended school, and close to thirty percent is illiterate. 
Females are much less likely than males to have completed any education cycle, and more females 
than males are illiterate (39 per cent compared to 25 per cent). InformaI sector workers are more 
11 In Sub-Saharan Africa, is not unusual for informality to exceed 50% of the Gross Domestic Product (Palmade, 
2005). 
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likely to neverhave attended school (3,6 .per cent) than those who work in the formaI private sector 
(21 per cent) or in the, public sector (2 per cent) ones. Interestingly, clos.e to 30 per cent of those 
who have attended primary school, and are currently in the labour market have failed to graduate 
from primary school. More over, 26 per cent of those who passed primary school never attended 
secondary school. 
As expected, we find that earning are positively correlated with educat.ion. Rowever, there 
lS no statistically significant difference between the monthly earnings of those who have never 
attended sehool and those with .primary education. It is only for those with at least the first 
level of secondary or technical secondary education that additional schooling yields much higher 
earnings. The premium for those with the second-Ievel of secondary sehool education relative to 
those with only primary education is 130 per cent. The corresponding premium is considerably 
higher for females (191 per eent) than for males (98 percent). 
University educated workers earn the highest wages. In fact, they earn twice as mueh as their 
counterparts with only secondary education. It is also interesting to note that university graduates 
in para-statal bodies earn the highest salaries (308,830 CFA monthly). Renee, this simple non-
/ 
parametric analysis implies that there are relatively few edueated people who can sec ure relatively 
well-paid positions in the public seetor, in para-statal bodies or in the private sector. is also 
a large pool of unskilled workers who work either in the private or informaI seetor. Consequently, 
this suggests that Cameroonmeets the conditions of our model to generate convex returns to 
education.12 We now need to test whether such eonvex returnsare in faet The next 
section outlines the estimation strategy to identify how labour market participants are selected 
into the formaI and informaI sectors. vVe then use this procedure to correct for potential sam pIe 
selection problems when estimating the earnings equation . 
.M.HLlUt"l'.Ll this is a simple non-parame tric analysis, it provides a first indication that returns to education are 
convex and that there are no returns to having sim ply attended primary education in Cameroon. 
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4. Estimation strategy 
Assume the data generating pro cess of earnings is given by a Mincerian equation (Mincer, 1974). 
As standard in the empirical earnings literature, the dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly 
earnings of individual i working in sector k (Yik); and the vector of explanatory variables (Xik) 
includes potential experience and potential experience squared, five educational dummies for com-
pleted education cycle (primary, secondary one, secondary two, vocational one, vocational two and 
university), industry of employment, gender and regional characteristics. Asearnings are observed 
only for those who are employed, ordinary least squares (OLS)estimates of the earnings equation 
may be biased because of sample selection (Heckman, 1979). Moreover, individuals are not ran-
domly assigned to their sector of employment. If such a choice, or constraint, is not accounted for, 
further biases of the parameter estimates of the earnings equation may arise. 13 
4.1 Labour market Participation 
As in Lassibille and Tan (2005), assume the underlying selection process of employment sector 
follows a polychotomous normal model with four mutually exclusive labour-market outcomes: un-
employed k = 0 (the reference group); employed in the informaI sect or (k = 1); in the private. 
formaI sector (k = 2); and in the public (including para-statal companies) sector (k = 3). As a 
rational individual i in this environment selects the employment sect or alternativek which yields 
the highest present value of net benefits, let Yik denote the unobserved utility for a labour market 
participant i who chooses the employment sector k. Thus, 
13However, besides sample selection, a likely much bigger inference challenge is the endogeneity of the education 
/ 
levels leading to omitted variable bias. lndeed, education levels are likely correlated with a host of variables that 
are not observed but important such as political or socio-economie patronage with certain well-connected individuals 
being able to access both higher education levels and take one of the coveted jobs, and households' credit constraints, 
which affect both the education levels of children and their future earnings potential independent of their education 
levels. To overcome this problem, there would have to be either instrumental variables or randomized evaluation 
data, neither which are available. Thus, due to omitted variable bias generated by the' endogeneity of education 
levels, the results provided in this chapter should not be taken as clear causal inference of the effect of education 
on earnings but instead as analyses of how eclucational attainment is correlated with labour market out~omes that 
include earnings and employment. 
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yik = p~Zik + 77ik, for k = 1,2,3. (4.1) 
For a typical sector k, Pk is a vector of parameters; Zik represents the maximum set of explanatory 
variables affecting the employment decision for all individuals i; and 77ik is a not parametrically 
specified random error term. Assume (TJik)'S are independent and identically Gumbel distributed. 
Clearly, the Irrelevant Independent Alternative (IIA) hypothesisis satisfied. Then, as shown in the 
literature on polychotomous choices (see McFadden, 1973), the probability that an individual i has 
·outcome k is given by a conditional logit: 
Pik = 
exp (p~ Zik) 
3 
I: exp (P~Zik) 
k=l 
(4.2) 
Equation (4.2) estimates the effects of controlled factors on the probability that an individual, 
i, chooses a sector of employment k among three alternatives: (1) informaI sect or (alternative 1); 
(2) formaI private sector (alternative 2); or formaI public and parastatal sector (alternative 3). 
4.2 Earnings Estimates with selectivity 
Self-selection can occur in observed wages (Yik,) if individuals are not randomly assigned to 
their sector of employment and are faced with more than two choices (McFadden, 1973). Under 
the null hypothesis that labour market participants are endogenously selected in one of three 
employment sect ors aforementioned, we rely on a two-stagemethod proposed by Trost and Lee 
(1984) to correct for potential sample selection whenestimating the earnings equation. 
Using their notation and relying on the logit maximum Iikelihood method, we estimate in the 
first stage a polychotomous model of the choice of employment sect or (4.2), and ùse the estimates 
flk to form:14 
14In the presence of multinomial choices and when selection is over a large number of alternatives not totally 
independents, the selection bias problem is fundamentally a matter of residuals correlation. From Monte-Carlo ex-
periments, Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2004) suggest that selection bias correction based on the multinomial 
logit model can provide fairly good correction for the outcome equation, even when the IIA hypothesis is violated. 
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(4.3) 
where cp is the standard normal density function; iP is a standard normal distribution and F a 
logis tic marginal distribution. J == iP- 1 F, is a strictly increasing transformation and J is implicitly 
~I 
determined by f3kZik, for aIl k = 1,2,:3 and all i. 
In a second stàge, conditional on the alternative k being chosen, we then consistently estimate 
by OLS the earnings function: 
(4.4) 
for k = 1,2,:3, where éik is a mean-zero random error term; 6k is a parameters vector and Ik is a 
parameter. 
'frost and Lee's twO-steps procedure requires one or more identifying variable(s), i.e. Z must 
contain at least one var~able which is not an element of X. Otherwise, the sample selection pro-
cedure may give worse results than simple ordinary least squares. We draw from the existing 
literature to find identifying variables. As in Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) and for the same rea-
sons, we use the following three variables ta identify sectorial choice: employment situation or 
industry'of employment in 1996, marital status and household size. The first variable accèmnts for 
possible inertia in changing the sect or of employment or of the barriers to find employment in the 
formaI sect or if unemployed.We expect those who already worked in the formaI sect or in 1996 
to remain in that sect or. Marital status, as weIl as household size, is a measure of the need for 
job security. Hence, we expect married individuals to prefer employment in the formaI than in the 
informal sector, or they'will work in the informaI sector rather than being unemployed. The same 
rationale can hold for household size. The other explanatory variables of the sector of employment 
include educational attainment, gender, area and province of residence.15 
15Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2004) criticize Trost and Lee's procedure. They argue that the correction' 
of the selection bias should use al! the correlationsbetween the disturbance term of the earnings equation (i.e., 7Jik) 
., " 
and the disturbance terms of al! categorical latent expressions (i.e., E:ik)' Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand prove 
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5. Results Analysis 
AH our specifications have the same explanatory variables except that education is either measured 
by the highest education cycle attended or graduation from an education cycle. The estimates of 
the determinants of a worker's sector of employment are in Table 3, with school attendance as 
explanatory variable, and, Table 4, with graduation as explanatory variable. The estimates of the 
Mincerian hourly earnings equations are in Table 5 and Table 6 withrespectively school attendance 
and graduation as explanatory variables. We distinguish between seven levels of school attendance: 
(i) never attended, (ii) primary school, (iii) secondary schoollevell, (iv) secondary schoollevel 2, 
(v) vocational school level 1, (vi) vocational schoollevel 2, and (vii) university. We also consider 
the corresponding graduation cycles which are listed as explanatory in Tables 3 and 6. 
5.1 Sector choice 
We start by contrasting the results across the two measures of labour market participant's human 
capital (Tables 3 and 4). We find interesting differences between the impact of education when 
measured by having attended a particular education cycle or having graduated from that cycle. 
First, we note that having attended only primary school does, not increase the likelihood that 
a labour market participant will find employment compared to someone who has never attended 
'school. However, primary school graduates are more likely to find employment in the formaI (public 
. . -
and private) sector and are less likely to be in the informaI sect or. Second, the margi~al probability 
of being in the formaI sector is much higher for a labour market participant who has graduated from 
any education cycle than for someone who has only attended that education level. Interestingly, the 
coefficients of the impact of human capital on labour market outcome are estimated with greater 
precision when we use graduation from, as opposed to attendance of, an education cycle. This 
this is not the case in Trost and Lee's method which we use to verify whether our results are robust, We have also 
verified if our results are robust to that critique, In addition, we performed Dahl (2002)' semiparametric method 
since it also corrects selection bias where there are a large number of exclusive choices, Results reported in tables 7 
. . 
to'S, indicate that: (i) the qualitative conclusions are preserved for al! sector of employment estimatesj (ii) Trost and 
Lee (19S4)'s method does not suffer from Bourguignon and' Al.'s critique, 
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result fits tne intuition that a formaI degree is better measure of an individual's human capital and 
is used as a screening device by both fi;rms in the privàte sect or and the government in their hiring 
decisions. 
There are similarities between the estimates when using the two measures of human capital. 
Primary school graduates who pursued further studies are less likely to work in the informaI sector. 
Thus, relative to uneducated labour market participants, or with primary schooling only, secondary 
schooi graduates are less Iikely to be in the informaI sector, and are more likely to work in the formaI 
sectors, than to be unemployed. Moreover, better education increases the predicted probability that 
an individual works in the formaI sector compared to the informai one. Furthermore, our results 
suggest that an increase in the level of educational attainment raises the predicted probability that 
an individual works in the private formaI sector, compared to the public and para-statal sector. 
For instance, workers with university profile have a predicted probability of working in the private 
formaI sector that exceeds about 28 percent when have graduated and 16 percent when attended 
that level their probability of working in the public sect or. It seems therefore that Cameroon 
high-skilled labour market participants prefer the private formaI sect or to the public sector.16 One 
can however claim that this last result is a trivial and obviously expected result. This is generally 
true for all developed countries and for some developing countries as well (see Psacharopoulos, 
1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). But, BenneU (1996) daims that salaries in developing 
countries are driven by salaries of the public sectar which are determined out of the market clearing 
system as observed in private sect or. Thus, returns to educations are to be taken very carefuUy. 
Suppose for instance that the Paul BeneU 's statement always holds. Then, in the case of Cameroon, 
one couid expects the predicted probability of employment for an individual with a substantial year 
or level of schooling to raise more in the public sector than it is the case in the private formaI sector. 17 
16 An intuitive explanation of this result is that because the private sector is very dynamic and faces foreign 
competitiveness, private firms are most able to hire workers with high qualifications than public administration 
do, since within public services, qualifications are standardized within legal procedures and public status doesn't 
necessary requîres for workers to exhibit an lllliversity profile for example . 
. 17In the case 'of Rwanda, Lassibille and Tan~(2005) found that workérs with higher education have apredicted 
probability of working in the public sect or that exceeds by about 70% the probability of working in the formaI private 
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Since we obtain the contrary of what Benell stated, we therefore provide evidences of an existing 
labour market clearing in Cameroon, who rank sectors as follows: the private formaI sector first, the 
public sect or in second position and the informaI sector in the last position. Urban area residents 
are more likely to work -in the formaI private sector than to be unemployed, and are less likely 
to work in the informaI sector. The area of residence is not a significant explanatory variable in 
being employed in the public sect or. FinaIly, we controlled provinces of residence of labour market 
participant so as to account for aIl other omitted \!"ariables within our study. We found for instance-
that, ceteris pari bus, a South West province's job seeker is more likely to work in both informaI 
and public sectors, compared to a potential worker living in either Douala or in Yaoundé. However, 
we uncoveredempirical evidence suggesting that a typical Yaoundé's labour market participant is 
more likely to work in the informaI sector and in the public sect or as weIl, compared to a typical 
Douala's labour market participant. This last feature could be possibly rela~ed to the importance 
of public service in Yaoundé and the public employment freeze of the latest 1990s. 
Most of the identifying variabl~s (household size, marital status and employment status in 
1996) are statistically significant in explaining the employment sector. First, our results show that 
an individual's occupation in 1996 is almost always statistically significant. As expected, those 
who in 1996, were in the formaI private sector, or in the public sect or , are less likely to be in the 
informal sect or in 2001. Such individuals are more likely to be in the private and public sectors 
respectively. It is of interest to note that inertia is highest in the public sector because the highest 
marginal probability of being employed in the public sect or is if one was already in that sector 
in 1996. This empirical pattern remains consistent with the l~te 1990s "restructuring" of public 
, . 
and semi-publics firms that leads to a bankruptcy of many public sector companies, an to the end 
of the recruitment in the publicsector (Eloundou Enyegue et al, 2004). Despite the employment 
freeze, and wage cuts, in the public sector following the economic downturn of the 80s and 90s, 
this sector remains the most attractive sectorof employment in 2001, for unemployed and looking 
for, and for those who were not in the labour force in 1996. This striking employment behavior 
seCtor. 
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can be intuitively jus~ified by the life-Iong employment guarantee generally offered in the public 
service, compared to the private sect or where workers must always remain competitive to secure 
their jobs positions. Second, our results undercover gender discrimination in work opportunities 
offered to men and women in the Cameroon labour market. Women are more likely to work in 
the informaI sect or than men. Conversely, men are more likely than women to work in the private 
formaI sector, or in the public and para-statal sector.18 Although this last evidence can be strongly 
support ive of feminists argumentations that there still be a lot to do in helping to solve for an 
under-representation of Cameroonian women in aIl important economic spheres, gender do es not 
however appear to play a role for hiring in the public and para-statal sect or. Thirei, those labour 
market participants who are not married are the most likely to be unemployed whether human 
capital is measured by graduation from, or attendanceof, an education cycle. In other words, in 
Cameroon labour market, being single is a wrong signal that a potential worker sends to potential 
employers. Large family size has a deleterious effect on employment in the informal sector, while 
there is no statistically significant effect in formaI sectors. 
5.2 Earnings equation 
We now turri to the estimates of the earnings equation by employment sect or which are reported 
in Tabies 5 and 6 with respectively school attendance and graduation from education cycle as 
explanatory variables. We report two series of estimates: (i) Trost and Lee (1984) 's non-weighted 
estimates, and (ii) Trost and Lee (1984) 's weighted estimates. Using population-weighted estimates 
allow for inferences at the population level. Interestingly, there are two important differences 
(primary eduGation and residing in an urban area) between the population-weighted and non-
weighted estimates obtained by Trost and Lee's method. 
The standard Mincerian specification estimated by weighted Trost and Lee's method fits the 
data weIl with an adjusted R-square of 0.5 for those in the formaI sector but only 0.075 for those 
in the informaI sector. The sample selection correction term is negative and statistically significant 
18Estimates nat shawn here ta save space indicate that men prabability ta wark -in the privat~ formaI sector and 
in the public and para-statal sector is quiet higher than wamen's prabability ta be emplayed in thase sectars. 
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for those who work in the public sect or but not for those in the informal or private formal sectors. 
The negative selection correction term means that the unobserved characteristics of those who work 
in the public sector are positively correlated with the unobserved components which affect their 
reservation earnings. However, such a correlation does not exist for those who work in the informaI 
sector or in the formaI private sect or. Intuitively, this absence of correlation may arise because the 
alternative occupation for those who are in the informaI or in the formaI private sectors may be' 
subsistence farming. In these activities, the unobserved characteristics are orthogonal to what is 
rewarded by the market in the informaI or the privatesectors. 
The returns to education are convex in all three sect ors of employment and there are no returns 
for those who have only attended primary school but not graduated, regardless of the sector. The 
profile of the convexity of the RORE to education is similar, and close in magnitude, to what has 
been estimated for Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Black South Africans (Schult~, 2004, Tables 
2 to 6). Hmyever, in our case, the threshold level after which returns to having attended school 
are positive is the second level of secondary or vocational school in the formaI (public and private) 
seètor, and the first level of secondary school in the informaI sect or . . This difference may be a 
consequence of the different technologies which are used in each of those sectors. However, RORE 
are positive for primary school graduates who work in the informaI sect or or in the private sector. 
Interestingly, havirig attended vocational school generate higher returns than general education 
for those who work in the informaI sector. Intuitively, many occupations in the informal sector 
require technical skills and, as a result, those with suchtraining earn higher returns than those with 
general scholarly training. Conversely, returns to formaI general education is higher in the formaI 
sector than in the informaI one. In particular, returns to. the second level of secondary education 
are highest for those in the public sect or. The exceptionally high profitability of higher education 
is robust across aIl me~hods. This is consistent with findings in other countries where the modern 
sect or is usually small and wages tend to be sticky (Lassibille and Peng Tan, 2005). 
There are similarities and difference between our estimates and those from the other two studies 
of RORE in Cameroon. Bingstenand Al. (2001, Table5) findpositive and statistically significant 
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returns at both the primary and secondary levèls in their sample of workers in' the manufl1cturing 
sector. In our case, there are no returns to having graduated from primary school for those who 
work in the public and para-statal sectors. Having attended school generates positive returns in 
the public and private sect ors as from the second level of secondary school onwards. Note that 
Bingsten and Al. (2001) do not distinguish between the two levels of secondary educatiolf. Lanot 
and Muller (1997), who distinguish only between primary and higher education, find no returns to 
primary education but their estimate of returns to higher education is greater than ours. RecaU 
however that neither of those two studies can inform us about the RORE in the informaI sector, 
or for vocational education, and that their samples are not representative of the population. 
The other explanatory variables of earnings in Cameroon confirm our non-parametric analysis, 
have the expected and màtch most findings for other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
number of years of potential experiencedisplays the characteristic. concave pattern in aIl spec-
ifications. Women in the informaI or theprivate sector earn significantly less than their male 
èounterparts. However, the gender earni,ngs gap does not exist in the public sector. The opposite 
holds for urban workers: urban workers in the public sect or earn more than th ose in rural areas. 
6. Conclusion and Policy Prescriptions 
We contribute to the economics of education literature by using the 2001 Cameroon Household 
Survey to estimate the private rates of return to education in Cameroon. We allow private RORE 
to differ by education level and bysector -formaI (public or private) or informaI -of employment 
and correct for a labour market participant's employment into one of those sectors. We compared 
RORE between those who attended an education cycle with those who graduated from that cycle. 
, . 
Our results highlight the importance of using representative population samples to estimate 
private RORE which are vali<;l for the population at large. We find strong convex RORE in aU 
. sectors of employment. Those who only attended primary school, but faHed to graduate, earn 
no return in any sect or of employment. However, the returns for primary school graduates are 
positive and statistically significant. PrivateRORE are also very high for those who attended; or 
, / 
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graduated from university. The convex and high rates of returns to education is consistent with 
recent findings in many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The other determinants of earnings 
are in line with the empirical literature. For instance, the number of years of potential experience 
displays the characteristic concave pattern in all specifications. Women in the informaI or· the 
. private sect or earn significantly less that their male counterparts. Those who live in rural areas 
consistently receive lower earnings than those in urban ones. 
There are a number of policy prescriptions which derive from our results. The fact that those 
who do not graduate from primary school earn no returns indicates that many individuals are in 
a poverty trap. Assuming that the quality of schooling does not change, one policy implication 
of our result is to strive to at least make students graduate from primary school and continue to 
further studies. In that regard, a scaling-up of the education budget at alllevels is required for the 
number and quality of secondary and university graduates to increase and thus take advantage of 
high RORE. There is room to allocate more resources to all levels of education so as to be more 
inclusive of those who cannot afford to send their children to school. For instance transfers could 
be targeted to families which cannot ~ducate their children through secondary school. 
Given our results, cuts to the Cameroon education budget in the 1980s and 1990s are likely 
to have had adverse effects both on these individuals welfare and on human capital accumulation. 
Aggregate p.uman capital generates positive external effects, including on children's and women's 
health (Schultz, 2002), and is an explanatory factor of economic growth (Barro, 2002). This 
implication is also valid for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa where the share of gross domestic product 
allocated to public education had reached an all-time high of 4.5 per cent in 1994, had unfortunately 
fallen to 3.4 per cent in 1999, the lat est available figure (World Development Indicators, 2004). It 
is therefore time for a renewed einphasison quality investment in education to generate sustained 
economic development. 
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7. Appendix 
Proof of the proposition 
The wage prenüum earned by a worker with secondary education relative to someone with 
primary education is given by: 
(7.1) 
Similarly, the wage premium of a worker with primary education relative to someone who works 
in the informai sector equals: 
Wp 
- -l. 
!:!:!. 
(7.2) 
The returns to education are strictly convex if (7.1) is greater than (7.2), i.e. after simplifying 
and taking the logarithm ofwages: 
(7.3) 
Otherwise the returns to education are concave. 
Substituting the logarithm of (2.2) and (2.3) in the left hand sides of (7.3), we obtain that: 
Simplifying the left hand side of (7.4) give 
(7.5) 
This completes the proof. 
., 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Cameroon, 2001 Cameroon Household Survey (1) 
Ali Males Females T-test 
Unequal Equal 
Number of respondents 56443 27727 28716 
Laborforce 
Number of labor market participants 19291 10265 9026 
urban sector 8240 4780 3460 
rural sector 11051 5485 5566 
Unemployment, in percentage 
ILO definition 8.41 8.68 8.11 
Labor market participants with zero earnings 21 17 25 
Distribution of wage earners 
Number of wage-earners 14058 7907 6151 
Formai private sector 3377 2522 855 
public sector 1293 889 404 
para-statal companies 259 209 50 
Informai sector 9129 4287 4842 
Average monthly earnings (in CFA Francs) 
by sector of activity 
Ali Sectors 55701 69331 37734 
Informai sector 32894 40078 26534 5.34 5.10 
Private formai sector 83866 90403 64586 4.56 4.30 
Public sector 133182 144 266 108790 5.10 3.93 
Para-statal companies 130531 135346 110405 1.09 0.93 
by region 
Urban areas 75719 89398 54820 
Rural areas 40265 52046 26379 
by education level 
No schooling 37958 50494 27857 
Primary school 37886 46604 26419 
First level of general secondary school 53557 63990 37512 
Second level of general secondary school 87720 92377 76820 
First level of technical secondary school 52965 62313 38187 
Second level of technical secondary scho.ol 89830 98570 69303 
University 189930 190755 187059 
Hours worked and earning 
Average number of hours worked per month 190 204 171 29.1 29 
Average hour1y earnings in CFA francs 
Country wide 361 415 291 22.9 22.7 
Urban areas 442 482 381 
Rural areas 299 357 230 
(1) Note to Table 1: The survey is the "Enquête Camerounaise auprès des Menages" (ECAM Il). The T -ratio is for the equality of wages between men 
women. unequal indicates that the Iwo samples are tested with unequal variances. The CFA franc is pegged ta the french franc at 100 CFA 
for 1 french franc. 
Table 2: Education and employment by gender of labor market participant (2) 
Ail Males Females 
Labor Wage Labor Wage Labor Wage 
force earners force earners force earners 
Number of respondents 20451 15039 10977 8430 9474 6609 
Respondents with missing earnings data n.a. 728 285 443 
% of which is literate and numerate 70 78 75 61 59 
Num. missing education data 51 32 18 10 33 22 
Sam pie with data on education 20400 10959 
, 
9441 
(% with 
No schooling 27 28 20 22 34 36 
Primary school 35 34 35 33 35 33 
"-
Secondary school 
General 1 st level 17 16 18 17 16 15 
General 2nd level 8 8 10 10 5 6 
Technical1st level 6 5 6 6 5 5 
Technical 2nd level 2 3 3 3 2 2 
University education 5 6 8 8 3 3 
(2) Note ta Table 2: Wage eamers are those who report having a remunerated employment. Wage earners include those with missing data on their wages 
(465 individuals: 143 males and 322 females ). Labor force is as defined in the paper. Unemployed is those who do not have a paid employment, i.e., labour 
force minus wage eamers. 
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Table 3: Sector of employment, marginal effect, School attendance (3) 
Informai Formai 
Private Public 
(1 ) (2) . (1) (2) (1 ) (2) 
Edl,lcation-Highest level attended 
Primary school -0.004 -0.004 0.024* 0.024* 0.011* 0.011* 
(0.27) (0.27) (1.91) (1.91) (1.6S) (1.6S) 
Secondary school, first level -0.069*** -0.069*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.031** 0.031** 
(3.06) (3.07) (4.79) (4.78) (2.07) (2.07) 
Secondary school, second level -0.220*** -0.220*** 0.144':'* 0.144*** '0.126** 0.126** 
(6.49) (6.S0) (4.S9) 
'-
(4.S9) (2.S3) (2.S3) 
Vocational training,. level one -0.113*** -0.113*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.066** 0.066** 
(3.S7) (3.S7) (3.61 ) (3.61) (2.10) (2.10) 
Vocational training, level two -0.269*** -0.269*** 0.2SS*** 0.2SS*** 0.076* 0.076* 
- (7.00) (7.01) (6.29) (6.30) (1.SS) (1.SS) 
University -0.419*** -0.419*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 
(13.00) (nOS) (S.21) (S.21) (2.9S) (2:9S) 
Age, gender and location 
Age 0.001 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
(1.18) (1.18) (2.97) (-2.97) (1.S8) (1.S8) 
Female 0.031*** 0.031*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.003* -0.003* 
(2.61 ) (2.61) (13.S2) (13.SS) (1.66) (1.66) 
Urban -0.066*** -0.066*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.000 0.000 
(4.S7) (4.S4) (10.69) (10.84) (0.16) (0.16) 
Identifying variables 
Household size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
(4.SS) (4.89) (0.97) (0.97) (0.93) (0.93) 
Single -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.019** -0.019** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
(6.83) (6.S3) (2.1S) (2.1S) (3.92) (3.91) 
Labour market status in 1996 
Work in the private sector -0.242*** -0.242*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
-(11.S4) (11.S7) (9.17) . (9.17) (3.79) (3.79) 
Work in the public sector -O.SOS*** -0.S08*** -0.094*** -0.094*** 0.766*** 0.766*** 
(20.S0) (20.7S) (7.99) (8.00) (19.3S) (19.37) 
Unpaid family workers -0.17S*** --0.17S*** -0.089*** -0.OS9*** -O.OOS -O.OOS 
(9.26) (9.27) (9.17) (9.21) (1.63) (1.63) 
Assistant workers -0.190*** -0.190*** 0.10S*** 0.10S*** 0.014 0.014 
(S.21) (S.21 ) (3.33) (3.32) (1.24) (1.24) 
Unemployed and looking for work -0.32S*** -0.32S*** -0.019 -0.019 0.034*** 0.034*** 
(14.20) (14.23) (1.41) (1.41) (2.97) (2.97) 
Not in the labor force -0.230*** -0.230*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
(12.62) (12.63) (S.42) (S.43) (3.39) (3.39) 
Table 3 continues on next page 
Table 3 (concluded): Sector of employment, marginal effect, School attendance 
Province 
Douala -0.047** 0.008 -0.007*** 
(2.29) (0.64) (5.43) -
Yaounde 0.039** -0.010 0.014*** 
(2.06) (0.87) (3.18) 
Adamaoua 0.040 0.005 0.039* 0.054** 0.014* -0.000 
(1.36) (0.17) (1.64) (2.10) (1.84) (0.00) 
Centre 0.051* 0.003 -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.002 -0.010*** 
(2.10) (0.1) (5.95) (5.05) (0.58) (4.86) 
East -0.022 -0.068** -0.021 -0.014 0.010* -0.002 
(0.73) (2.18 (1.18) (0.76) (1.91 ) (1.04) 
Extreme North -0.178*** -0.211 *** 0.346*** 0.371 *** 0.018** 0.003 
(6.66) (7.91) (13.00) (13.44) (2.55) (0.80) 
Littoral 0.044** -0.002 -0.038*** -0.032** 0.003' -0.006*** 
(1.94) (0.07) (3.27) (2.47) (0.84) (2.95) 
North 0.269*** 0.258*** -0.064*** -0.053*** 0.015* 0.002 
(15.12) (14.63) (4.97) (3.73) (1.81) (0.36) 
North-West -0.084*** -0.136*** -0.053*** -0.049*** 0.002 -0.006*** 
(3.33) (5.26) (4.06) (3.62) (0:50) (2.72) 
West 0.171*.** 0.134*** -0.073*** -0.066*** -0.002 -0.008*** 
(9.22) (6.75) (7.31) (6.02) (0.72) (4.75) 
South -0.042 -0.091*** 0.028 0.0353 -0.004 -0.010*** 
(1.37) (2.89) (1.19) (1.42) (1.38) . (5.31) 
South-West 0.073*** 0.066*** -0.013 0.004 0.075*** 0.032*** 
(2.84) (2.63) (0.78) (0.23) (4.56) (3.81 ) 
Number of observations 11018 2609 220 
(3) Note to Table 3: Workers of parastatal companies are included in the public sector. The reference category for school attendance is those 
who have never attended school. The reference category for labour market status in 1996 is those who where self-employed. The reference for the 
province category are respectively Douala for model (1) and Yaoundé for m9del (2). The robust t-ratios are reported under parenthesis under each 
parameter estimate. *, **, and, *** denote the parameter is statiscally different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1 % level respectively. 
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Table 4: Sector of employment, marginal effect, Highest diploma (4) 
Informai Formai 
Private Public 
(1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) 
Education-Labor market participant holds a: 
Primary school certificate -0.OS5*** -0.OS5*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.013** 0.013** 
(6.01) (6.01) (6.62) (6.62) (2.42) (2.42) 
First level secondary school diploma -0.21S*** -0.21S*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
(S.96) (S.97) (7.S1 ) (7.S1 ) (3.09) (3.09) 
Probatoire diploma -0.327*** -0.327*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.OS7** 0.OS7** 
(S.53) (S.53) (6.07) (6.07) (2.56) (2.56) 
High school certificate -0.430*** -0.429*** 0.296*** 0.300*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
(13.66) (13.66) (S.30) (S.30) (3.04) (3.04) 
Technical degree (BTS or DUT) -0.597*~* -0.597*** 0.46S*** 0.46S*** 0.153** 0.153** 
(15.63) (15.63) (6.19) (6.19) (2.26) .. (2.26) 
University degree (BA, BSc. And above) .-0.503*** -0.503*** 0.29S*** 0.29S*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 
(13.62) (13.62) (5.93) (5.94) (3.99) (3.99) 
Age, gender and location 
Age 0.001** 0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
(2.3S) (2.3S) (3.4S) (3.4S) . (0.73) (0.73) 
Female 0.079*** 0.079*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.002 -0.002 
(6.94) (6.94) (13.20) (13.20) (1.43) (1.43) 
Urban -0.130*** -0.130*** 0.11S*** 0.11S*** -0.001 -0.001 
(9.29) (9.30) (9.S3) (9.S3) (0.41) (0.41 ) 
Identifying variables 
Household size -O.OOS*** -O.OOS*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(6.1S) (6.1S) (0.17) (0.17) (0.55) (0.55) 
Single -0.OS1*** -0.OS1*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.010*** -0.006*** 
(5.75) (5.75) (0.59) (0.59) (3.21 ) (3.21) 
'Labour market status in 1996 
Work in the private sector -0.327*** -'0.327*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
(15.16) (15.16) (8.48) (8.48) (3.76) (3.76) 
Work in the publie sector -0.605*** -0.605*** -0.112*** -0.112*** 0.766*** 0.766*** 
(26.33) (26.30) (10.40) (10.40) (19.73) (19.73) 
Unpaid family workers -0.267*** -0.267*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.007** -0.007** 
(12.S4) (12.77) (10.77) (10.77) (2.30) (2.30) 
Assistant workers -0.2S3*** -0.283*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.022 0.022 
(7.S4) (7.S4) (2.66) . (2.66) (1.59) (1.59) 
Unemployed and looking for work -0.415*** -0.415*** -0.032** -0.032** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
(17.35) (17.31) (2.38) (2.38) (3.06) (3.06) 
Not in the labor force -0.294*** -0.294*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
(14.56) (14.53) (6.39) (6.39) (3.37) (3.37) 
Table 4 continues on nextpage 
Table 4 (concluded): Sector of employment, marginal effect, Highest diploma 
Province 
Douala -0.035* 0.015 -0.007*** 
(1.82) (1.10) (4.83) 
Yaounde 0.0269 -0.016 0.013*** 
(1.56) (1.31) (2.91) 
Adamaoua 0.002 -0.022 0.073*** 0.100*** 0.012 -0.001 
(0.07)· (0.69) (2.66) (3.27) (1.63) (0.16) 
Centre 0.130*** 0.107*** -0.067*** -0.055*** -0.003 -0.009*** 
(7.72) (5.68) (5.45) (4.00) (1.09) (4.87) 
East 0.055** 0.030 -0.030* -0.015 0.009* -0.002 
(2.31 ) (1.13) (1.68) (0.76) (1.76) (0.84) 
Extreme North -0.283*** -0.314*** 0.357*** 0.388*** 0.014** 0.001 
(10.69) (11.65). (13.56) (14.27) (2.10) (0.30) 
Littoral 0.097*** 0.072*** -0.055*** -0.042*** 0.002 -0.006*** 
(5.80) (3.86) (4.64) (3.16) (0.46) (3.05) 
North 0.189*** 0.181*** -0.078*** -0.066*** 0.012 -0.0001 
(11.53) (10.86) (6.04) (4.48) (1.49) (0.01) 
North-West 0.040* 0.005 -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.002 -0.010*** 
(1.91 ) (0.20) (5.39) (4.20) (0.67) (4.18) 
West 0.118*** 0.091*** -0.083*** -0.072*** -0.003 -0.010*** 
(7.23) (5.00) (7.79) (6.12) (1.18) (4.85) 
South -0.001 -0.038 0.008 0.024 -0.005 -0.010*** 
(0.03) (1.23) (0.37) (0.95) (1.48) (5.00) 
South-West 0.039* 0.034 -0.044*** -0.027 0.058*** 0.025*** 
(1.64) (1.43) (2.89) (1.53) (4.21 ) (3.36) 
Number of observations 12643 2851 238 
(4) Note to Table 4: Workers of parastatal companies are included in the public sector. The reference category for school attendance is those 
who have never attended school. The reference category for labour market status in 1996 is those who where self-employed. The reference for the 
province category are respectively Douala for model (1) and Yaoundé for model (2). The first level of secondary school diploma corresponds to the 
. . 
BEPC, CAP or the GCE-O Level. High school certificate is either the Baccalaureat (French speaking ) or the CGE A level (English speaking). The 
robust t-ratios are reported under parenthesis under each parameter estimate. " .. , and, ••• denote the parameter is statiscally different from zero 
'at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5 : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, Highest education level attended (5) . 
Trost and Lee (1984) 
Unweighted Estimates Population-Weighted Estimates 
Informai Formai Informai Formai 
Prlvate . PUbliC Prlvate PUbliC 
(1 ) (2) (1) (2) (1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) 
Education 
Primary school 0.065** 0.065** ~0.037 -0.037 0.095 0.095 0.051 0.051 -0.078 -0.078 -0.059 -0.059 
(2.363) (2.363) (0.566) (0.566) (0.588) (0.588) (1.524) (1.524) (0.768) (0.768) (0.271) (0.271) 
Secondary schoollevel 1 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.178** 0.178** 0.397** 0.397** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.126 0.126 0.270 0.270 
(3.639) (3.639) . (2.376) (2.376) (2.458) (2.458) (2.898) (2.898) (1.133) (1.133) (1.224) (1.224) 
Secondary schoollevel 2 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.421 *** 0.421 *** 0.676*** 0.676*** 0.424*** 0.424*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.581 *** 0.581 *** 
(6.987) (6.987) (5.227) (5.227) (4.150) (4.150) (5.505) (5.505) (3.060) (3.060) (2.614) (2.614) 
University 0.767*** 0.767*** '1.122*** 1.122*** 1.120*** 1.120*** 0.833*** 0.833*** 1.034*** 1.034*** 1.031*** 1.031*** 
(6.182) (6.182) (12.398) (12,398) (6.856) (6.856) (5.806) (5.806) (8.377) (8.377) (4.613) (4.613) 
Vocational schoollevel 1 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.107 0.107 0.280 0.280 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.074 0.074 0.144 0.144 
(4.135) (4.135) (1.256) (1.256) (1.638) (1.638) (3.715) (3.715) (0.618) (0.618) (0.628) (0.628) 
Vocational schoollevel2 0.556*** 0.556*** 0.437*~* 0.437*** 0.603*** 0.603*** 0.511 *** 0.511 *** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.472* 0.472* 
(5.341 ) (5.341) (4.265) (4.265) (3.480) (3.480) (4.324) (4.324) (2.784) (2.784) (1.933) (1.933) 
Potential experience 
Experience 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.051 *** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051 *** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.040*** 0.040*** . 0.065*** 0.065*** 
(7.407) (7.407) (11.468) (11.468) (3.704) (3.704) (4.395) (4.395) (6.473) (6.473) (3.336) (3.336) 
Experience squared -0.021 *** -0.021 *** -0.059*** -0.059*- -0.059** -0.059** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.093** -0.093** 
(5.120) (5.120) (6.780) (6.780) (2.121 ) (2.121 ) (2.752) (2.752) (3.818) (3.818) (2.335) (2.335) 
Gender and location 
Female -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.051 -0.051 -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.041 -0.041 
(8.420) (8.420) (3.573) (3.573) (1.375) (1.375) (7.000) (7.000) (4.545) (4.545) (0.832) (0.832) 
Urban 0.082*** 0.082*** -0.024 -0.024 0.091- 0.091** 0.035 0.035 -0.015 -0.015 0.172*** 0.172*** 
(2.618) (2.618) (0.483) (0.483) (2.190) (2.190) (0.871) (0.871 ) (0.229) (0.229) (2.870) (2.870) 
Sector 
Commerce -0.078** -0.078** -0.119* -0.119* 0.186 0.186 -0.063 -0.063 -0.257*** -0.257*** 0.521* 0.521* 
(2.556) (2.556) (1.841 ) (1.841 ) (0.600) (0:600) (1.386) (1.386) (3.186) (3.186) (1.938) (1.938) 
Construction and transport -0.'107** -0.107** -0.008 -0.008 0.818*** 0.818-* -0.038 -0.038 -0.182** -0.182** 0.776*** 0.776-* 
(2.317) (2.317) (0.117) (0.117) (5.420) (5.420) (0.658) (0.658) (2.036) (2.036) (3.931 ) (3.931 ) 
Table 5 contmued on next page 
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Table 5 (continued) : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, Highest education level attended 
Manufacturing 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.011 .0.392** 0.392** 0.024 0.024 -0.168* -0.168* 0.260 0.260 
(0.344) (0.344) (0.161 ) (0.161) (2.260) '(2.260) (0.339) (0.339) (1.923) (1.923) (1.240) (1.240) 
Service -0.172*" -0.172*** -0.131* -0.131* 0.572*** 0.572*** . -0.131** -0.131** -0.310*** -0.310*** 0.566*** 0.566*** 
(4.414) (4.414) (1.946) (1.946) (5.218) (5.218) (2.425) (2.425) (3.590) (3.590) (4.061 ) (4.061 ) 
Province ~ 
Douala -0.003 0.047 -0.045 -0.004 0.099* -0.037 
(0.049) (0.840) (0.617) (0.073) (1.721 ) (0.475) 
Yaounde 0.003 -0.047 0.045 0.004 -0.099* 0.037 
(0.049) (0.840) (0.617) (0.073) (1.721) (0.475) 
Adamaoua 0.170"* 0.168*** -0.235*** -0.189** -0.104 -0.149* 0.162** 0.158" -0.252** -0.153 0.011 -0.026 
(3.059) (2.834) (2.922) (2.242) (1.023) (1.731 ) (2.511 ) (2.394) (2.176) (1.289) (0.103) (0.288) 
Centre -0.008 -0.011 -0.130* -0.083 -0.087 -0.132* -0.153** -0.157** -0.130 -0.030 -0.053 -0.090 
(0.161) (0.197) . (1.658) (1.022) (0.960) (1.795) (2.412) (2.447) (1.356) (0.309) (0.475) (0.922) 
East· 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.061 -0.047 -0.092 0.032 0.028 0.173 0.272** 0.010 -0.027 
(0.239) (0.187) (0.179) (0.710) (0.549) (1.403) (0.426) (0.368) (1.551 ) (2.396) (0.105) (0.339) 
Extreme North 0.002 -0.001 -0.192** -0.146* -0.005 -0.050 -0.050 -0.054 -0.302*** -0.202* -0.223 -0.261* 
(0.028) (0.017) (2.408) (1.674) (0.043) (0.546) (0.783) (0.815) (2.771) (1.753) (1.365) (1.695) 
Littoral 0.062 0.060 -0.313*** -0.267*** -0.137 -0.182** 0.030 0.027 -0.368*** -0.269*** -0.092 -0.129 
(1.107) (1.006) (4.155) (3.347) (1.367) (2.143) (0.504) (0.433) (4.464) (3.092) (0.860) (1.402) 
North -0.137*** -0.140** -0.027 0.020 -0.043 -0.088 -0.208*** -0.212*** -0.035 0.065 -0.086 -0.123 
(2.697) (2.575) (0.290) (0.208) (0.367) (0.864) (3.452) (3.466) (0.280) (0.522) (0.555) (0.877) 
North West -0.210*** -0.213*** -0.680*** -0.633*" 0.105 0.060 -0.264*** -0.268*** -0.573*** -0.473*** 0.114 0.076 
(4.102) (3.900) (7.824) (7.065) (1.054) (0.707) (4.551 ) (4.557) (5.560) (4.503) (0.981) (0.757) 
West 0.031 0.029 -0.485*** -0.438*** -0.098 -0.143** -0.037 -0.041 -0.500*** -0.401*** -0.018 -0.055 
(0.646) (0.556) (6.246) (5.501) (1.129) (2.075) (0.673) (0.739) (5.846) (4.644) (0.184) (0.691) 
South 0.115" 0.113* -0.179*** -0.132* -0.074 -0.119* 0.104 0.100 -0.286*" -0.187* -0.085 -0.122 
(1.961) (1.822) (2.607) (1.776) (0.924) (1.903) (1.164) (1.113) (2.738) (1.707) (0.875) . (1.487) 
South,West 0.227*** 0.225*** -0.370*** -0.323*" -0.207** -0.253*** 0.213*** 0.209*** -0.311*** -0.212** -0.201 -0.238** 
(4.154) (3.865). (4.457) (3.786) (2.119) (3.168) (3.238) (3.140) (2.970) (1 ~979) (1.611) (2.242) 
Table 5 continued on next page 
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Table 5 (concluded) : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, Highest education level attended 
Selection term 0.090* 0.090* -0.052 -0.052 -0.234*" -0.234*** 0.053 0.053 -0.118 -0.118 -0.213*** -0.213*** 
(1.652) (1.652) (0.773) (0.773) (6.409) (6.409) (0.718) (0.718) (1.538) (1.538) (4.779) (4.779) 
, 
Constant 4.679*- 4.681*** 4.864"* 4.817*** 4.448*** 4.494*- 4.792-* 4.795 .... 5.293*** 5.194*** 4.323*** 4.361-* 
(74.758) (72.234) (35.437) (33.399) (17.525) (18.587) (63.643) (63.392) (29.430) (27.777) (11.812) (12.352) 
Observations 9042 3351 1544 9042 3351 1544 
R-Squared 0.070 0.233 0.446 0.075 0.194 0.513 
(5)Note to Table 5: Workers of parastatal companies are included in the public sector. The reference group for education is those who have never at!ended school. The reference for the p'rovince category are 
respectively Douala for model (1) and Yaoundé model (2). The robust t-ratios are reported under parenthesis under each parameter estimate. " ", and, ... denote the parameter is statiscally different fr'om zero at 10%, 
50/0 and 1 % respec!ively. 
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Table 6 : Minc~rian hourly eamings equation, by sector, Scho~1 graduate (6) 
Trost and Lee (1984) 
Unweighted Estlmates Population-Weighted Estimates 
Informai Formai Informai Formai 
Private Public Private Public 
(1) (2) (1 ) (2) (1) (2) (1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) 
Labor market participant holds 
Primary school certificate , 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.121** 0.121** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.130* 0.130* 0.177 0.177 
(4.034) (4.034) (2.376) (2.376) (3.297) (3.297) (3.400) (3.400) (1.652) (1.652) (1.284) (1.284) 
First level sec. school Diploma 0.347*** 0.347*** 0.432*** 0.432*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.438*** 0.438*** 0.507*** 0.507*** 
(6.348) (6.348) (6.735) (6.735) (6.642) (6.642) (4.435) (4.435) (4,802) (4.802) (3.396) (3.396) 
Probatoire Diploma 0.608*** 0.608*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.788*** 0.788*** 0.637*** 0.637*** 0.525*** 0.525*** 0.596*** 0.596*** 
(5.579) (5.579) (6.414) (6.414) (6.943) (6.943) (4.841) (4.841) (4.617) (4.617) (3.748) (3.748) 
High school certificate 0.665*** 0.665***' 0.738*** 0.738*** 0.914*** 0.914*** 0.585*** 0.585*** 0.672*** 0.672*** 0.796*** 0.796*** 
(6.403) (6.403) (9.673) (9.673) (8.704) (8.704) (4.878) (4.878) (6.895) (6.895) (5.320) (5.320) 
Technical degree (BTS or DUT) 0.277* 0.277* 1.172*** 1.172*** 1.070*** 1.070*** 0.205 0.205 1.211*** 1.211*** 0.895*** 0.895*** 
(1.811) (1.811 ) (10.299) (10.299) (8.684) (8.684) (1.038) (1.038) (9.027) (9.027) (4.851 ) (4.851 ) 
Univ. degree (BA M.A and above) 1.303*** 1.303*** 1.490*** 1.490*** 1.344*** 1.344*** 1.321*** 1.321*** 1.453*** 1.453*** 1.247*** 1.247*** 
(7.054) (7.054) (16.028) (16.028) (12.442) (12.442) (6.304) (6.304) (12.135) (12.135) (8.363) (8.363) 
Potential experience 
Experience 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
(7.400) (7.400) (11.431) (11.431) (3.778) (3.778) (4.228) (4.228) (6.726) (6.726) (2.832) (2.832) 
Experience squared -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.059** -0.059** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.086* -0.086* 
(5.683) . (5.683) (6.678) (6.678) (2.175) (2.175) (2.964) (2.964) (3.892) (3.892) (1.958) (1.958) 
Gender and location 
Female -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.048 -0.048 -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.276*** -0.276*** -0.008 -0.008 
(9.671) (9.671 ) (3.283) (3.283) (1.361 ) (1.361 ) (7.746) (7.746) (4.502) (4.502) (0.156) (0.156) 
Urban 0.153*** 0.153*** -0.023 -0.023 0.069* 0.069* 0.070* 0.070* 0.013 0.013 0.169*** 0.169*** 
. (4.814) (4.814) (0.483) (0.483) (1.659) (1.659) (1.704) (1.704) (0.204) (0.204) (2.718) (2.718) 
Sector 
Commerce -0.026 -0.026 -0.062 -0.062 0.295 0.295 -0.012 -0.012 -0.192** -0.192** 0.643** 0.643** 
(0.825) (0.825) (0.955) (Q.955) (0.869) (0.869) (0.264) (0.264) (2.348) (2.348) (2.174) (2.174) 
Construction and transport 0.024 0.024 0.037 0.037 0.908*** 0.908*** 0.086 0.086 -0.075 -0.075 0.908*** 0.908*** 
(0.487) (0.487) (0.515) (0.515) (4.711) (4.711 ) (1.459) (1.459) (0.805) (0.805) (4.551 ) (4.551 ) 
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Table 6 (continued) : Mincerian hou~y eamings equation, by sector, School graduate 
M an ufactu ri ng 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.567*·· 0.567"· 0.088 0.088 -0.118 -0.118 0.449·" 0.449··· 
(1.110) (1.110) (0.754) (0.754) (4.115) (4.115) (1.271 ) (1.271) . (1.305) . . (1.305) (2.946) (2.946) 
Service -0.101" -0.101·· -0.103 -0.103 0.525··· 0.525"· -0.059 -0.059 -0.248··· -0.248··· 0.471··· 0.471··· 
(2.561 ) (2.561 ) (1.526) (1.526) (4.948) (4.948) (1.088) (1.088) (2.781 ) (2.781) (3.240) (3.240) 
Province 
Douala 0.018 -0.045 0.047 0.028 -0.088 0.038 
(0.341) (0.821) (0.675) (0.509) (1.526) (0.517) 
Yaounde -0.018 0.045 -0.047 -0.028 0.088 -0.038 
(0.341) (0.821) . (0.675) (0.509) (1.526) (0.517) 
Adamaoua 0.143·· 0.125·· -0.220··· -0.175·· -0.057 -0.104 0.129· 0.101 -0.340·" -0.252·· 0.030 -0.008 
(2.546) (2.126) (2.725) (2.067) (0.590) (1.260) (1.958) (1.521) (2.760) (2.005) (0.266) . (0.085) 
Centre -0.131·· -0.149··· -0.168·· -0:124 -0.050 -0.097 -0.335'" -0.363··· -0.408··· -0.320·· 0.015 -0.023 
(2.472) (2.679) (2.116) (1.510) (0.579) (1.371 ) (5.298) (5.749) (3.076) (2.413) (0.137) . (0.239) 
East -0.145·· -0.163··· 0.073 0.117 0.026 -0.022 -0.167*· -0.195"· 9·260·· 0.348"· 0.129 0.091 
(2.496) (2.686) (0.868) (1.356) (0.307) (0.330) (2.256) (2.621) (2.358) (3.111 ) (1.333) (1.157) 
Extreme North 0.092· 0.074 -0.124 -0.079 0.050 0.002 0.045 0.017 -0.132 -0.044 -0.115 -0.153 
(1.677) (1.281 ) (1.589) (0.926) (0.484) (0.027) (0.708) (0.266) (1.239) (0.391) (0.721) (1.012) 
Littoral -0.028 -0.045 -0.253··· -0.209"· -0.076 -0.123 -0.089 -0.117* -0.299··· -0.212·· -0.003 -0.041 
(0.496) (0.776) (3.382) (2.668) (0.786) (1.475) (1.450) (1.908) (3.670) (2.506) . (0.032) (0.461 ) 
North -0.039 -0.056 0.057 0.101 -0.032 -0.080 -0.112· -0.140" . 0.064 0.152 -0.082 -0.120 . 
(0.769) (1.061 ) (0.612) (1.082) (0.279) (0.765) . (1.881) (2.348) (0.523) (1.235) (0.547) (0.874) 
North West -0.394"· -0.411··· -0.779··· -0.734"· 0.049 0.001 -0.490··· -0.518·" -0.714··· -0.627··· 0.055 0.017 
(7.645) (7.603) (8.852) (8.182) (0.482) (0.014) (8.304) (8.801) (6.586) (5.731) (0.462) (0.155) 
West ·0.087* 0.070 -0.495··· -0.450"· 0.089 -0.136·· 0.032 0.004 -0.519··· -0.431·" 0.005 -0.032 
(1.778) (1.348) (6.410) (5.709) (1.067) (2.041 ) (0.569) (0.075) (6.094) (5.060) (0.057) (0.410) 
South 0.009 -0.009 -0.113· -0.069 -0.030 -0.077 -0.037 -0.065 -0.190· -0.102 -0.019 -0.056 
(0.144) (0.148) (1.666) (0.942) (0.396) (1.303) (0.441 ) (0.768) (1.823) (0.939) (0.194) (0.674) 
South West 0.298··· 0.280··· -0.411··· -0.366'" -0.283··· -0.331··· 0.275·" 0.247*·· -0.349·" -0.261" -0.301" -0.338··· 
(5.401 ) (4.851 ) (4.899) (4.290) (2.937) (4.048) (4.126) (3.710) (3.379) (2.506) (2.265) (2.824) 
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Table 6 (concluded) : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector,School graduate 
Selection term 
/ 0.054 0.054 -0.095 -0.095 -0.233*- -0.233*** 0.057 0.057 -0.118 -0.118 -0.241 *** -0.241*** 
(0.991 ) (0.991 ) (1.429) (1.429) (6.631) (6.631 ) (0.772) (0.772) (1.493) (1.493) (5.100) (5.100) 
Constant 
4.605*** 4.622*** 4.817*** 4.772*** 4.465*** 4.512*** 4.712*** 4.739*- 5.085*** 4.998*** 4.470*** 4.507*** 
(80.309) (77.982) (37.930) (35.330) (20.070) (21.425) (67.762) (68.639) (30.581) (28.648) (12.985) (13.645) 
Number of observation 
R-Squared 10133 3430 1552 ' 10133 3430 1552 
0.085 0.085 0.254 0.254 0.471 0.471 . 0.104 0.104 0.216 0.216 0.520 0.520 
(S)Note to Table 6: Workers of parastatal companies are included in the public sector. The reference group for education is thase who have never atlended school. The reference for the province category' are 
respectively Douala for model (1) and Yaoundé model (2). The first level of secondary school diploma corresponds to the BEPC, CAP or the GCE-O Level. High school certificate is either the Baccalaureat 
(French speaking ) or the CGE A level (English speaking). The The robust t-ratios are reported under parenthesis under each parameter estimate. " ", and, ... denote the parameter is statiscally different from zero at 
10%, 5% and 1 % respectively. 
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Table 7: Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, Highest education level attended, robustness check (7) 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgan (2004) Dahl (2002) 
Informai Formai Informai Formai 
Private Public Private Public 
(1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) (1) (2) (1 ) (2) (1) (2) (1 ) (2) 
Education 
Primary school 0.063** 0.063" -0.042 -0.042 -0.290 -0.290 0.072** 0.072*** -0.032 -0.032 0.223 0.223 
(2.139) (2.068) (0.613) (0.606) (0.751) (0.733) (2.548) (2.779) (0.478) (0.541) (0.898) (0.895) 
Secondary schoollevel 1 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.169* 0.169* -0.160 -0.160 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.192" 0.192*** 0.556" 0.556" 
(3.180) (3.294) (1.924) (1.958) (0.412) (0.398) (4.220) (4.492) (2.566) (2.699) (2.393) (2.314) 
Secondary schoollevel 2 0.468"* 0.468"* 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.120 0.120 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.439*" 0.439*** 0.889*" 0.889*** 
(6.141 ) (6.308) (4.115) (3.941) (0.314) (0.303) (8.010) (8.359) (5.527) (5.865) (3.835) (3.694) 
University 0.805"* 0.805"* 1.083*" 1.083*** 0.491 0.491 0.863*" 0.863*** 1.145*** 1.145*** 1.329*** 1.329"* 
(5.945) (6.207) (8.518) (8.209) (1.241 ) (1.197) (7.845) (7.337) (13.488) (13.883) (5.657) (5.506) 
Vocational school level 1 0.225"* 0.225"* 0.083 0.083 -0.183 -0.183 0.244*" 0.244*** 0.119 0.119 0.456* 0.456* 
(3.726) (3.746) (0.930) (0.877) (0.487) (0.469) (4.518) (4.965) (1.344) (1.498) (1.892) (1.829) 
Vocational school level 2 0.582"* 0.582*** 0.433*" 0.433"* 0.032 0.032 0.605*** 0.605"* 0.467*** 0.467*** 0.792*** 0.792"* 
(4.980) (5.202) (3.492) (3.485) (0.081) (0.078) (5.865) (6.032) (4.705) (5.026) (3.323) (3.153) 
Potential experience 
Experience 0.013"* 0.013*** 0.039"* 0.039*" 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.017*" 0.017*** 0.051*" 0.051*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
(4.931) (5.261 ) (7.642) (7.449) (3.470) (3.374) (7.632) (7.800) (11.206) (11.928) (5.946) (5.872) 
Experience squared -0.016*** -0.016*" -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.067" -0.067* -0.022*** -0.022"* -0.060*" -0.060*** -0.119*** -0.119*** 
(3.700) (4.057) (4.728) (4.571) (1.969) (1.921 ) (5.300) (5.366) (6.503) (7.194) (3.664) (3.648) 
Gender and location 
Female -0.181*** -0.181*" -0.091 -0.091* -0.1 09~ -0.109* -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.195*" -0.195*** -0.034 -0.034 
(6.127) (5.892) (1.552) (1.663) (1.917) (1.942) (11.025) (10.734) (5.023) (4.638) (0.828) (0.873) 
Urban 0.078" 0.078" -0.063 -0.063 0.093* 0.093* 0.101*** 0.101*** -0.005 -0.005 0.060 0.060 
(2.335) (2.362) (1.302) (1.366) (1.927) (1.780) (3.498) (3.718) (0.131 ) (0.133) (1.312) (1.361 ) 
Sector lal 
Commerce -0.072** -0.072** -0.119* -0.119* 0.000 0.000 -0.080*" -0.080*** -0.122** -0.122* 0.000 0.000 
(2.157) (2.309) (1.677) (1.721) (.) (.) (2.666) (2.751) (1.987) (1.824) (.) (.) 
Construction and transport -0.092* -0.092* -0.010 -0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.094* -0.094" -0.007 -0.007 0.000 0.000 
(1.941 ) (1.898) (0.126) (0.130) (.) (.) (1.901 ) (2.185) (0.106) (0.101 ) (. ) (.) 
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Table 7 (continued) : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, Hjghest education level attended, robustness check 
Manufacturing 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.000 
(0.409) . (0.398) (0.167) (0.173) (.) (.) (0.280) (0.273) (0.193) (0.189) (. ) (.) 
Service -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.116 -0.116* 0.000 0.000 -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.128** -0.128* 0.000 0.000 
(3.608) (3.689) (1;572) . (1.666) (.) (.) (4.375) (4.314) (1.962) (1.956) (.) (.) 
Province 
Douala 0.025 0.082 -0.053 0.005 0.054 -0.137 
(0.477) (1.402) (0.562) (0.102) (0.964) (1.569) 
Yaounde -0.025 -0.082 0.053 -0.005 -0.054 0.137 
(0.510) (1.433) (0.548) (0.107) (0.979) (1.620) 
Adamaoua 0.099 0.124* -0.351 *** -0.268*** -0.222 -0.276** 0.168*** 0.173*** -0.237*** -0.183** -0.014 -0.151* 
(1.349) (1.816) (3.725) (2.958) (1.414) (2.106) (3.062) (2.917) (3.048) (2.219) (0.125) (1.752) 
Centre -0.043 -0.018 -0.181** -0.099 -0.139 -0.192** -0.025 "0.020 -0.145* -0.091 -0.076 -0.213*** 
(0.806) (0.302) (2.230) (1.157) (1.196) (2.117) (0.496) (0.373) (1.882) (1.131 ) (0.730) (2.685) 
East -0.001 0.024 0.018 0.100 -0.152 -0.206** 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.065 0.043 -0.094 
(0.020) (0.372) (0.209) (1.136) (1.243) (2.491 ) (0.062) (0.149) (0.132) (0.739) (0.432) (1.375) 
Extreme North -0.051 -0.026 -0.361*** -0.278*** -0.132 -0.186 0.040 0.046 -0.163** -0.110 0.056 -0.081 
(0.882) (0.425) (4.175) (3.148) (0.937) (1.602) (0.783) (0.859) (2.316) (1.498) (0.457) (0.822) 
Littoral 0.038 0.063 -0.335*** -0.253*** -0.214 -0.267** 0.049 0.054 -0.318*** -0.264*** -0.107 -0.244*** 
(0.652) (1.054) (4.210) (3.136) . (1.614) (2.439) (0.859) (0.900) (4.170) (3.173) (0.915) (2.682) 
North -0.286*** -0.261 *** -0.240** -0.158 0.091 0.038 -0.156*** -0.150*** . -0.051 0.003 0.005 -0.132 
(4.672) (4.027) (2.202) (1.406) (0.571) (0.296) (3.007) (2.766) (0.583) (0.032) (0.037) (1.163) 
North West -0.205*** -0.180*** -0.640*** -0.558*** 0.060 0.007 -0.221 *** -0.216*** . -0.688*** -0.634*** 0.203* 0.066 
(4.030) (3.313) (6.955) (6.090) (0.459) (0.068) (4.358) (4.014) (8.064) (6.990) (1.784) (0.728) 
West -0.058 -0.032 -0.599*** -0.517*** -0.106 -0.160 0.011 0.016 -0.506*** -0.452*** -0.002 -0.139* 
(1.170) (0.587) (6.675) (6.278) (0.839) (1.619) (0.219) (0.298) (6.760) (5.876) (0.023) (1.776) 
South' 0.111 * 0.136** -0.181*** -0.099 -0.184* -0.237*** 0.111 * 0.117** -0.171** -0.117 -0.069 -0.206*** 
(1,889) (2.199) (2.681) (1.369) (1.709) (2.941 ) (1.909) (1.961) (2.389) (1.552) (0.763) (3.066) 
South West 0.122** 0.148** -0.549*** -0.467*** 0.283 0.229 0.222*** 0.227*** -0.380*** -0.326*** -0.018 -0.154 
(1.964) (2.198) (4.378) (3.801 ) . (1.315) (1.070) (3.901) (3.906) (4.713) (3.661 ) (0.157) (1.633) 
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Tabl.e 7 (concluded) : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, Highest education level attended, robustness check 
Selection term 
Selection term 0 0.455** 0.455** 0.877*** 0.877*** -0.591 ** -0.591* 
(2.230) (2.233) (3.896) (3.910) (2.077) (1.902) .. 
Selection term 1 -0.043 -0.043 -0.090 -0.090 0.582 0.582 
(0.357) (0.359) (0.295) (0.291) (1.587) (1.495) 
Selection term 2 -0.019 -0.019 -0.039 -0.039 -0.266 -0.266 
(0.068) (0.075) (0.348) (0.372) (0.848) (0.877) 
Selection term 3 ~0.203 -0.203 -0.050 -0.050 -0.318*** -0.318*** 
(0.544) (0.544) (0.149) (0.153) (2.863) (2.618) 
Constant 4.953*** 4.928*** 5.259*** 5.177*** 5.587*** . 5.640*** 4.711*** 4.706*** 4.794*** 4.740*** 4.098*** 4.235*** 
(44.535) (43.732) (22.746) (21.459) (11.650) . (11.156) (77.976) (76.594) (48.219) (45.830) (15.188) (15.967) 
(7) Note to Table 7: Workers of parastatal companies are included in the public sector. The referenc~ group for education is those who have never atlended scheol. The reference for the province category are Douala 
for model (1) and Yaoundé for model (2). The robust t-ratios are reported under parenthesis under each parameter estimate. " ", and, ••• denote the parameter is statiscally different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1 % lever 
respectively. (a) indicates these variables were dropped to solve for multicolinearity problem coming with this method. 
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Table 8: Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, School graduate, robustness check (8) 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgan (2004) Dahl (2002) 
Informai Formai Informai Formai 
Private Public Private Public 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1 ) (2) 
Education -
Primary school certificate 0.110··· 0.110··· 0.098· 0.098· 0.256·· 0.256·· 0.112-· 0.112-· 0.142··· 0.142··· 0.432··· 0.432-· 
(3.926) (3.906) (1.778) (1.742) (2.297) (2.340) (4.312) (4.359) (2.978) (3.030) (4.060) (4.297) 
First level sec. school diploma 0.353··· 0.353··· 0.386··· 0.386·- 0.586·- 0.586··· 0.364··· 0.364·- 0.467*·· 0.467*" 0.855··· 0.855··· 
(5.621) (6.046) (5.002) (5.132) (4.966) (5.062) (7.142) (7.488) (7.718) (7.881 ) (8.153) (8.549) 
Probatoire diploma 0.619-· 0.619··· 0.518··· 0.518··· 0.706-· 0.706··· 0.638··· 0.638··· 0.601··· 0.601··· 0.984··· 0.984··· 
(5.507) (5.602) (5.422) (5.416) (5.399) (5.535) .. (6.359) (6.444) (7.794) (7.764) (8.538) (8.922) 
High school certificate . 0.680-· 0.680··· 0.668··· 0.668-· 0.810-· 0.810··· 0.707*·· 0.707*·· 0.792··· 0.792"· 1.093··· 1.093··· 
(6.349) (6.309) (7.226) (7.233) (6.359) (6.575) (7.151 ) (6.958) (12.071 ) (12.833) (10.021) (10.667) 
Technical degree(BTS or DUT) 0.299· 0.299· 1.090··· 1.090-· 0.936-· 0.936··· 0.354·· 0.354··· 1.239"· 1.239'" 1.263··· 1.263-· 
(1.810) (1.896) (7.657) (7.656) (6.290) (6.184) (2.492) (2.659) (11.718) (11.493) (9.734) (10.439) 
University (BA, BSc. and above) 1.340··· 1.340··· 1.385··· 1.385·- 1.226'" 1.226··· 1.362"· 1.362·- 1.524··· 1.524··· 1.547*·· 1.547*·· 
(6.819) (6.910) (11.578) (11.149) (9.352) (9.637) (7.469) (7.286) (17.460) (17.371 ) (13.938) (14.600) 
Potential experience 
Experience 0.013··· 0.013··· 0.037*·· 0.037'" 0.047'" 0.047*·· 0.016··· 0.016··· 0.049··· 0.049"· 0.080··· 0.080··· 
(5.234) (5.263). (7.605) (7.742) (3.624) (3.387) (7.266) (7.305) (11.045) (11.686) (7.443) (7.198) 
Experience squared -0.019··· -0.01 Q ••• -0.042··· -0.042··· -0.055- -0.055· -0.023··· -0.023·- -0.059-· -0.059·" -0.108··· -0.108··· 
(4.432) (4.525) (4.536) (4.579) (2.059) (1.881 ) (5.646) (5.618) (6.579) (6.980) (4.451 ) (4.365) 
Gender and location 
Female -0.213··· -0.213··· -0.082 -0.082 -0.015 -0.015 -0.237*·· -0.237*·· -0.197*- -0.197*·· -0.073·· -0.073·· 
(7.174) (6.934) (1.472) (1.452) (0.330) (0.350) (11.736) (11.848) (4.832) (5.031 ) (2.087) (2.044) 
Urban 0.169-· 0.169··· -0.013 -0.013 0.029 0.029 0.164··· 0.164··· 0.010 0.010 0.042 0.042 
\ (5.166) (4.982) (0.276) (0.282) (0.668) (0.633) (5.203) (5.782) (0.232) (0.238) (0.970) (0.979) 
Sector\31 
Commerce -0.022 -0.022 -0.073 -0.073 0.222 0.222 -0.028 -0.028 -0.065 -0.065 0.046 0.046 
(0.689) (0.729) . (1.135) (1.119) (0.545) (0.576) (0.895) (0.885) (1.054) (1.013) (0.107) (0.113) 
Construction and transport 0.031 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.861-· 0.861··· 0.032 0.032 0.043 0.043 0.815··· 0.815··· 
(0.617) (0.636) (0.312) (0:324) (4.379) (4.403) (0.695) (0.688) (0.623) (0.608) (4.452) (4.313) 
Table 8 continues on next page 
109 
Table 8 (continued) : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, by sector, School graduate, robustness check 
Manufacturing 0.053 0.053 0.037 0.037 0.540*** 0.540*** 0.049 0.049 0.056 0.056 0.526*** 0.526*** 
(1.163) (1.130) (0.510) (0.541) (3.889) (3.969) (1.103) (1.073) (0.809) (0.839) (4.001 ) (3.754) 
Service -0.086** cO.086** -0.102 -0.102 0.493*- 0.493*** -0.096** -0.096** -0.097 -0.097 0.601*** 0.601*** 
(2.092) (2.257) (1.412) (1.543) (4.641) (4.769) (2.404) (2.540) (1.425) (1.375) (5.766) (5.522) 
Province 
Douala 0.001 -0.082 0.062 0.011 -0.059 0.106 
(0.016) (1.511) (0.831 ) (0.212) (1.065) (1.502) 
Yaounde -0.001 0.082 -0.062 -0.011 0.059 -0.106 
(0.016) (1.462) (0.888) (0.237) (1.172) (1.442) 
Adamaoua 0.090 0.089 -0.344*** -0.261 *** -0.070 -0.131 0.140*** 0.129- -0.215** -0.157** -0.027 -0.134 
(1.511) (1.457) (3.905) (3.062) (0.654) (1.550) (2.586) (2.176) (2.496) (1.967) (0.275) (1.626) 
Centre -0.171 *** -0.172*** -0.262*** -0.179** . -0.041 -0.103 -0.144*- -0.155*- -0.199*** -0.141* -0.069 -0.175** 
(3.180) (3.262) (3.205) (2.094) (0.421 ) ( 1.417) (2.742) (2.841 ) (2.644) (1.748) (0.749) (2.488) 
East -0.178*** -0.178*** ·0.007 0.089 0.015 -0.047 -0.155*- -0.166*** 0.059 0.117 0.079 -0.027 
(3.061) (2.856) (0.081 ) (.1.004) (0.164) (0.711 ) (2.599) (2.609) (0.665) (1.415) (0.992) (0.400) 
Extreme North 0.069 0.068 -0.249*** ·-0.167** -0.025 -0.086 0.114** 0.102- -0.069 -0.010 0.071 -0.036 
(1.221) (1.156) (2.973) (2.028) (0.221) (0.890) (2.250) (2.021) (0.990) (0.136) (0.683) (0.407) 
Littoral -0.060 -0.061 -0.311*** -0.229*** -0.053 -0.114 -0.039 -0.051 -0.269*** -0.210*** -0.050 -0.156* 
(1.007) (1.077) (3.826) (2.921) (0.499) (1.261 ) (0.694) (0.865) (3.463) (2.746) (0.506) (1.747) 
North -0.106* -0.107* -0.082 0.001 0.006 -0.056 -0.054 -0.065 0.014 0.072 0.017 -0.089 
(1.926) (1.920) (0.821) (0.006) (0.045) (~.576) (1.075) (1.251) (0.155) (0.796) (0.155) (0.834) 
North West -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.789-* -0.707*** 0.064 0.002 -0.405*- -0.417*- -0.805*** -0.746*** 0.065 -0.041 
(7.901) (7.570) (8.419) (7.697) (0.610) (0.025) (7.861 ) (7.636) (9.045) (8.364) (0.601) (0.451 ) 
West 0.046 0.045 -0.566*** -0.483*** -0.080 -0.142** 0.073 0.061 -0.531 *** -0.473*** -0.077 -0.183** 
(0.898) (0.876) (6.874) (5.971) (0.864) (2.103) (1.483) (1.211) (6.891) (6.211 ) (0.928) (2.406) 
South -0.007 -0.008 -0.145** , -0.063 -0.084 -0.146** 0.001 -0.011 -0.109 -0.050 -0.049 -0.156** 
(0.126) (0.137) (1.975) (0.900) (1.015) (2.437) (0.009) (0.179) (1.589) (0.711 ) (0.654) (2.558) 
South West 0.251 *** 0.250-* -0.542*** -0.460*** -0.240** -0.302*** 0.291*~* 0.280-* -0.436*** -0.377*** -0.199** -0.305*** 
(4.350) (4.309) (5.503) (5.294) (2.328) (3.825) (5.169) (4.753) (5.284) (4.496) (2.049) (3.736) 
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Table 8 (conëluded) : Mincerian hourly eamings equation, bysector, School graduate, robustness. check 
Selection term 
-J 
Selection term 0 0.334·· 0.334*** 0.622*** 0.622*** 0.172 0.172 
(2.554) (2.576) (3.202) (3.511 ) (0.657) (0.611 ) 
Selection term 1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.090 -0.090 0.695·* 0.695** 
(0.064) (0.068) (0.333) (0.335) (2.077) (2.162) 
Selection term 2 -0.051 -0.051 -0.158* -0.158* 0.055 0.055 
(0.262) (0.261) (1.850) (1.855) (0.275) (0.274) 
Selection term 3 -0.174 -0.174 -0.362 -0.362 -0.069 -0.069 
(0.737) (0.784) (1.149) . (1.182) (0.701) (0.747) 
Selection term 4 
, 
Constant 4.740*** 4.741*** 5.139*" 5.057*** 4.642*·· 4.704*" 4.630'" 4.641·** 4.689*** 4.630*- 3.644*- 3.750**· . 
(55.521) (57.205) (25.457) (25.128) (19.170) (19.537) (82.123) (81.392) (52.714) (51.403) . (21.374) (21.444) 
(8) Note to Table 8: Workers of parastatal companies are included in the public sector. The reference group for education is those w~o have never atlended school. The reference for the province category are 
Douala for model (1) and Yaoundé for model (2). The robust t-ratios are reported under parenthesis under each parameter estimate .• , •• , and, ... denote the parameter is statiscally dilferent from zero at 10%, 5% and 
1 % level respectively. (a). indicates these variables were automatically dropped to solve for multicolinearity problem coming with this method. The .first level of secondary diploma corresponds to the BEPC, CAP or 
the GCE-O Level. High school certificate is either the Baccalaureat (French speaking) or the GCE Advanced level (English speaking). 
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Concl usion ·générale 
Un des postulats fondamentaux du cadre néo-classique est que l'homo oeconomicus, I.e., 
l'agent doté d'une rationalité illimitée ou substantielle optimise ses choix en s'orientant en tout 
temps vers l'utilité espérée la plus élevée. Deux éssais de cette thèse ont cependant démontré que 
la présence de normes sociales dans la plupart des environnements sous développés peut faire en 
sorte qu'y être néoclassique ne soit pas nécessairement rationnel. Dans un troisième essai, nous 
avons montré que la rém~nération du capital humain dans bon nombre de pays en développement 
est significativement différente de celle qui est très souvent observée dans beaucoup de pays riches. 
Le premier chapitre avait deux objectifs importants. Le premier était d'explorer les im-
plications pour le choix par les femmes de l'activité économique et de la demande de capital, 
de l'interaction entre les facteurs économiques et sociaux. L'accès au crédit à des conditions avan-
tageuses et l'absence de légalité étaient les principaux facteurs économiques sous-tendant la décision 
des femmes d'entreprendre des activités économiques dans notre modèle, alors que la prédominance 
dans l'économie informelle de formes patriarcales de régulation des affaires caractérisait le contexte 
social régissant cette décision. Le second objectif consistait à dégager les conditions nécessaires et 
suffisantes pour que les services de microfinance généralement offerts aux femmes contribuent à la 
consolidation de leur émancipation socioéconomique. Nous nous sommes inspiré de la ·littérature 
existante pour supposer que les revenus gagnés par les entrepreneures représentaient le facteur le 
plus décisif pour leur émancipation. Pour atteindre nos objectifs, nous avons construit un modèle 
compor~ant un-jeu super modulaire de choix d'activités économiques entre des entrepreneures ho-
mogènes ex ante. Nous avons démontré que ce jeu admet deux équilibres de Nash tous symétriques 
en stratégies pures et ordonnées au sens de Pareto. Nous avons aussi montré que l'équilibre où 
toutes les femmes choisissent d'opérer des activités économiques à haute productivité dans le secteur 
informel avait plus d'impact sur leur émancipation, et était par conséquent préféré à celui où les 
. femmes choisissaient toutes de rester confinées dans des activités moins lucratives (ou à faible pro-
ductivité). En raison de cette multiplicité d'équilibres, nous avons conclu que l'accès au crédit bien 
qu'étant nécessaire, ne constituait pas une condition suffisante pour faire de l'émancipation des 
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femmes une réalité de tous les jours. Nous avons montré que les échecs de coordination dans les 
choix d'activités par les femmes pouvaient empêcher ces dernières de créer des réseaux d'affaires 
assez grands pour atténuer les formes patriarcales de régulation d'affaires qui les désavantagent 
comparativement aux hommes, lorsque vient le temps d'opérer des activités plus lucratives. Nous 
avons démontré qu'une condition suffisante à la consolidation de l'émancipation des femmes via les 
services de microfinance serait que les institutions de microfinance assujettissent l'accès des femmes 
au crédit à leur adoption d'activités économiques informelles plus productives. A notre sens, une 
telle conditionnalité pourrait aider les organisations de micro finance à organiser ces femmes dans 
des réseaux d'affaires (les coopératives sont un exemple) assez grands pour atténuer les pratiques 
patriarcales q!li accroissent considérablement les coût d'opération d'activités à haute productivité 
dans l'économie informelle lorsqu'on est une femme. Finalement, le premier chapitre a démontré 
l'importance de la prise en compte du contexte socioculturel dans l'implémentation des projets de 
développement ciblant spécifiquement les femmes vivant dans les environnements sous développés. 
Le deuxième chapitre visait lui aussi deux objectifs principaux. Le premier était de démontrer 
comment les normes sociales pouvaient influencer les décisions de modernisation des exploitations 
agricoles (ou fermes) en Afrique Subsaharienne. Le contexte socioculturel que nous avons considéré 
met l'accent sur la prédominance dans les communautés rurales africaines des traditions de solidarité 
et de générosité 'qui obligent individus à partager leurs avoirs avec les autres membres de 
leur communauté. Comme conséquence, les personnes ayant l'esprit d'entreprise et le souci d' 
innovation dans leurs activités font inévitablement face à des problèmes de contrôle total de leurs 
actifs financiers et non financiers. Le deuxième but était de proposer des conditions nécessaires et 
suffisantes pour que les fermiers modernisent leurs pratiques agricoles dans un tel contexte. Dans 
ce chapitre, nous avons également pris en compte le fait que l'environnement africain, excepté les 
pays déchirés par la guerre, procure des opportunités économiques poteritiellement profitables aux 
propriétaires de petites exploitations agricoles, qui, selon les théoriciens néo-Boserupiens jouent un 
rôle de premier plan dans la décision d'introduii:e des innovations technologiques dans l'agriculture. 
Pour atteindre ces deux buts, nous avons utilisé un cadre de théorie de jeux comprenant un jeu 
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non coopératif de décision de modernisation des activités agricoles entre des fermiers propriétaires 
et homogènes en début de période. Nous avons démontré que ce jeu admet deux équilibres de 
Nash en stratégies pures, symétriques et ordonn_és au sens de Pareto. L'équilibre où tous les 
fermiers choisissent de moderniser leurs techniques agricoles est préférée à celui où tous choisissent 
le statut quo, i.e., rejettent les innovations agricoles. En raison de la multiplicité d'équilibres, nous 
avons conclu que les politiques publiques peuvent jouer un rôle significatif dans la modernisation 
des activités agricoles en Afrique Subsaharienne, au delà de ce qui est prescrit par les théories néo-
Boserupiennes d'innovation induite. En d'autres termes, la pénurie et les opportunités économiques 
pour les fermiers, qui ont été mises en avant par les agroéconomistes néo-Boserupiens comme les 
facteurs les plus déterminants de l'adoption des innovations technologiques dans l'agriculture, sont, 
dans le contexte de l'Afrique Subsaharienne nécessaires mais pas suffisante à la modernisation 
des pratiques agricoles. Nous avons démontré en effet que les échecs de coordination dans les 
décisions de modernisation des exploitations agricoles peuvent empêcher les fermiers de résister 
aux obligations traditionnelles de solidarité et de partage qui freinent leurs efforts de constitution 
d'épargne productive .. Nous avons montré que l'obtention de conditions nécessaires et suffisantes 
dans le contexte de l'Afrique Subsaharienne passe par l'ajout aux pré requis néo-Boserupiens d'une 
technologie sécuritaire d'épargne à la Duflo (2006). A notre sens, une telle technologie d'épargne 
peut aider à atténuer les pressions sociales qui empêchent les propriétaires de petites exploitations 
en Afrique Subsaharienne de constituer une épargne nécessaire à l'achat d'engrais. 
Dans le troisième chapitre de notre thèse, nous avons contribué à la littérature empirique 
sur les retours à l'éducation en utilisant l'enquête camerounaise auprès des ménages (effectuée en 
2001) pour estimer les taux de rendement privés à l'éducation (TDRE). Nous avons permis aux 
TDRE de différer par niveau d'éducation et par secteur d'emploi - formel (public ou privé) ou 
informel- et nous avons tenu compte du biais provenant de la sélection du secteur d'activité par 
les différents participants au marché du travail. Nous avons comparé les TDRE de personnes qui 
ont fréquenté un cycle d'éducation avec ceux d'individus ayant reçu un diplôme dudit'cycle. Nos 
estimations ont démontré l'importance d'utiliser des échantillons représentatifs de la populationdans 
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l'estimation des TDRE qui sont valides pour la population toute entière. Comme résultats, nous 
avons obtenu des hautement convexes dans tous les secteurs d'activité. Nous avons aussi 
montré que les individus qui sont uniquement allés à l'école primaire sans y avoir reçu de diplôme 
n'enregistrent aucun retour à l'éducation quelque soit le secteur d'emploi. Cependant, les retours 
pour les diplômés de l'école primaire sont positifs et statistiquement significatifs. Nos résultats 
ont révélé des très élevés pour les participants au marché du travail qui ont fréquenté 
l'université ainsi que pour ceux qui y ont reçu un diplôme. La convexité et le niveau élevé des taux 
de rendement à l'éducation que nous avons obtenu pour le Cameroun sont conformes aux résultats 
récents issus de beaucoup d'autres pays africains au sud du Sahara.De plus, les autres déterminants 
socioéconomiques des revenus que nous avons mis en lumière dans cet essai sont en droite ligne avec 
la littérature empirique. En nous basant sur nos résultats, nous avons prescrit un certain nombre· 
de politique publiques. Premièrement, sous l'hypothèse que la qualité de l'enseignement ne change 
pas au Cameroun, nous avons recommandé que les pouvoirs publics incitent les élèves à graduer 
à l'école primaire et à continuer leurs études dans les autres cycles d'éducation. Deuxièmement, 
les autorités publiques doivent aussi allouer des transferts financiers aux familles les plus pauvres 
afin de leur permettre d'envoyer leurs enfants à l'école pour que ces dernier puissent profitent des 
retombées positives d'une telle décision. 
